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Three Papers on the Black-White Mobility Gap in the United States 
 
Liana E. Fox 
Paper 1/Chapter 2: Missing at Random? An Analysis of the Effect of Sample Selection on 
Intergenerational Earnings Elasticities by Race 
Utilizing the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, I assess the effect of sample selection 
bias on estimates of intergenerational earnings elasticities for white and black father-son pairs, 
regressing log child earnings on log parent earnings. Estimating four increasingly less selected 
models, I assess the robustness of estimates to alternative methods of handling sons who are 
missing data due to periods of unemployment or part-time employment. The results indicate that 
the assumption of exogenous selection into full-time employment significantly biases the 
estimates for blacks, although it does not have a large impact on estimates for whites. As a 
consequence, selection bias will understate the magnitude of the black-white mobility gap. The 
results also indicate that two methods substantially mitigate this selection bias: having a long 
panel, or imputing data in a short panel.  
Paper 2/Chapter 3: Measuring the Black-White Mobility Gap: A Comparison of Datasets and 
Methods 
Chapter 3 utilizes both the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) and the Panel 
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) to analyze the magnitude and nature of black-white gaps in 
intergenerational earnings and income mobility in the United States. This chapter finds that 
relying on different datasets or measures will lead to different conclusions about the relative 
magnitudes of black versus white elasticities and correlations, but using directional mobility 
matrices consistently reveals a sizable mobility gap between black and white families, with low-
 
 
income black families disproportionately trapped at the bottom of the income distribution and 
more advantaged black children more likely to lose that advantage in adulthood than similarly 
situated white children. I find the family income analyses to be most consistent and estimate the 
upward mobility gap as between 19.1 and 20.3 percentage points and the downward gap between 
-20.9 and -21.0. Additionally, I find that racial disparities are much greater among sons than 
daughters and that incarceration and being raised in a female-headed household have much 
larger impacts on the mobility prospects of blacks than whites. 
Paper 3/Chapter 4: Can Parental Wealth Explain the Black-White Mobility Gap? 
Utilizing longitudinal data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), this 
chapter examines the relationship between parental wealth and intergenerational income mobility 
for black and white families. I find that total parental wealth promotes upward mobility for low-
income white families, but does not protect against downward mobility for white families from 
the top half of the income distribution. Conversely, I find that total parental wealth does not 
assist low-income black families while home ownership may have negative associations with the 
likelihood of upward mobility for these families. However, for black families from the top half 
of the income distribution home equity is protective against downward mobility suggesting a 
heterogeneous relationship between home ownership and mobility for black families. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
The United States is often described as the land of opportunity. However, with the 
dramatic increase in income inequality since the 1970s, the equality of this opportunity has been 
called into question. As a society, we are willing to tolerate inequality as long as there is fairness 
and opportunity for all individuals to succeed, regardless of family background. However, recent 
analyses (Hertz 2007; Isaacs 2008) find that opportunity may not apply equally to all citizens. 
While the black-white male wage gap has closed considerably since passage of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, black families are more likely to remain poor and experience relative (and often 
absolute) declines in income position from one generation to the next compared with white 
families. From a social welfare perspective, this means that an extra dollar of income does not 
guarantee the same level of long-run economic success for black families as white families. 
Research focusing on black-white economic disparities has found a narrowing of the male wage 
gap from 50% in 1967 to 27% in 1998 (Couch and Daly 2002), while the family income gap has 
closed considerably less, with median black family income comprising 59% of the median white 
family income in 1967 and 62% in 2007 (Mishel, Bernstein and Shierholz 2009). These 
comparisons highlight the importance of examining both individual earnings and family income 
to get a complete portrait of relative economic well-being and opportunity.  
One measure of opportunity in society is intergenerational mobility, which can be 
measured by examining the relationship between children’s income or earnings with respect to 
the same measure for their parents. This relationship can be quantified by estimating the 
elasticity or correlation or by predicting the likelihood of directional mobility between two 
generations. Higher elasticities indicate greater similarity between outcomes for children and 





intergenerational transmission of economic well-being would be the comparison of parental 
family income to child family income, it also conflates trends and disparities in employment and 
family structure. However, examining only earnings results in a selected sample that may not be 
representative of the total population. Therefore, deciding when to examine intergenerational 
persistence in family income versus individual earnings represents a tradeoff between a more 
inclusive measure and population and a better-defined mechanism structure. This dissertation 
explores several methodological issues in estimating the magnitude of these disparities, as well 
as examines the role of wealth in explaining the black-white mobility gap. 
Chapter 2 utilizes the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) to provide new estimates 
of intergenerational earnings elasticities for white and black father-son pairs estimated using the 
traditional methodology of regressing log child earnings on log parent earnings. This chapter 
pays special attention to the impact of sample selection (i.e. excluding unemployed or part-time 
employed sons from the sample) on intergenerational mobility estimates. I generate predicted 
estimates of son’s potential earnings (as actual earnings have been censored due to either 
unemployment or underemployment) and then perform a bounding exercise to examine the range 
of estimates.  
Chapter 3 expands on Chapter 2 by comprehensively examining family income mobility 
in addition to earnings mobility. The more inclusive measure of family income extends the 
previous analysis of father-son earnings to include all sources of economic well-being and also 
allows for the examination of individuals from otherwise excluded family structures such as 
female-headed households. This chapter utilizes both the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 
(NLSY) and the Panel Study on Income Dynamics (PSID) datasets as well as multiple methods 





to quantify the magnitude and nature of the black-white family income mobility gap in the 
United States. It also tests the sensitivity of results to incarceration and family structure. 
Chapter 4 builds off of methodological advances discussed in the previous two chapters 
in an effort to explain the mobility gap by examining the relationship between parental wealth 
and intergenerational income mobility for black and white families. Utilizing the PSID Wealth 
Supplements, I estimate how parental wealth impacts children’s directional income mobility for 
black and white families and explore differences in this impact by asset type. I also perform a 
decomposition analysis to investigate the role of wealth/capital accumulation in explaining the 
economic mobility gap. 
Finally, Chapter 5 provides a summary of the main results from Chapters 2-4 and 
discusses implications for policy and social work practice. While the individual chapters cover 
slightly different years and cohorts, with parental resources measured in 1968-82 in Chapter 2, 
1979-81 in Chapter 3 and 1984-89 in Chapter 4, and child resources measured in 1997-2009 in 
each chapter, an attempt is made to compare results across chapters. Areas of future research are 
also highlighted.  
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CHAPTER 2: MISSING AT RANDOM? AN ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECT OF SAMPLE 
SELECTION ON INTERGENERATIONAL EARNINGS ELASTICITIES BY RACE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Intergenerational mobility is an important measure of social equality and opportunity in a 
country. Higher mobility signals more potential for individuals to prosper or fail based on 
individual effort or attributes, while lower mobility signals a system where status is primarily 
based on family background. Economists and sociologists have been attempting to measure 
intergenerational mobility for decades, but new methods continue to challenge previous findings 
(Solon 1999; Black & Devereux 2010). Previous research has highlighted the importance of 
using permanent income measures rather than single-year income measures (Grawe 2006; Haider 
& Solon 2006). Similarly, due to life-cycle variation in income, the age at which income is 
observed matters quite a bit, and ideally should be measured from both generations while they 
are in their 30s-40s (Solon 1999; Black & Devereux 2010) and age-adjusted to account for age 
differences within a sample (Solon 1992; Bratberg et al 2007). Additionally, more recent work 
has focused on non-linearities in mobility, with both the lowest and highest income families 
experiencing a greater deal of ―stickiness‖ than do middle income families (Hertz 2005; Grawe 
2004; Eide & Showalter 1999). 
While all these potential sources of bias have been corrected for in recent research, there 
still exists one potentially serious concern: sample selection bias. Typically, intergenerational 
mobility is measured by estimating the elasticity between parents’ income or earnings and the 
same measure for their children. Higher elasticities (i.e. closer to 1) indicate greater reliance on 
parents’ income and therefore lower mobility (the direction of mobility—upward or 





intergenerational elasticity it is common to exclude unemployed and part-time employed 
children (or individuals who report no income or earnings) from the sample with the assumption 
of exogenous selection into full-time employment. However, evidence suggests that sons from 
lower income families may have a weaker attachment to the labor force and therefore lower 
mobility, so excluding individuals with perhaps the highest elasticities introduces a downward 
bias to the current intergenerational elasticity estimates. A few papers have examined selection 
bias in the intergenerational mobility literature and found it to be a problem (Couch & Lillard 
1998; Minicozzi 2003; Francesconi & Nicoletti 2006). However, this literature has not examined 
the effect of selection bias on estimates of how mobility differs by race. This is a potentially 
serious omission given that the extent of bias associated with missing employment data is likely 
to be much more severe for blacks than for whites, given their lower adult employment rates.  
This chapter therefore provides new estimates of intergenerational elasticities for blacks 
and whites explicitly taking into account the effect of selection bias. To that end, I examine the 
impact of four alternative approaches to missing data on sons’ earnings. The first model follows 
the standard assumption of ―exogenous‖ selection into full-time employment, restricting the 
sample to sons who were employed full-time at age 35/36 and 37/38. The second model reduces 
missing data by imputing a predicted value of sons’ earnings for individuals with earnings 
censored by part-time employment or unemployment. The third model  also reduces missing data 
by utilizing upper and lower bounds on sons’ earnings that have been censored by part-time 
employment or unemployment to estimate the range of potential elasticities. Finally, the fourth 
model is the most inclusive, allowing information on sons’ earnings from full-time employment 





exclude individuals who dropped out of the PSID or who were consistently unemployed or part-
time employed for their entire prime-age working careers. 
BACKGROUND 
  In attempting to explain the differences in intergenerational mobility estimates in the 
literature, several papers have examined the impact of sample selection bias. First, Couch and 
Lillard (1998) found that intergenerational correlations are very sensitive to selection rules. They 
found that a more restrictive sample, which was often more homogenous, led to higher 
intergenerational income correlations. Specifically the authors warn against excluding estimates 
of low-earnings (even if due to part-time employment or unemployment); stating that such 
exclusions should only be done if one is trying to explicitly identify a sub-population, not 
examine overall mobility rates.  
However, in 2003, Minicozzi found the opposite result—excluding part-time and 
unemployed workers biased the intergenerational elasticities downward. Minicozzi found that 
differential treatment of part-time employed workers accounts for some of the variation in 
estimates across current studies. While the exact reasons for the disparities in findings between 
Couch and Lillard and Minicozzi are not readily apparent, Minicozzi had a larger sample size 
and focused on sons aged 27-29, while Couch and Lillard had a wider age range (22-30). Studies 
that estimate elasticities at younger ages tend to produce smaller estimates (Solon 1999), but that 
would suggest that Couch and Lillard’s estimates should be lower than Minicozzi’s which was 
not the case.  
In 2006, Francesconi and Nicoletti set aside earlier findings on sample selection and 
focused on non-labor market selection processes such as ―non-ignorable attrition‖ and short 





their parents at late ages will have better measures of initial status due to more years of measured 
parental income. The authors find evidence of a downward bias in intergenerational elasticities, 
especially at the ends of the occupational prestige distribution (used instead of earnings/income 
to avoid labor market selection issues). This bias is especially problematic in short panels. Taken 
together, these three papers highlight the importance of sample selection, although the ultimate 
direction of bias is unclear. 
DATA 
For this analysis, I use the Panel Study on Income Dynamics (PSID), which is a 
longitudinal survey that follows individuals and their offspring from 1968 to present. The survey 
was conducted annually from 1968-1997 and biannually since then, with the most recent data 
covering 2007. The PSID includes rich data on labor earnings, hours worked, employment status 
and family relationships. Using this data it is possible to identify individuals whose earnings 
have been censored by working part-time or part-year, but unfortunately it is not possible to tell 
whether individuals are voluntarily choosing to work part-time, or whether this type of 
employment is due to economic conditions restricting their opportunities. 
Sample Restrictions 
As one of the main goals of this analysis is to examine the effect of sample selection on 
intergenerational elasticity measures, I am very deliberate about selecting my own sample. Since 
the issue of selection becomes much less clear when thinking about women opting out of the 
labor force to raise children, I focus my analysis on the relationship between sons and their 
fathers.
 1
 As a very high percent of prime-age men work full-time, it is not a stretch to assume 
                                                          
1
Implicit in this framework is that I am only looking at sons raised in male-headed families since I am looking at the 
relationship between father and son earnings. I choose this restriction so as to focus on issues related to 
intergenerational earnings transmissions and not to confuse the issue of family structure. A preliminary analysis 





that most prime-age men would work full-time if they had the opportunity, which theoretically 
allows the assumption of exogenous selection into full-time employment to have some validity. 
My overall sample is restricted to white and black father-son pairs in the PSID with at least three 
years of valid father earnings while the son was living at home under 21 years old and the father 
was between age 35-55.
 2
  As a result of these restrictions, the father cohort was born between 
1904-1938 and the son cohort was born between 1954-1973. Further restrictions for each model 
are detailed below. 
Earnings in the PSID include the individual’s annual earnings from labor including 
salaries, wages, bonuses, overtime, and commissions. For this analysis, earnings are first 
adjusted to 2006 dollars using the CPI-U, logged and then averaged for all available years. 
Father’s earnings are only included for years when the son lived at home and was age 21 or 
below and the father was between 35 and 55 years old. Sons’ earnings are included for years 
when the son lived outside of his parents’ home and was employed full-time (>2,000 hours/year).  
METHODS 
Following the standard intergenerational mobility methodology (Black & Devereux 
2010), I calculate the intergenerational earnings elasticity by regressing the log of permanent 
child earnings on the log of permanent parent earnings: 
                    (       )                 (1) 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
earnings are much less related to parents’ earnings) than individuals raised in a two-parent family (0.11 vs. 0.36 
elasticity). This assumption is especially important when looking at families by race, as a very rough examination of 
a single year of PSID data shows that 37% of black sons lived in a female-headed family compared with 11% of 
white sons. However, family structure is volatile, so many of these individuals are included in the final sample in 
years when their father (or other cohabiting adult male) is present. Chapter 3 explores relaxing this restriction. 
2
 Findings are robust to choice of restriction on fathers’ ages, whether they are restricted to age 35-55 or 30-60. Age 
range of 35-55 was used in this analysis to be consistent with recommendations from Haider and Solon (2006) and 





Consistent with current methodology (Black & Devereux 2010), I estimate Equation 1 by 
first subtracting the mean value of log earnings from each observation to suppress the constant 
term (Equation 1a) and then age-adjust son and parent earnings to account for life-cycle variation 
in earnings (Equations 1b & 1c).
3
  
(                 (        )
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅)        (         )                ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅         (1a) 
To age-adjust earnings, I follow previous research (Bratberg et al 2007) and regress log 
earnings on age and age-squared and use the residual in the final estimation equation: 
   (        )                            (          )
 
                 (1b) 
   (         )                             (           )
 
         (1c) 
This results in the following simplified equation: 
                                                           (2)   
where   is the intergenerational earnings elasticity, lower-case     is the age-adjusted, de-
meaned value of log earnings and    is the error term. The interpretation of    is that the closer it 
is to 1, the less mobility in society, as a large percent of variation in a son’s earnings comes from 
his father’s earnings, while the closer    is to 0, the greater the mobility.
4
  
This is the method used for calculating intergenerational elasticities in all of my models, 
although the procedure for estimating          and selecting sons into the sample varies from 
model to model. For each model I estimate an overall elasticity, a white elasticity and a black 
elasticity. I start from the most restrictive model and expand out, investigating alternative 
methodologies for estimating permanent child earnings which allow for the inclusion of a greater 
                                                          
3
 Mean values of both son and father earnings can be found in Appendix Table 2.1. 
4






number of father-son pairs into the sample, which should therefore allow for greater 
representativeness and generalizability of results.  
Model 1: “Exogenous” selection into full-time employment 
In my first model, I restrict the sample to sons who were employed full-time at both age 
35/36 and age 37/38 (N=444). This model best estimates the current methodology in the 
literature, which assumes that sons are exogenously selected into full-time employment. This is 
the most restrictive model as no information from sons who are employed part-time or 
unemployed is included in this estimation of intergenerational elasticity. Additionally, 
individuals with missing earnings data during either of these two time periods are excluded. In 
this specification I am drawing on 2 years of sons’ earnings and an average of 9.7 years of 
fathers’ earnings information. Average earnings can be found in Appendix Table 2.1 for each 
model specification both overall and by race. 
Model 2: Imputed earnings at age 35/36 and 37/38 for part-time/unemployed sons 
To examine the role of ―exogenous‖ selection, I estimate an imputed value of son’s 
potential earnings as a proxy for actual labor earnings.
5
 Potential earnings at age 35/36 and 37/38 
are estimated from the average earnings from full-time employment while age 25-34 and age 39-
55 as well as a range of demographic characteristics. In my imputation the first-stage equation is: 
 ̂                     ̅                                      (3) 
                                                          
5
 Alternatively, in lieu of this imputation procedure, I could have used earnings from sons in their twenties and used 
an adjustment factor to scale up these values, but I was hesitant to use such an adjustment factor due to differences 
in life-cycle growth of wages. According to Haider and Solon (2006), using earnings from an individual in their 
twenties causes a large attenuation bias, but the bias is small if earnings are measured between the early thirties and 
the mid-forties. Additionally, Haider and Solon found that individuals with the greatest potential lifetime earnings 
often have lower earnings than other individuals early on in their careers as this time is often spent in education or 
taking risks (i.e. starting a business) with larger potential payouts in the future. To avoid this life-cycle bias, I chose 
to impute earnings values based on average actual earnings at both younger and older ages, as well as other human 





where   ̅ is average earnings from full-time employment at age 25-34 and age 39-55 and    is a 
vector of individual characteristics (educational attainment, race, age, age-squared, marital 
status, and state of residence). The results from this first-stage equation are displayed in Table 
2.2. From this equation, I then generate predicted values of  ̂               for all sons and plug 
those values into equation 2. 
Therefore, my second-stage equation is: 
 ̂                                                                  (4) 
where   is the intergenerational earnings elasticity adjusted for selection with the same 
interpretation as the earlier elasticity. For consistency, all sons are given imputed values for 
 ̂        even if they had valid earnings information for those years. An examination of this 
imputation process can be found in Table 2.3, which compares imputed earnings to actual 
earnings. By imputing values of sons’ earnings for unemployed and part-time employed sons, the 
sample size for this model increases to 757. In this specification I utilize an average of 4.5 years 
of sons’ earnings and an average of 9.4 years of fathers’ earnings information (see Appendix 
Table 2.1 for average values of earnings). 
Model 3: Estimation of upper and lower bounds 
Subsequent to the imputation regressions, I follow Minicozzi (2003) to estimate upper 
and lower bounds of sons’ earnings to verify the accuracy of the imputation procedure and 
estimate the range of potential elasticities. To calculate the lower-bound, I use the earnings value 
equal to the maximum of either the lowest reported logged child income from full-time 
employment for the sample of sons who worked full-time at both age 35/36 and 37/38, which is 
7.56 or the individual’s actual average log reported earnings from age 35/36 and 37/38. Actual 







 This procedure is consistent with Minicozzi’s ―modified lower-bounds‖ 
estimate: 
                                                                     (5) 
For the vast majority of individuals, their own averaged actual earnings from age 35/36 
and 37/38 are greater than 7.56 (unlogged 7.56 is equal to less than $2,000/year). In fact, the 
lower bound estimate of 7.56 is only binding for 18 of the 313 lower-bound earnings estimates 
for sons. 
For the upper-bound, I loosely follow Minicozzi’s modified upper-bound estimate, but 
instead of dividing my sample into 10 different categories with varying upper-bound estimates I 
simply divide my sample into two groups: Group A who had one year of full time employment at 
age 35/36 or 37/38 and Group B who was not full-time employed at either 35/36 or 37/38. The 
upper bound for individuals in Group A is simply the single year of earnings from full-time 
employment at either 35/36 or 37/38. The upper-bound for individuals in Group B is the 
maximum single year of earnings received from any type of employment (including part-time 
and part-year employment) from age 25-38. 
                                                                         (6) 
                                                                          (7) 
Figures 1A-C show scatter plots of the upper and lower-bound estimate assumptions. 
Figure 1A is the scatter-plot of Model 1, which only plots sons with full-time employment at 
both age 35/36 and 37/38. Figure 1B also includes the lower-bound estimates for the 313 
individuals missing data due to censoring and Figure 1C includes the upper-bound estimates for 
censored individuals. From these scatter plots it is possible to see that the impact of upper and 
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lower-bound estimates does not greatly alter the distribution, although the lower-bound set of 
estimates are more greatly dispersed than the upper-bound estimates. 
Finally, as shown in the scatter plots these estimates appear to be fairly reasonable  
approximations of sons’ potential earnings while nearly doubling the sample size. Potential bias 
from these estimates stems from the fact that they are reliant on a single year of earnings data, 
which tends to be more volatile than a long-term or averaged value of income. However, there is 
no apparent reason while this volatility would be systematically skewed in one direction or 
another and therefore its presence only adds noise to the measurement of sons’ earnings. This 
measurement error will reduce the efficiency of the estimates through attenuation bias but it will 
not systematically bias the results. 
Model 4: Long-run average of full-time earnings 
Finally, there is a tension in the literature between using more years of data in order to 
better estimate permanent income (and avoid attenuation bias) and using income at precise ages 
in order to most aptly avoid life-cycle bias. While of course the ideal dataset would have income 
measured for all individuals at every year (as longitudinal datasets such as the PSID attempt to 
do, but only administrative datasets such as Social Security earnings actually do), the reality is 
that many people drop in and out of the PSID and there is evidence that some of this volatility is 
nonrandom (Zabel 1998). Due to the nature of the PSID, the item non-response rate for earnings 
is fairly high in any given year.  
In Model 4, I explore the usage of long-run panels as a means for working around 
selection bias issues. In this model, I increase my sample size to 906 father-son pairs by 
including all sons with at least two years of earnings information from full-time employment at 





so the likelihood of excluding an individual due solely to unemployment or part-time 
employment over 20 years is slim. In this model  ̂        is the average log earnings from full-
time employment for all available years between the son’s age of 35-55.  
 ̂         ̅                                                        (8) 
In this specification I have an average of 4.7 years of sons’ earnings (ranging from 2-13 
years) and an average of 9.6 years of fathers’ earnings information (ranging from 3-15 years). As 
shown in Appendix Table 2.1, the average earnings values for both fathers and sons is very 
similar in this model compared with values from the three prior alternative model specifications. 
In all model specifications the overall average logged value of fathers’ earnings ranges between 
10.65 and 10.69 (or roughly between $42,000-$44,000). The overall average logged value of 
sons’ earnings ranges between 10.61 and 10.84 (or roughly between $41,000-$51,000). All 
values have been converted to 2006 dollars using the CPI-U. 
RESULTS 
Model 1: Assumption of exogenous selection into full-time employment 
The results from running the standard OLS regression (Model 1) with the assumption of 
exogenous selection into full-time employment are displayed in the top row of Table 2.1. The 
overall elasticity between fathers’ and sons’ earnings is 0.42. This number is consistent with the 
literature which finds a range of income elasticity estimates from 0.3 to 0.5 (Solon 1999). The 
elasticity for black father-son pairs is higher than white pairs (0.44 vs 0.41), although this 
difference is not statistically significant.  Previous research has found elasticities to be lower for 







Model 2: Imputed earnings 
Model 2 provides predicted values for the full sample of individuals who reported 
employment status information for both years (age 35/36 and 37/38). The imputation process 
expanded the sample size to 757 and reduced the overall elasticity to 0.34. To examine the 
quality of the imputed estimates, I compared the elasticities using predicted values of  ̂        
(Model 2) to the elasticities using actual values of        (Model 1) for observations where there 
was overlap in the models.
7
 Comparing these elasticities shows that the predicted model closely 
approximated the actual elasticities. In Table 2.3, the comparison of subsamples of Model 1 and 
Model 2 shows that the predicted elasticities are smaller than those for the actual values (0.39 vs 
0.42) and that the difference is greatest for white father-son pairs (0.36 vs 0.41). However, none 
of these differences are statistically significant. Interestingly, the subsample results of Model 2 
again shows that elasticities for blacks are higher than whites (0.48 vs 0.36). These findings are 
consistent with the full results from the first-stage regression (Table 2.2) which show that  ̂         
is a strong predictor of actual earnings. 
Additionally, Table 2.3 shows the elasticities just for the sample that was assumed to be 
exogenously selected out of the sample in Model 1 (i.e. individuals who worked part-time or 
were unemployed for at least one of the two years) in Model 2b. These elasticities are 
substantially different from the results of Model 2a, which is the subsample of Model 2 that was 
employed full-time. If individuals were randomly selected to unemployment or part-time 
employment in a given year, we would expect to see similar predicted elasticities for full-time 
workers (Model 2a) and non-full-time workers (Model 2b). Instead, we see very different results 
between the two models, indicating that the choice to exclude these individuals is not innocuous. 
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However, even within this sample, the direction of bias appears to differ based on race. White 
individuals who were excluded from the original model have a higher intergenerational elasticity 
(0.42) compared to white individuals who worked full-time in both years (0.36). This indicates 
that excluded individuals had less mobility, consistent with my original hypothesis and 
Minicozzi (2003). However, a completely different situation exists for black individuals. In 
Model 2b, excluded blacks had a substantially lower elasticity than full-time blacks in Model 2a 
(0.18 vs 0.48). As mentioned earlier, the results in Models 1-2 are surprising in that the 
elasticities for blacks are higher than whites, which is inconsistent with existing literature (Hertz 
2005). In fact, the magnitude of the elasticity for blacks in Model 2a (0.48) suggests that 
selection bias has a strong upward bias on the elasticity estimate, indicating that excluded 
individuals have greater mobility than the selected sample would indicate. At this point it is 
important to remember that elasticities provide no information about the direction of mobility, 
only the degree of stickiness between generations. One can imagine that some of this increased 
mobility would be greater downward mobility since we are now including individuals with a 
marginal attachment to the labor force. This finding is consistent with Couch and Lillard’s 
findings of upward bias in rigidly-defined samples. However, the sample size for blacks is 
relatively small, so caution should be exercised in the interpretation of these results. 
Model 3: Upper and lower bounds 
 Returning to Table 2.1, Model 3 tests the validity of the imputed earnings measures 
generated in Model 2 by creating upper and lower-bound estimates of sons’ earnings and then 
using these values to estimate ranges of intergenerational earnings elasticities. From Table 2.1, 
we can see that the elasticities from imputed earnings (Model 2) fall directly into the ranges 





a much higher elasticity for white father-son pairs (0.37-0.43) than for black pairs (0.27-0.28), 
which is consistent with the literature. These bounded estimates provide further evidence that  
the exclusion of non-full-time workers in a sample is problematic for estimating mobility for 
blacks. The assumption of exogenous selection into full-time employment is biasing the 
elasticity estimate for blacks upward, indicating less mobility than is seen in the full sample. 
Model 4: Long-term estimates 
Finally, in Model 4, I attempt to avoid the assumption of exogenous selection into full-
time employment altogether by using the long-run average of earnings from full-time 
employment for sons aged 35-55. Averaging in 20 years of data increases the sample size to 906 
and reduces the likelihood that an individual will be excluded from the sample due to selection. 
However, if individuals dropped out of the sample in a non-random way, this estimate could still 
suffer from selection bias.
8
 
Looking at Model 4, an interesting result of this expanded sample is that the 
intergenerational elasticities are much lower than in the original sample in Model 1 (0.34 vs 
0.42). This result is consistent with Couch and Lillard (1998) who found that more restrictive 
sample selection rules are associated with greater intergenerational correlations. This result could 
also be due to the fact that Model 1 is much more precisely identified, with all individuals having 
exactly two years of full-time employment in a two-year period versus a range of 2-16 years of 
full-time employment over a twenty-year period in Model 4.  
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 One could imagine two alternative and contradictory situations: 1) Downwardly mobile individuals drop out of the 
sample because they do not wish to be reminded of their failure in life and; 2) Upwardly mobile individuals drop out 
of the sample because they have moved to a better location and possibly cut ties with their previous friends/family. 
Analyses of PSID attrition have found no difference in the labor force participation of attriters and non-attriters 
(Zabel 1998) and that overall attrition has no effects on parameter estimates of earnings equations (Becketti, et al. 





Interestingly, the results from Model 2 and 3 look very similar to the results from Model 
4, indicating that having a longer panel may mitigate the bias created by sample selection in 
shorter panels, which is consistent with Francesconi and Nicoletti (2006). The similarity in the 
estimates also indicates that in the absence of a long panel, the usage of imputation or bounding 
could result in more accurate estimates of intergenerational elasticities in a short panel than 
relying solely on biased assumptions of exogenous selection into full-time employment. 
CONCLUSION  
Fundamentally, an investigation into intergenerational mobility is an examination of 
equality of opportunity in a society. A good measure of intergenerational earnings elasticity is 
important for policymakers concerned with redistribution and inequality. In an immobile society, 
family background is the primary determinant of future economic well-being, while more 
mobility signals greater opportunity for children to move beyond their origins.  
This chapter provides new evidence showing that a great deal of father-son earnings 
mobility exists, but that mobility differs substantially by race. In addition, while previous 
research has been divided as to the extent and direction of bias caused by selection, this chapter 
sheds some light on situations where bias might be especially problematic.  Table 2.1 provides 
evidence that sample selection leads to downward bias in elasticity estimates among whites, 
while upwardly biasing estimates among blacks. This means that estimates with strict sample 
selection restrictions could overestimate mobility for whites and underestimate mobility for 
blacks, and produce inaccurate estimates of black-white differentials in mobility.  
Consistent with Francesconi and Nicoletti (2006), I find that selection based on labor 





solutions. One is the use of long panels. The other, when only short panels are available, is to 
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FIGURES AND TABLES 
 
Note: Expanded sample in Model 4 includes all individuals with at least 2 years of full-time earnings between the age of 35 and 55 
regardless of employment status at age 35/36 and 37/38. 
 
Table 2.1: Intergenerational elasticities, by model specification and race             
 
Overall White Black 
Model 1: 
         Standard Methodology (FT both years) 0.4156*** 0.4066*** 0.4412*** 
(FT both years) (0.04) (0.05) (0.07) 
 
444 357 87 
Model 2: 
         Predicted values, full sample (FT, UE & PT) 0.3379*** 0.3879*** 0.2729*** 
(Valid employment status both years) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
 
757 586 171 
Model 3: 
         Upper and Lower-Bounds, full sample (FT, UE & PT) 0.3240*** - 0.3643*** 0.3687*** - 0.4276*** 0.2660*** - 0.2822*** 
(Valid employment status both years) (0.03) - (0.04) (0.04) - (0.06) (0.05) - (0.06) 
 
757 586 171 
Model 4: 
         Standard Methodology, expanded sample 0.3402*** 0.3819*** 0.2826*** 
(Long run estimate, 2+ yrs FT emp between age 35-55) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
 
906 680 226 
Standard errors in parentheses 
         N's in italics 












Average log earnings from FT emp at age 25-34,39-55 0.8880*** 
 
(0.05) 
Less than high school 0.0123 
 
(0.08) 
Some college 0.0509 
 
(0.06) 


















  State Dummy Variables Included Yes 
  Observations 435 
R-squared 0.66 
Standard errors in parentheses 









Table 2.3: Comparison of intergenerational elasticities by actual vs. imputed earnings and race 
  
Overall White Black 
Model 1 (Actual Earnings): 
   Model 1a: Subsample, non-missing Y25-34, 39-55 0.4209*** 0.4070*** 0.4672*** 
  
(0.04) (0.05) (0.08) 
  
435 351 84 
     Model 2 (Imputed Earnings): 
   Model 2a: Subsample, non-missing Y25-34, 39-55 0.3871*** 0.3596*** 0.4790*** 
  
(0.03) (0.04) (0.06) 
  
435 351 84 
     Model 2b: Subsample, "exogenously" selected (UE/PT) 0.2683*** 0.4225*** 0.1801*** 
  
(0.04) (0.07) (0.05) 
  
312 227 85 
     Model 2: Full sample (FT, UE & PT) 0.3379*** 0.3879*** 0.2729*** 
  
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
  
757 586 171 
Standard errors in parentheses 
   N's in italics 
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Figure 2.1A: Scatter plot of sons’ earnings and fathers’ earnings with 
the assumption of exogenous selection into full-time employment;  
Figure 2.1B: Scatter plot including censored sons earnings with the 
lower-bound assumptions;  
Figure 2.1C: Scatter plot including censored sons earnings with the 
upper-bound assumptions   








CHAPTER 2 APPENDIX 
  
Appendix Table 2.1: Average Earnings, by model specification and race   
 
N Overall White Black 
Model 1: 
        Mean Fathers' Earnings 444 10.6872 10.8085 10.1893 
  
(0.66) (0.63) (0.60) 
    Mean Sons' Earnings 444  10.8396 10.9235 10.4951 
  
(0.66) (0.66) (0.52) 
Model 2: 
        Mean Fathers' Earnings 757 10.6638 10.7955 10.2125 
  
(0.63) (0.59) (0.54) 
    Mean Sons' Earnings 757 10.7442 10.8319 10.4437 
  
(0.57) (0.56) (0.50) 
Model 3: 
        Mean Fathers' Earnings 757 10.6467 10.7955 10.1369 
  
(0.71) (0.59) (0.85) 
    Mean Sons' Earnings 757 10.6122 - 10.8315 10.7064 - 10.9111 10.2891 - 10.5584 
  
(0.86) - (0.63) (0.85) - (0.62) (0.79) - (0.60) 
Model 4: 
        Mean Fathers' Earnings 906 10.6519 10.8232 10.1365 
  
(0.70) (0.59) (0.76) 
    Mean Sons' Earnings 906 10.8113 10.9290 10.4568 
  
(0.64) (0.64) (0.52) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
     
Note: Model 1 is the assumption of exogenous selection into full-time employment, Model 2 is 
imputed values for censored sons' earnings, Model 3 is lower and upper-bound estimates of sons' 
earnings and Model 4 is the long-run estimate of sons' earnings, averaging all earnings from full-time 
employment at age 35-55. 








CHAPTER 3: MEASURING THE BLACK-WHITE MOBILITY GAP: A COMPARISON OF 
DATASETS AND METHODS 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Very few papers have attempted to quantify the magnitude of the racial gaps in 
intergenerational mobility in the United States. Data quality, sample size and lack of adequate 
measurement tools have impeded this comparison. This chapter extends previous black-white 
mobility analyses using both of the primary U.S. datasets utilized by intergenerational mobility 
researchers---the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and the National Longitudinal Survey 
of Youth (NLSY)--and analyzes both income and earnings mobility to provide a comprehensive 
portrait of differences in the economic transmission process between black and white families. 
This chapter also examines the role of incarceration and family structure in black-white mobility 
estimates, due to their large and potentially confounding relationship with race. 
BACKGROUND 
The few studies that have attempted to disaggregate intergenerational economic mobility 
by race (Hertz, 2005, 2007; Bhattacharya & Mazumder, 2011; Isaacs, 2008; Mazumder 2008, 
2011) have found significant disparities in intergenerational income and earnings elasticities 
between black and white families, but with the magnitude of the black-white gaps varying 
considerably depending on the dataset used and on whether income or earnings mobility is 
analzyed. No study to date has provided definitive estimates using both the NLSY and PSID 
datasets for both income and earnings’ definitions of mobility.   
Studies Examining Black-White Disparities 
In an early study that considered elasticities by race, Anders Björklund and colleagues 
(2002) found that the full sample intergenerational earnings elasticity vs. the white-only 








elasticity was higher (0.43 vs. 0.32), indicating that race explains a sizable amount of the 
similarity of income between brothers (and therefore similarity between generations, as sibling 
similarity implies that family and community origins play a role in determining socioeconomic 
status). However, Björklund did not directly estimate an elasticity for black families. 
In one of the first studies to directly estimate the black-white mobility gap, Hertz (2005) 
used the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and estimated the mobility gap to be 40%, 
which means there is a 40% difference in adult income between blacks and whites who grew up 
in equal income families. Hertz also found that blacks have a much lower rate of upward 
mobility from the bottom of the income distribution and were half as likely to transition from 
―rags to riches‖ (i.e. bottom to top quartile) as whites. Hertz established that there is 
heterogeneity in the income transmission process between black and white families and that 
observed differences in mobility are not simply due to differences in parental income. 
Two separate 2008 Pew reports examined black-white transition matrices using NLSY 
(Mazumder 2008) and PSID (Isaacs 2008). While the results with the two datasets are broadly 
similar, the analysis using the PSID finds more stickiness at the bottom of the income 
distribution for blacks than the NLSY analysis (54 percent of blacks remain in bottom quintile 
vs. 31 percent of whites in PSID compared with 44 vs. 25 percent in NLSY). The PSID analysis 
also finds more downward mobility from the middle for blacks than the NLSY analysis (45 
percent of blacks in middle quintile fall to bottom quintile vs. 16 percent of whites in PSID 
compared with 27 vs. 17 percent in NLSY). In attempting to explain these differences, 
Mazumder (2008) argues that the sample of black families in the NLSY is more representative 
than the PSID sample.  








Using NLSY, Debopam Bhattacharya and Bhashkar Mazumder (2011) again found that 
blacks are less likely than whites to transition out of the bottom of the income distribution. 
However, the authors also highlight the sensitivity of these findings to measurement 
specification as blacks were nearly as likely as whites to end up in a higher income percentile as 
their fathers, but were less likely to move across a quintile or decile threshold than whites. Due 
to this sensitivity, Bhattacharya and Mazumder developed a new measure for comparing the 
mobility of black and white families which allows for more flexible cut-points and thresholds. 
Utilizing this new methodology, Mazumder (2011) analyzed both the NLSY and Survey 
of Income and Program Participation matched to Social Security Administration data (SIPP-
SSA) to find that blacks are less upwardly mobile and more downwardly mobile than whites. He 
also finds that much of these disparities can be explained by AFQT scores in adolescence. 
Studies Comparing NLSY to PSID 
 While not examining racial differences in mobility, several intergenerational mobility 
analyses have examined both the NLSY and PSID so their findings (and limitations) deserve 
discussion here. In one of the only studies directly comparing the NLSY to PSID (and GSS), 
Levine and Mazumder (2002) create two cohorts of sons from each dataset (using the NLS 
Young Men or NLS66 cohort for the early cohort and the NLSY79 for the later cohort). They 
restrict their samples to families with positive family income in all three years.
9
 Levine and 
Mazumder look at the elasticity between total family income in parent generation when child was 
living at home and age 14-24 and sons’ earnings at age 28-36 at two points in time using three 
surveys. A potential concern is that the outcome ages of sons are fairly young (average age 
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 This excludes families with $0 income, which can potentially be problematic in short panels (as shown in Chapter 
2) for black families. However, this is likely less of an issue than it was in my analysis as they are excluding 0’s on 
family income, not individual earnings and families are much less likely to have $0 in family income. 








around 30) so there is a potential for life-cycle bias. Also, their samples are relatively small 
(NLSY79=1,082; PSID=464). Levine and Mazumder find inconsistent results as to whether 
intergenerational mobility is increasing or decreasing over time. While they restrict their 
analyses to children from two-parent households, they run sensitivity analyses on single-parent 
households and find dampening effects on their estimates. Similarly, they do not look at racial 
differences in this paper, but as a sensitivity check the authors re-run all analyses just focused on 
white families and find ―virtually identical results‖. However, based on my findings from 
Chapter 2, I find that these selection restrictions would not necessarily bias white results, but 
instead would bias black results, something which the authors do not test (or likely cannot test 
due to small sample sizes). 
 In a cross-country analysis, Grawe (2004) utilized both the NLSY and PSID to obtain 
estimates of persistence in the U.S. While Grawe had to substantially limit his sample in both 
datasets for consistency with international datasets, he found that the NLSY produced much 
lower estimates of persistence than the PSID. In a similar cross-national analysis, Jäntti et al 
(2006) examine both NLSY and PSID (although they only report results on NLSY) and find that 
their standard errors in the PSID are large and therefore not useful in international comparisons. 
Studies Comparing Income to Earnings Mobility 
In addition to differences in survey choices, different studies analyze different 
intergenerational economic outcomes. Despite the fact that both income versus earnings analyses 
attempt to measure the same basic concept of economic status, the choice of measure has 
different implications for mechanisms that may influence outcomes. Income captures a much 
broader construct of economic position and research on intergenerational correlations of 
worklessness (Macmillan 2011) and welfare recipiency (Page 2004) highlight the various ways 








through which researchers would find a strong correlation in income, but not earnings. On the 
other hand, earnings mobility precisely investigates the intergenerational relationship between 
economic returns to employment, but these analyses are restricted to father-son pairs. Family 
income analyses are the most inclusive as they examine economic outcomes of daughters as well 
as children from female-headed households who would be omitted from father-son earnings 
analyses. To the extent that female-headed households are disproportionately low-income and 
therefore more likely to have low mobility (i.e. high elasticities), I hypothesize that the exclusion 
of these families will introduce a downward bias to the intergenerational earnings elasticity. 
Previous research has found greater earnings mobility than income mobility (Peters 1992), which 
is consistent with the possibility of downward bias in earnings elasticities.  
   Often choice of the outcome measure is constrained by available data. For example, the 
NLSY does not measure parent (or father) earnings, but rather only has estimates of total family 
income. As a result, some studies (e.g. Levine and Mazumder 2002) use the two constructs 
interchangeably, measuring the elasticity between parent family income and child earnings. In 
this chapter I will examine all possible resource constructs across all samples to evaluate the 
effect choice of outcome measure plays in estimating intergenerational relationships and black-
white disparities. 
DATA  
In this chapter I utilize both the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and the 
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY). Analyzing the two most widely-used 
longitudinal surveys in the U.S. will allow me to clearly compare differences in the mobility gap 
and identify the best estimates of intergenerational mobility by race. I will examine the impact of 








alternative selection restrictions and choice of economic resource measure --total family income 
and individual earnings -- on intergenerational mobility estimates.  
The National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY) is a nationally representative 
longitudinal survey of individuals who were 14-22 years old in 1979. Individuals in this survey 
were interviewed annually from 1979-1994 and biannually from 1994-2010. The NLSY covers a 
wide range of health and economic questions asked repeatedly throughout the respondent's life. 
The original sample size was 12,686 individuals. Retention rates for this survey have been 
approximately 70% over the survey's 27-year duration. The method of data collection has varied 
over the years, with in-person interviews conducted from 1979-1986 and 1988-2000 and 
telephone interviews conducted in 1987 and 2002-2010. Computer-assisted interviewing 
replaced paper-and-pencil interviewing in 1993.  
While the NLSY follows these children throughout their life, it does not follow other 
household members (such as parents), so it is not a true intergenerational survey and information 
about parents is limited to the years when children lived at home age 14-22. Additionally, for the 
parent generation, only total family income is reported, not parent earnings. 
The Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) is a longitudinal survey that began with a 
nationally representative sample of families in 1968 and subsequently follows each family 
member and their offspring from 1968 to present. The survey was conducted annually from 
1968-1997 and biannually since then, with the most recent data covering 2009. The PSID 
includes rich data on labor earnings, family income, hours worked, employment status and 
family relationships.  
The original PSID sample included 4,800 families and was comprised of two distinct 
components: the Survey Research Center (SRC) national sample and the Survey of Economic 








Opportunity (SEO) low-income household sample. The SEO over-sample of low-income 
families included a large number of minority households, which was designed to allow 
researchers to examine the effect of the War on Poverty. When combined and weighted, these 
two surveys formed a nationally representative sample. While the PSID has fairly high annual 
response rates (between 96.9-98.5 percent), a large (over 10 percent) attrition rate in the first year 
followed by subsequent small (3-4 percent) attrition accumulates over time resulting in a 
response rate of 56.1 percent of the original sample for individuals who lived in the 1968 
households (Fitzgerald, Gottschalk & Moffitt, 1998b). Researchers have previously expressed 
some concerns about representativeness of PSID over-sample due to technical problem in the 
collection of the list for initial sample frame and high rate of attrition among blacks (Solon 1992; 
Lee & Solon 2009).
10
 Between 1968 and 1975 the attrition rate for black and white families was 
similar, but after 1975 blacks attrited from the sample at significantly greater levels, leading to 
only 49 percent of the initial sample of blacks remaining in the sample by 1989, compared with 
59 percent of whites. Several researchers have examined possible attrition biases in the PSID and 
found while there are significant differences between the attritors and non-attritors, it is not an 
issue if the proper population weights are used (Becketti et al. 1988; Fitzgerald, Gottschalk & 
Moffitt 1998a). Furthermore, many of the demographic differences between the attritors and 
non-attritors in the first generation disappear by the second generation. Fitzgerald, Gottschalk 
and Moffitt (1998b) did not find evidence of statistically significant attrition bias in 
intergenerational earnings estimates.  
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 Two-thirds of the SEO oversample was discontinued due to budgetary constraints in 1997 and is therefore 
excluded from my samples as I require at least three years of child resources between 1997-2009. 








NLSY Sample Restrictions 
The NLSY sample includes children born between 1957-64 and begins in 1979 when 
these children are between 14-22. Consistent with prior research on the NLSY (Mazumder 
2008), I exclude the military sample (N=1280) and restrict parent income to 1979-1981 (which is 
annual family income from the previous year). As a result of these restrictions, the parent cohort 
was born between 1915-1949 and the child cohort was born between 1957-1964. To be included 
in the sample, children must have been living at home in one of these years and had their parent 
fill out the income questionnaire (Version A), and then must have been observed for three years 
of outcome measurement (either total family income or earnings) as an adult (between years 
1998-2010). While many of the analyses focus on the comparison of white, non-Hispanic and 
black, non-Hispanic families (hereafter referred to simply as ―white‖ or ―black‖), all sample 
members are included in the overall analyses. These non-white and non-black sample members 
are retained in the analyses to be comparable with previous research and as they are needed for 
accurately ranking each generation in the mobility matrices. Each sample is weighted to provide 
nationally representative estimates. This results in a final family income-family income sample of 
5,710 with 2,828 white families and 1,727 black families (for overall estimates, 1,155 Hispanic 
families are included). This sample has an average of 2.1 years of parent income and 5.9 years of 
child income (see Table 3.1). The family income-child earnings sample is smaller (N=5,276).  
PSID Sample Restrictions 
To be consistent with the NLSY data, I construct three increasingly less-selected samples 
from the PSID. The first sample (PSID #1), is the closest match to the NLSY dataset in terms of 
years of data and age/cohort of sample members, because I limit my use of historical data from 
parents to what is available in the NLSY. Specifically, PSID #1 is restricted to children born 








between 1957-64, living at home with parents in 1979-1981 with a minimum of one year of 
parental family income. The sample is also restricted to children who report at least three years 
of income or earnings in adulthood in 1997-2009. Parental income is only collected from 1979-
1981 to be consistent with NLSY sample. The family income-family income sample of PSID #1 
has an N of 1,027 with 554 white non-Hispanic, 446 black non-Hispanic and 27 other/Hispanic 
families and an average of 2.6 years of parent income and 6.6 years of child income (See Table 
3.1 for descriptive statistics).  In addition to the family income-family income and family income-
child earnings samples (N=882) constructed to match the NLSY, I also construct a father 
earnings-child earnings sample (N=658); however, due to small sample size, there is very little 
that can be inferred from this latter sample in PSID #1. 
The second PSID sample (PSID #2) preserves the same sample composition as PSID #1, 
but includes historic parental income and earnings data. As the PSID began in 1968, this 
increases the average number of years of parent income from 2.6 to 13.4 (see Table 3.1). PSID 
#2 tests the robustness of PSID #1 to improvements in parent data, as this is much closer to a true 
measure of permanent parental resources.  
The third PSID sample (PSID #3) relaxes the birth year constraint to 1947-1974, but 
imposes stronger restrictions on inclusion. At least three years of parental income/earnings are 
required as opposed to a single year as all other samples. As a result of the expanded sample size 
and better measure of permanent parental resources, I believe this to be the most reliable and 
methodologically consistent PSID sample. The PSID #3 has a family income-family income 
sample of 2,482 with 1,498 white, 915 black and 69 other race/ethnicity families. 
Incarceration 








For both the NLSY and PSID samples, I test the sensitivity of my analyses to the 
exclusion of ever-incarcerated individuals as incarceration is intimately linked to decreased 
lifetime earnings potential (Western 2002). Unfortunately, limited information exists regarding 
the incarceration status of individuals in the NLSY or PSID. In the NLSY, during each interview 
the location of the respondent is recorded, including whether or not the interview is taking place 
in prison or jail. In addition, a criminal history module was asked in 1980 which asked whether 
the individual had ever previously been incarcerated. The PSID has slightly more limited 
incarceration data as each wave identifies nonresponse due to incarceration and a select number 
of years (1984-93, 1999-2009) identify ―type of institutional housing‖ for entire family unit and 
jail/prison is an option. In 1995 a supplemental crime module was collected similar to the NLSY 
module. In both the PSID and NLSY, only a small percentage of individuals could be identified 
as ever incarcerated (approx 7% of PSID and 5% of NLSY weighted). Of the PSID #1 sample 
(N=1,027), 72 individuals were ever incarcerated (NWhite =31, NBlack=37). Of the NLSY sample 
(N=5,710), 361 were ever incarcerated (NWhite =108, NBlack=165). It is possible to miss 
individuals incarcerated for less than 12 or 24 months (between survey periods), or for 
individuals who could not be found due to incarceration. Previous research (Western 2002) has 
found that survey response rates do not differ greatly by incarceration status, so this last issue 
may be moot, but would suggest that the PSID does a slightly worse job of capturing the ever-
incarcerated population in years where the only way to identify incarcerated individuals is 
through the non-response due to incarceration variable.  
Female-Headed Households 
The NLSY has very limited information regarding family structure in childhood with 
only a single question asking who the child lived with at age 14. However, we know that family 








structure is a dynamic component and therefore should be measured more comprehensively. This 
is a limitation of the NLSY sample, but not of the PSID, as I am looking at a later cohort within 
the study and therefore have many more years data during the child’s childhood. In the NLSY, 
families are classified as male- or female-headed at age 14; 1,055 NLSY children lived in a 
female-headed household (NWhite =241, NBlack=592). 
In the PSID, it is possible to identify the presence (or absence) of an adult male in the 
household for up to 14 years. I created two mutually-exclusive classifications: never female-






There are three primary intergenerational relationships I will examine in the NLSY and 
PSID: family income-family income, family income-child earnings and father earnings-child 
earnings. The child earnings analyses are always separated by the gender of the child due to 
differences in male vs. female labor force participation (see Chadwick and Solon 2002). Family 
Income includes all sources of income (e.g. earnings, self-employment/business income, 
transfers) from individuals in the family older than 14 years old, before taxes or other 
deductions. Individual earnings only includes labor earnings from the individual (either child or 
father). These measures capture different mechanisms through which the intergenerational 
economic transmission process may operate. Family incomes could still be highly correlated 
even if both generations do not work and instead receive income from welfare or investment 
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 If I created a female-headed household classification analogous to the NLSY definition (i.e. on the basis of who 
the child lived with at age 14) I would only capture slightly more than half of the children from ever-female-headed 
families. 








income. While the earnings analyses provide more information about the labor market processes 
underlying these relationships, these analyses are limited due to smaller sample sizes as they 
only include employed children with an employed father, which limits sample sizes more for 
black families than whites. 
Parent resources are only measured in years when the child lived at home and was age 22 
or below and the household head age was between 30 and 64 years old. Children’s economic 
resources are measured in years when the child lived outside of their parents’ home and was 
between age 33 and 52. All samples require one year of positive parental resources and at least 
three years of children’s resources, while PSID #3 requires a minimum of three years of data in 
each generation.  
Family income and individual earnings are first converted to 2009 dollars using CPI-U-
RS, logged, averaged for all available years and then age-adjusted to account for life-cycle 
variation. The residual from this process is then used in calculating elasticities, correlations and 
rank mobility matrices. 
In addition to the above analyses, I also test the sensitivity of the family income analyses 
by adjusting family income for family size. Following Gottschalk and Danziger (2005), I create 
an adjusted family income measure by dividing total family income by the poverty threshold for 
a family of that size/composition for that year. The poverty threshold is taken from 1978 and 
adjusted for inflation by the CPI-U-RS for subsequent years. Prior to 1978, the CPI-U is scaled 
by the RS to provide consistent results. The adjusted family income measure is a ratio of income-
to-needs and can be used to calculate elasticities by taking the log of the average ratio in each 
generation. 
 









In this chapter, I examine three measures of intergenerational mobility: elasticities, 
correlation coefficients, and upward/downward rank mobility matrices. Each measure has its 
own strengths and limitations, discussed below. 
Intergenerational Elasticity 
The intergenerational elasticity is the most commonly used measure of intergenerational 
mobility but has two areas of concern. First, it fails to account for changes in income/earnings 
variation over time. By definition, elasticities will increase if income variation increases from 
one generation to the next. Second, calculating an elasticity for a sub-group provides information 
about the rate of regression to the mean within that sub-group, which is less informative than 
knowing how an individual will do in the next generation relative to the entire population. 
However, elasticities can be used to answer questions such as: if a child grows up in a household 
with family income XX% above the average, what percent above average would we expect that 
child’s family income to be in adulthood?  
To calculate the intergenerational elasticity, I follow standard methodology (Black & 
Devereux 2010), by regressing the average log of child resources on the average log of parent 
resources: 
                    (       )                                          (1) 
I then subtract the mean value of resources from each generation to suppress the constant 
term and then age-adjust resources to account for life-cycle variation in earnings. To age-adjust 
earnings, I follow previous research (Bratberg et al 2007) and regress log earnings on age and 
age-squared and use the residual in the final estimation equation, which results in the following 
simplified equation: 








                                                                               (2)   
where   is the intergenerational earnings elasticity, lower-case     is the age-adjusted, de-
meaned value of log earnings and    is the error term.  
Correlation Coefficients 
The correlation coefficient (   is simply the elasticity multiplied by the ratio of standard 
deviations of log resources (σ) between the two generations: 
  (
       
      ⁄ )                                                            (3)   
If income variance is constant over time the correlation will equal the elasticity. However, it is 
widely found that income and earnings’ variation has been increasing over time, which results in 
a correlation that is lower than the elasticity. The correlation does not allow the same 
interpretation as the elasticity, but is preferred by some (Björklund and Jäntti 2009) as a better 
measure for comparison of mobility over time or across countries.  
Up/Downward Rank Mobility Matrices 
Despite their ability to succinctly describe intergenerational relationships, neither 
elasticities nor correlations provide any information about the direction of mobility. Previous 
intergenerational research has used transition matrices as a way to estimate the direction of 
mobility and allow sub-group comparisons. The problem with transition matrices is that they 
impose set cut-points and look at the likelihood that individuals in those quantiles (typically 
deciles or quintiles) will move to another quantile in the income distribution. However, as the 
black income distribution lies to the left of the white income distribution, at any given range of 
incomes, the average black income will be lower than the average white income. As a result, 
examining transition matrices leads to potential bias as black families would have to gain greater 








dollar values of income to move between quintiles (or deciles) than white families. (i.e. within 
the bottom quintile of the overall income distribution, blacks are disproportionately represented 
in the bottom of that quintile, therefore to reach the second quintile they would have to move 
further in the income distribution than a white family.) Therefore, use of transition matrices 
could potentially overstate the magnitude of the mobility gap.  
As a result of this potential bias in transition matrices, Bhattacharya and Mazumder 
(2011) developed a new measure of  upward or downward rank mobility, which looks at the 
likelihood that a child will exceed their parent’s place in the income distribution by a given 
amount. This estimate gives the likelihood of a child exceeding (or falling below) their parent’s 
place in the income distribution by a certain number of percentile points, conditional on their 
parents beginning at or below a given percentile (i.e. given that a child grew up in the bottom 
quintile of the income distribution, there is a 20 percent probability of that child moving at least 
30 percentage points above their parent’s income). Borrowing notation directly from Mazumder 
(2011), this estimating equation is: 
                      |           (4) 
 
where URM stands for upward rank mobility, s is a given percentile in the income distribution 
and   is the amount that children’s income percentile (  ) exceeds their parent’s income 
percentile (  ). When   =0, this equation estimates the likelihood that a child’s income rank 
exceeds their parents’. The downward rank mobility (DRM) equation is a slight modification:  
 
                      |           (5) 
 
While matrices are useful for examining an infinite number of different size movements 
from any range of starting points, examination of all the possible results creates a complicated 








picture. As a result, while I will present full sets of upward/downward matrices for movements 
of 1, 10, 20 and 30 percentage points for each parental resource decile cutoff, I will focus 
primarily on defining upward mobility as a movement of at least 20 percentage points up from 
the parent’s initial position in the bottom of the income quintile. Conversely, I will examine 
downward mobility as a movement of at least 20 percentage points down from the top half of the 
parental resource distribution. 
An argument could be made that the upward mobility measure gives an advantage to 
black families if we believe that regardless of race, lower income people are more likely to 
exceed their parent’s income and since a higher percentage of black are lower income, as a group 
blacks might be more likely to exceed their parents’ income than whites. Despite this potential 
problem, blacks are still less likely to exceed their parents’ income, so the estimate of the upward 
mobility gap can be viewed as a lower-bound estimate. 
RESULTS 
 Table 3.2 presents the results of the intergenerational elasticity and correlation analyses 
by dataset and resource measure. Looking first at the overall estimates, the intergenerational 
family income- family income mobility elasticities are between 0.43 to 0.65, and therefore 
consistent with previous literature which finds this elasticity to be in the range of 0.4 to 0.6 
(Solon 1999; Black and Devereux 2010). Additionally, the overall elasticities are higher than 
either the white-only or black-only estimates (with the exception of the daughter estimates). 
According to Hertz (2005), this is an indication of standard omitted variables bias due to the 
omission of race as a variable. This indicates the presence of heterogeneity in the income 
transmission process above and beyond differences due to disparities in income levels between 
the two groups. Interestingly, the overall estimates for daughter outcomes are not higher than the 








within-group estimates suggesting that some of the heterogeneity in the income transmission 
process by race may be confined to males. 
Across the three sets of overall PSID estimates, I find a gradient of monotonically 
decreasing elasticities across measurement specification, with the strongest relationship to be the 
family income-family income elasticity, followed by family income-son earnings elasticity and 
then father-son earnings elasticity, meaning that there is greater earnings mobility than income 
mobility, which is consistent with previous research (Peters 1992). However, in the NLSY 
sample, I find that the family income-son earnings elasticity is larger than the family income-
family income elasticity (0.58 vs 0.43).
12
  
 Consistent with the overall results, for both white and black families, analysis of the 
NLSY finds stronger elasticities for family income-son earnings than family income-family 
income, while analysis of the PSID finds the opposite result in all three samples. In general, 
elasticities in the PSID increase with additional years of parental and child data          
                . This same relationship also exists in the correlation analysis, although the 
magnitude of the disparities is reduced.  
These results suggest that relying on different datasets or measures of economic resources 
would lead to different conclusions about the comparison of black to white elasticities. Analysis 
of the NLSY points to very similar elasticities for whites and blacks (family income- family 
income elasticities of 0.38 and 0.35 and family income-son earnings elasticities of 0.50 and 0.50, 
respectively), while the PSID indicates stronger elasticities for whites than blacks (in PSID #3 
family income elasticities of 0.55 and 0.34 and family income-son earnings elasticities of 0.51 
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contains a large Hispanic oversample (N=1,155), while the PSID has a much smaller Hispanic and other sample 
(N=27 in PSID #1/2, N=69 in PSID #3). Longitudinal weights are used to make each sample nationally 
representative. 








and 0.24). I find the NLSY results quite surprising and while the NLSY has a larger sample, I am 
more inclined to believe the estimates generated in PSID #3 as they are more consistent with 
previous research (Hertz 2005). Across each type of economic resource, the PSID #2 or #3 
predicts the strongest persistence among whites, while among blacks, the NLSY often produces 
the largest elasticities and correlations although PSID #3 is very similar to NLSY for family 
income-family income and family income-daughter earnings. As a result, I would tend to favor 
the PSID #3 sample as the black-white comparisons are most consistent with previous research 
and the family income-family income measure for blacks is consistent with the NLSY.  However, 
as the PSID #3 sample only has a small N for the family income-son earnings analysis for black 
families, I would be cautious about stating that the elasticity for black sons is less than the 
elasticity for black daughters, especially as this relationship does not hold up in the NLSY 
analysis.  
Among all the intergenerational elasticity estimates, the family income-family income 
estimates are the most stable across dataset and sample selection, ranging from 0.31 to 0.55 for 
whites and 0.17 to 0.35 for blacks. As a result of my conceptual preference for the most inclusive 
sample and the most inclusive measure of economic well-being, combined with the robustness of 
the family income-family income results across varying samples, I would place a greater 
emphasis on these results. Combined with my preference for PSID #3, this would result in the 
best elasticity estimate of 0.55 for white families and 0.34 for black families. Adjusting family 
income for family size does not substantially change any of these results (results not shown). I 
find that the intergenerational elasticities are much more sensitive than the correlations to sample 
size and number of years of parental resource data. For example, looking at the family income-
son earnings relationship, the elasticity ranges from 0.17 to 0.51 for white families and 0.10 to 








0.50 for black families, while the corresponding correlations range from 0.14 to 0.34 for white 
families and 0.08 to 0.22 for black families. 
Across all sets of overall analyses, measures of daughter’s outcomes display lower 
elasticities than son’s outcomes, which is consistent with literature (Chadwick and Solon 
2002).
13
 In the analyses stratified by race, it is interesting to note that there is a higher degree of 
similarity between black and white daughters than sons (as well as a higher degree of 
consistency among data sets). The family income-daughter earnings elasticity ranges between 
0.25-0.37 among white families and 0.37-0.48 among black families. In comparison, the family 
income-son earnings elasticity ranges between 0.17-0.51 among white families and 0.10-0.50 
among black families. 
Sensitivity Analyses 
I examine the sensitivity of these results to incarceration (see Appendix Tables 3.1-3.3) 
and female-headed household status (see Appendix Tables 3.4-3.6). Excluding ever-incarcerated 
individuals makes little difference for most of these estimates, with the exception of black father-
son earnings. In the PSID #3 sample excluding ever-incarcerated individuals decreases the 
sample from 212 to 187 and decreases the elasticity from 0.24 (p<0.10) to 0.16 (p>0.10). This is 
the one relationship that is weakened by the exclusion of ever-incarcerated individuals. All other 
black correlations and elasticities are either unchanged or strengthened by the exclusion of ever-
incarcerated individuals.  
Due to a larger sample size of incarcerated individuals in the NLSY, I am able to also 
compare the ever-incarcerated and never-incarcerated populations and find some suggestive 
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 The one exception is in PSID #1 where the family income-daughter earnings elasticity is higher than the family 
income-son earnings elasticity (0.30 to 0.28), but I believe the son elasticity value to be artificially low in this 
sample as it is inconsistent with the other three models. 








results. For white families, being incarcerated weakens the intergenerational relationship but 
does not completely eliminate it, as is the case for black families. While caution should be given 
to these results due to sample size (N=165), there appears to be almost no intergenerational 
relationship between income or earnings for the ever-incarcerated black population. This 
disparity between black and white children is possibly driven by differences in charge severity 
(misdemeanor vs. felony), length of incarceration (or recidivism) or could also be due to 
differences in future earnings potential for previously incarcerated individuals (Western 2002). It 
is also possible that black individuals are more likely to work in the informal labor market after 
incarceration and as a result may be less likely to fully report those earnings.  
Comparing the never-female-headed households to the ever-female-headed households, 
there are large disparities among black families in both the NLSY and PSID samples, with 
children growing up in a female-headed household having a much stronger intergenerational 
association than those with a constant male-presence. This is consistent with my hypothesis that 
children from female-headed households would have higher elasticities than children from male-
headed households. In contrast, among white families the relationships (when significant) appear 
to be fairly similar regardless of family structure, although the sample of female-headed 
households is very small. It should be noted that half of black children grew up in an ever 
female-headed household and half of those children were always in a female headed household. 
This is in comparison to a fifth of white children ever living in a female-headed household and 
one-tenth of those children always living in female headed household. This dosage disparity 
explains why we would expect to see smaller effects of ever living in a female headed household 
on estimates of mobility among white families than blacks.  
 








Up/Downward Rank Mobility Matrices 
Table 3.3 presents the reduced-form results of the upward/downward mobility matrices 
for NLSY and PSID #3.
14
 The full sets of matrices are available in Appendix Tables 3.8-3.22, 
while Table 3.3 displays only the results of a 20 percentage point upward mobility increase from 
the bottom quintile of the parental distribution and a 20 percentage point decline from the top 
half of the parental distribution.
15
 Focusing on the family income-family income results for the 
NLSY (the first line of Table 3.3) I find that 56.6% of white children who grow up in the bottom 
income quintile will exceed their parent’s rank in the income distribution by at least 20 
percentage points, compared with only 37.6% of black children from similar economic 
backgrounds. The difference in these likelihoods is the upward mobility gap (56.6-37.6=19.1), 
which is 19.1 percentage points. This means that children from low-income black families are 
considerably less likely to experience upward mobility as adults than white children from a 
similar economic background. In the downward mobility analysis, white children who grew up 
in the top half of the income distribution have a 41.0% likelihood of falling at least 20 percentage 
points below their parent’s ranking, compared with similar black children who have a 62.0% 
likelihood of downward mobility. The magnitude of the downward mobility gap (41.0-62.0=       
-21.0) indicates that black children are at an intergenerational disadvantage compared with white 
children who grew up with similar parental economic resources.  
Upward and downward mobility matrices can provide detailed information about 
disparities between blacks and whites both in regards to the magnitude of movement (e.g. 
exceeding parents’ rank by 20 or 30 percentage points) as well as by the place in the distribution. 
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 A version of Table 3.3 restricted to the never-incarcerated population is available in Appendix Table 3.7. 
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 The family-size-adjusted family income results are roughly the same magnitude as the unadjusted numbers 
(results not shown). 








Looking at the directional mobility results, I find a wide range in the estimated magnitude of the 
upward (0.2 to 20.3 percentage points) and downward (-21.0 to 22.9 percentage points) mobility 
gaps, although some are based on rather small cell sizes with large standard errors. Due to the 
issue of small cell size, I would place the most weight on the family income-family income 
results, which estimate the upward mobility gap as between 19.1 and 20.3 percentage points and 
the downward gap between -20.9 and -21.0.
16
  
Within the family income-family income analyses, the predicted upward mobility gaps 
between sons and daughters are very similar. Interestingly, I find that the family income-child 
earnings downward mobility gap for daughters is positive, suggesting that black daughters are 
less likely (or at least not more likely) than white daughters to experience a decline in earnings 
rank relative to their parent’s income ranking. However, much of this difference stems from the 
high degree of downward mobility for white daughters’ earnings (over 60% of white daughters 
fall at least 20 percentage points in own earnings rank relative to their family income or father 
earnings rank), likely due to reduced labor market participation by white females.  
CONCLUSION 
 
Choice of dataset and economic resource measure clearly affects conclusions about 
black-white differences in intergenerational mobility. Using the PSID to examine elasticities and 
correlations leads to the conclusion that there is stronger intergenerational economic persistence 
among whites than blacks, while using the NLSY suggests that there are no differences by race. 
Using the PSID, I find that greater earnings mobility exists than income mobility, while I find the 
opposite result in the NLSY. Among the three PSID samples, elasticities increase with additional 
years of parental and child data                          , suggesting that better 
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 Using the same methodology, Mazumder (2011) finds a family income-family income upward mobility gap of 24.6 
and a downward mobility gap of -18.4, which are consistent with both my NLSY and PSID results. 








measurement of parental resources leads to a stronger observed level of persistence and 
highlighting the importance of these restrictions in elasticity estimation.  
Despite the sensitivity of results to measurement and specification, I consistently find that 
racial disparities are much greater among sons than daughters. I also find that black children 
from female-headed households experience greater persistence than those from male-headed 
households, but that rates of persistence across family structure are fairly similar for white 
children. Additionally, ever-incarcerated blacks have a very low level of economic similarity 
with their parents (likely due to downward mobility), while incarceration among whites only 
slightly weakens intergenerational relationships.  
 These differences in results reflect differences in the sample and content of the two 
datasets. The NLSY has a large sample and produces consistent results, but has limited family 
background information (parental income, earnings, family structure, etc). In contrast, the PSID 
has a smaller sample, but has much richer background information as well as wealth data that 
may help to explain some of the racial differences in mobility (examined in Chapter 4). 
Examining the three PSID samples highlights a weakness (and possible source of bias) in the 
NLSY sample which has less parental resource information. Across all resource measures, family 
income-family income results were the most robust to sample restrictions and choice of dataset. 
The sensitivity of results to dataset, sample, and measure may be one reason not much 
has been written (or at least published) about black-white mobility gaps in the United States. 
This is especially true when methods are limited to intergenerational elasticities and correlations. 
However, utilizing new methods by Bhattacharya and Mazumder (2011) produces more 
consistent results, although it does create more demands on data. Focusing on the likelihood of 
upward mobility from the bottom quintile, it is clear that regardless of dataset or economic 








resource measurement, a sizable mobility gap exists between black and white families, with low-
income black families disproportionately trapped at the bottom of the income (or earnings) 
distribution. Similarly, more advantaged black children are more likely to lose that advantage in 
adulthood than similar white children. Additional research is needed to explore potential 
explanations for this gap. 
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Overall         
Parent Income (in 2009$) $66,974 $93,887 $75,601 $67,805 
Yrs of Parent Income 2.1 2.6 13.4 10.8 
Child Income (in 2009$) $83,017 $97,689 $97,689 $89,122 
Yrs of Child Income 5.9 6.6 6.6 6.6 
Son Earnings (in 2009$) $64,706 $74,920 $74,920 $67,054 
Yrs of Son Earnings 6.0 6.1 6.1 6.0 
Ave Parent Age in 1979 46.6 46.3 46.3 42.0 
Ave Child Age at midpt 42.7 41.9 41.9 39.0 
N 5710 1027 1027 2483 
White         
Parent Income (in 2009$) $73,222 $102,361 $81,941 $71,999 
Yrs of Parent Income 2.1 2.6 13.5 10.7 
Child Income (in 2009$) $89,531 $109,322 $109,322 $95,506 
Yrs of Child Income 6.0 6.7 6.7 6.6 
Son Earnings (in 2009$) $68,896 $80,144 $80,144 $69,024 
Yrs of Son Earnings 6.1 6.3 6.3 6.1 
Ave Parent Age in 1979 46.7 46.6 46.6 41.8 
Ave Child Age at midpt 42.7 41.9 41.9 38.8 
N 2828 554 554 1498 
Black         
Parent Income (in 2009$) $40,250 $52,281 $42,390 $39,578 
Yrs of Parent Income 2.1 2.7 12.9 11.1 
Child Income (in 2009$) $53,348 $46,456 $46,456 $47,500 
Yrs of Child Income 5.5 6.4 6.4 6.5 
Son Earnings (in 2009$) $43,025 $42,161 $42,161 $43,075 
Yrs of Son Earnings 5.6 5.7 5.7 5.6 
Ave Parent Age in 1979 45.8 45.6 45.6 43.2 
Ave Child Age at midpt 42.7 42.0 42.0 40.3 











Table 3.2: Intergenerational Elasticities and Correlations PSID v NLSY
NLSY PSID (#1) PSID (#2) PSID (#3) NLSY PSID (#1) PSID (#2) PSID (#3) NLSY PSID (#1) PSID (#2) PSID (#3)
Intergenerational Elasticities
Income-Income 0.4337*** 0.4674*** 0.6523*** 0.6458*** 0.3754*** 0.3054*** 0.5202*** 0.5469*** 0.3500*** 0.1657 0.1974 0.3406***
(0.019) (0.049) (0.054) (0.036) (0.028) (0.066) (0.076) (0.049) (0.031) (0.130) (0.167) (0.102)
Income-Son Earn 0.5753*** 0.2816*** 0.4476*** 0.5324*** 0.5011*** 0.1729* 0.3829*** 0.5149*** 0.5027*** 0.0959 0.1471 0.2358*
(0.053) (0.065) (0.067) (0.061) (0.073) (0.092) (0.106) (0.077) (0.088) (0.076) (0.098) (0.141)
Income-Daughter Earn 0.3092*** 0.3018*** 0.3419*** 0.3407*** 0.2543** 0.3124*** 0.3745*** 0.3388*** 0.4832*** 0.3733*** 0.4190*** 0.4476***
(0.063) (0.080) (0.088) (0.057) (0.100) (0.117) (0.142) (0.085) (0.080) (0.132) (0.151) (0.093)
Father-Son Earn 0.1961*** 0.3231*** 0.4063*** 0.1529** 0.2692*** 0.3880*** 0.0385 0.1051 0.2443*
(0.058) (0.072) (0.056) (0.071) (0.094) (0.071) (0.142) (0.231) (0.130)
Father-Daughter Earn 0.1460* 0.2942*** 0.2222*** 0.1426 0.3006** 0.2951*** 0.1737** 0.4069*** 0.1519**
(0.086) (0.095) (0.055) (0.104) (0.118) (0.071) (0.075) (0.124) (0.066)
Correlations
Income-Income 0.3563 0.3634 0.4328 0.4443 0.3084 0.2373 0.3450 0.3762 0.2864 0.1290 0.1322 0.2356
Income-Son Earn 0.2529 0.2384 0.3186 0.3560 0.2203 0.1464 0.2728 0.3444 0.2191 0.0815 0.1056 0.1554
Income-Daughter Earn 0.1247 0.2276 0.2152 0.2102 0.1026 0.2359 0.2356 0.2093 0.1949 0.2813 0.2624 0.2782
Father-Son Earn 0.1869 0.2468 0.3107 0.1458 0.2056 0.2966 0.0374 0.0819 0.1859
Father-Daughter Earn 0.1267 0.1870 0.1565 0.1240 0.1912 0.2080 0.1470 0.2497 0.1106
Sample Size
Income-Income 5710 1,027 1,027 2,483 2828 554 554 1,498 1727 446 446 915
Income-Son Earn 2763 420 420 1,031 1432 258 258 707 794 149 149 293
Income-Daughter Earn 2513 462 462 1,099 1226 238 238 630 794 210 210 439
Father-Son Earn 324 324 921 230 230 682 85 85 212
Father-Daughter Earn 338 338 934 220 220 606 105 105 300

















Table 3.3: Likelihood of Upward and Downward Mobility by Race, NLSY and PSID
Panel A: Likelihood of upward mobility from bottom quintile
White Black N's White Black N's White Black
Family Income-Family Income
NLSY N w = 430 0.566 0.376 0.191 ***    228 0.595 0.401 0.194 ***    202 0.536 0.355 0.181 ***    
N b = 945 (0.027) (0.017) (0.032) 439 (0.037) (0.025) (0.045) 506 (0.039) (0.022) (0.045)
PSID (#3) 201 0.523 0.321 0.203 ***    116 0.530 0.362 0.168 ** 85 0.514 0.289 0.224 ***    
619 (0.040) (0.034) (0.052) 223 (0.052) (0.060) (0.080) 396 (0.062) (0.038) (0.072)
Family Income-Child Earnings
NLSY 409 0.641 0.558 0.083 ***    229 0.701 0.591 0.110 ** 180 0.569 0.529 0.041
865 (0.026) (0.018) (0.032) 417 (0.034) (0.026) (0.043) 448 (0.041) (0.024) (0.047)
PSID (#3) 184 0.561 0.541 0.020 109 0.683 0.665 0.018 75 0.384 0.444 -0.060
512 (0.041) (0.042) (0.059) 187 (0.052) (0.075) (0.092) 325 (0.063) (0.047) (0.079)
Father Earnings-Child Earnings
PSID (#3) 214 0.618 0.577 0.041 128 0.741 0.736 0.006 86 0.427 0.442 -0.016          
327 (0.037) (0.051) (0.063) 127 (0.044) (0.061) (0.076) 200 (0.059) (0.070) (0.092)
Panel B: Likelihood of downward mobility from top half
White Black N's White Black N's White Black
Family Income-Family Income
NLSY N w = 1537 0.410 0.620 -0.210 ***    786 0.395 0.586 -0.190 ***    751 0.425 0.652 -0.227  ***    
N b = 295 (0.013) (0.030) (0.033) 147 (0.018) (0.043) (0.047) 148 (0.018) (0.042) (0.046)
PSID (#3) 816 0.391 0.600 -0.209  **     407 0.371 0.583 -0.212 409 0.411 0.611 -0.200
88 (0.019) (0.099) (0.101) 44 (0.027) (0.140) (0.143) 44 (0.027) (0.134) (0.137)
Family Income-Child Earnings
NLSY 1436 0.452 0.467 -0.015 766 0.312 0.430 -0.119  **     670 0.616 0.503 0.114  **     
281 (0.013) (0.032) (0.034) 142 (0.017) (0.044) (0.047) 139 (0.019) (0.046) (0.049)
PSID (#3) 715 0.471 0.242 0.229 ***    354 0.316 0.284 0.033 361 0.624 0.213 0.411 ***    
69 (0.020) (0.071) (0.074) 36 (0.028) (0.113) (0.116) 33 (0.027) (0.088) (0.092)
Father Earnings-Child Earnings
PSID (#3) 675 0.457 0.301 0.156        340 0.299 0.168 0.131 335 0.616 0.525 0.091        
42 (0.021) (0.108) (0.110) 22 (0.028) (0.090) (0.094) 20 (0.029) (0.207) (0.209)
See Appendix Tables 3.8-3.22 for full matrices
Daughters
N: White, 
Black W-B Gap W-B Gap W-B Gap
Both Sons & Daughters Sons
Both Sons & Daughters Sons Daughters
N: White, 









CHAPTER 3 APPENDIX: 
 
Appendix Table 3.1: Intergenerational Elasticities and Correlations by Incarceration History, Overall
Ever Incarc
NLSY PSID (#1) PSID (#2) PSID (#3) NLSY NLSY PSID (#1) PSID (#2) PSID (#3)
Family Income -Family Income (Not adjusted by family size)
Corr 0.3563 0.3634 0.4328 0.4443 0.1320 0.3558 0.3666 0.4343 0.4424
IGE 0.4337*** 0.4674*** 0.6523*** 0.6458*** 0.1834* 0.4158*** 0.4574*** 0.6306*** 0.6337***
(0.019) (0.049) (0.054) (0.036) (0.109) (0.020) (0.049) (0.056) (0.037)
N 5710 1,027 1,027 2,483 361 5,349 955 955 2,312
Family Income-Family Income (Family size adjusted by poverty threshold)
Corr 0.2956 0.4210 0.4809 0.4848 0.3418 0.1797 0.2161 0.3145 0.3200
IGE 0.3259*** 0.4386*** 0.5961*** 0.5962*** 0.3251*** 0.2236*** 0.2783*** 0.8890*** 0.8568***
(0.018) (0.040) (0.039) (0.028) (0.102) (0.044) (0.080) (0.203) (0.121)
N 5704 1,027 1,027 2,483 361 5,343 955 955 2,312
Family Income-Children's Earnings 
Corr 0.1910 0.2259 0.2496 0.2602 0.1233 0.1792 0.2266 0.2417 0.2571
IGE 0.4627*** 0.3084*** 0.4074*** 0.4308*** 0.3201* 0.4289*** 0.3156*** 0.4000*** 0.4360***
(0.042) (0.054) (0.060) (0.043) (0.183) (0.043) (0.055) (0.063) (0.044)
N 5276 882 882 2,130 296 4,980 828 828 2,003
Family Income-Son Earnings 
Corr 0.2529 0.2384 0.3186 0.3560 0.1074 0.2362 0.2347 0.3077 0.3540
IGE 0.5753*** 0.2816*** 0.4476*** 0.5324*** 0.2874 0.5098*** 0.2800*** 0.4339*** 0.5425***
(0.053) (0.065) (0.067) (0.061) (0.199) (0.055) (0.066) (0.075) (0.064)
N 2763 420 420 1,031 271 2,492 375 375 923
Family Income-Daughter Earnings
Corr 0.1247 0.2276 0.2152 0.2102 0.3775 0.1199 0.2258 0.2054 0.2036
IGE 0.3092*** 0.3018*** 0.3419*** 0.3407*** 0.6768 0.2980*** 0.2992*** 0.3250*** 0.3313***
(0.063) (0.080) (0.088) (0.057) (0.398) (0.064) (0.079) (0.089) (0.058)
N 2513 462 462 1,099 25 2,488 453 453 1,080
Father Earnings-Son Earnings IGE
Corr 0.1869 0.2468 0.3107 0.1832 0.2329 0.3032
IGE 0.1961*** 0.3231*** 0.4063*** 0.1952*** 0.3272*** 0.3990***
(0.058) (0.072) (0.056) (0.061) (0.088) (0.061)
N 324 324 921 293 293 832
Father Earnings-Daughter Earnings
Corr 0.1267 0.1870 0.1565 0.1433 0.1940 0.1576
IGE 0.1460* 0.2942*** 0.2222*** 0.1639* 0.3021*** 0.2223***
(0.086) (0.095) (0.055) (0.085) (0.094) (0.055)
N 338 338 934 332 332 918











NLSY PSID (#1) PSID (#2) PSID (#3) NLSY NLSY PSID (#1) PSID (#2) PSID (#3)
Family Income-Family Income (Not adjusted by family size)
Corr 0.3084 0.2373 0.3450 0.3762 0.1241 0.3031 0.2460 0.3418 0.3647
IGE 0.3754*** 0.3054*** 0.5202*** 0.5469*** 0.1724 0.3542*** 0.3073*** 0.4967*** 0.5229***
(0.028) (0.066) (0.076) (0.049) (0.163) (0.028) (0.062) (0.077) (0.051)
N 2828 554 554 1,498 108 2,720 523 523 1,421
Family Income-Family Income (Family size adjusted by poverty threshold)
Corr 0.2010 0.2925 0.3867 0.4076 0.3332 0.1364 0.1700 0.3041 0.2820
IGE 0.2216*** 0.3049*** 0.4791*** 0.5011*** 0.3175** 0.1698*** 0.2189*** 0.8599*** 0.7557***
(0.023) (0.049) (0.059) (0.040) (0.130) (0.043) (0.080) (0.267) (0.151)
N 2825 554 554 1,498 108 2,717 523 523 1,421
Family Income-Children's Earnings 
Corr 0.1626 0.1851 0.2187 0.2325 0.1010 0.1526 0.2033 0.2229 0.2271
IGE 0.3937*** 0.2527*** 0.3569*** 0.3847*** 0.2620 0.3653*** 0.2832*** 0.3689*** 0.3851***
(0.062) (0.078) (0.093) (0.059) (0.262) (0.064) (0.079) (0.099) (0.062)
N 2658 496 496 1,337 87 2,571 469 469 1,268
Family Income-Son Earnings 
Corr 0.2203 0.1464 0.2728 0.3444 0.0754 0.2102 0.1552 0.2690 0.3324
IGE 0.5011*** 0.1729* 0.3829*** 0.5149*** 0.2013 0.4537*** 0.1850** 0.3789*** 0.5095***
(0.073) (0.092) (0.106) (0.077) (0.292) (0.076) (0.094) (0.121) (0.086)
N 1432 258 258 707 78 1,354 234 234 645
Family Income-Daughter Earnings
Corr 0.1026 0.2359 0.2356 0.2093 0.5818 0.0958 0.2494 0.2368 0.2081
IGE 0.2543** 0.3124*** 0.3745*** 0.3388*** 1.0231 0.2382** 0.3304*** 0.3748*** 0.3385***
(0.100) (0.117) (0.142) (0.085) (0.572) (0.101) (0.114) (0.141) (0.085)
N 1226 238 238 630 9 1,217 235 235 623
Father Earnings-Son Earnings IGE
Corr 0.1458 0.2056 0.2966 0.1514 0.1917 0.2988
IGE 0.1529** 0.2692*** 0.3880*** 0.1613** 0.2693** 0.3934***
(0.071) (0.094) (0.071) (0.076) (0.130) (0.080)
N 230 230 682 209 209 621
Father Earnings-Daughter Earnings
Corr 0.1240 0.1912 0.2080 0.1455 0.2023 0.2123
IGE 0.1426 0.3006** 0.2951*** 0.1661 0.3149*** 0.2994***
(0.104) (0.118) (0.071) (0.104) (0.117) (0.071)
N 220 220 606 218 218 599
Appendix Table 3.2: Intergenerational Elasticities and Correlations by Incarceration History, White non-
Hispanic Families











NLSY PSID (#1) PSID (#2) PSID (#3) NLSY NLSY PSID (#1) PSID (#2) PSID (#3)
Family Income-Family Income (Not adjusted by family size)
Corr 0.2864 0.1290 0.1322 0.2356 0.0695 0.3075 0.1129 0.1274 0.2619
IGE 0.3500*** 0.1657 0.1974 0.3406*** 0.0971 0.3612*** 0.1417 0.1845 0.3725***
(0.031) (0.130) (0.167) (0.102) (0.096) (0.031) (0.139) (0.175) (0.108)
N 1727 446 446 915 165 1,562 409 409 828
Family Income-Family Income (Family size adjusted by poverty threshold)
Corr 0.3579 0.1922 0.2374 0.3116 0.0891 0.2723 0.1539 0.1758 0.2718
IGE 0.3954*** 0.1979 0.2869** 0.3771*** 0.0856 0.3390*** 0.1981* 0.4900* 0.7193***
(0.038) (0.136) (0.139) (0.084) (0.092) (0.097) (0.109) (0.262) (0.211)
N 1724 446 446 915 165 1,559 409 409 828
Family Income-Children's Earnings 
Corr 0.2018 0.1730 0.1958 0.2511 0.0445 0.2074 0.1520 0.1711 0.2695
IGE 0.4909*** 0.2335*** 0.3151*** 0.4117*** 0.1155 0.4985*** 0.2100** 0.2796** 0.4536***
(0.059) (0.087) (0.110) (0.092) (0.214) (0.061) (0.088) (0.109) (0.080)
N 1588 359 359 732 139 1,449 336 336 681
Family Income-Son Earnings 
Corr 0.2191 0.0815 0.1056 0.1554 0.0375 0.2321 0.0562 0.0671 0.1685
IGE 0.5027*** 0.0959 0.1471 0.2358* 0.1004 0.5053*** 0.0684 0.0960 0.2633*
(0.088) (0.076) (0.098) (0.141) (0.223) (0.092) (0.075) (0.086) (0.144)
N 794 149 149 293 129 665 132 132 253
Family Income-Daughter Earnings
Corr 0.1949 0.2813 0.2624 0.2782 0.1965 0.1911 0.2456 0.2296 0.2650
IGE 0.4832*** 0.3733*** 0.4190*** 0.4476*** 0.4419 0.4750*** 0.3273** 0.3657** 0.4290***
(0.080) (0.132) (0.151) (0.093) (0.735) (0.081) (0.131) (0.150) (0.094)
N 794 210 210 439 10 784 204 204 428
Father Earnings-Son Earnings IGE
Corr 0.0374 0.0819 0.1859 -0.0817 -0.0804 0.1189
IGE 0.0385 0.1051 0.2443* -0.0850 -0.1090 0.1565
(0.142) (0.231) (0.130) (0.087) (0.171) (0.118)
N 85 85 212 77 77 187
Father Earnings-Daughter Earnings
Corr 0.1470 0.2497 0.1106 0.1538 0.2499 0.1101
IGE 0.1737** 0.4069*** 0.1519** 0.1788** 0.4011*** 0.1499**
(0.075) (0.124) (0.066) (0.075) (0.126) (0.066)
N 105 105 300 101 101 292
Appendix Table 3.3: Intergenerational Elasticities and Correlations by Incarceration History, Black non-
Hispanic Families










Appendix Table 3.4: Intergenerational Elasticities and Correlations by Family Structure, Overall
NLSY PSID (#1) PSID (#2) PSID (#3) NLSY PSID (#1) PSID (#2) PSID (#3)
Family Income-Family Income (Not adjusted by family size)
Corr 0.3476 0.3212 0.3997 0.3970 0.2396 0.3802 0.4746 0.4461
IGE 0.4557*** 0.4882*** 0.6993*** 0.6665*** 0.2953*** 0.4556*** 0.6575*** 0.5703***
(0.022) (0.069) (0.072) (0.046) (0.055) (0.080) (0.095) (0.062)
N 4,655 684 684 1,682 1,055 343 343 801
Family Income-Family Income (Family size adjusted by poverty threshold)
Corr 0.2717 0.3532 0.4251 0.4360 0.3205 0.5028 0.5547 0.5177
IGE 0.2997*** 0.4032*** 0.5690*** 0.5801*** 0.4132*** 0.4862*** 0.6553*** 0.5831***
(0.020) (0.056) (0.054) (0.035) (0.057) (0.056) (0.065) (0.046)
N 4,651 684 684 1,682 1,053 343 343 801
Family Income-Children's Earnings 
Corr 0.1856 0.2014 0.2489 0.2674 0.1457 0.2562 0.2376 0.1903
IGE 0.4917*** 0.3366*** 0.4879*** 0.5241*** 0.3465*** 0.2993*** 0.3322*** 0.2623***
(0.050) (0.081) (0.085) (0.058) (0.102) (0.076) (0.098) (0.069)
N 4,309 595 595 1,454 967 287 287 676
Family Income-Son Earnings 
Corr 0.2551 0.2119 0.3276 0.3599 0.1509 0.2179 0.2428 0.2299
IGE 0.6266*** 0.3040*** 0.5347*** 0.6185*** 0.3345** 0.2263*** 0.3076** 0.2945***
(0.060) (0.105) (0.091) (0.074) (0.158) (0.084) (0.130) (0.104)
N 2,281 292 292 734 482 128 128 297
Family Income-Daughter Earnings
Corr 0.1145 0.2128 0.2111 0.2234 0.1292 0.2761 0.2187 0.1848
IGE 0.3141*** 0.3412*** 0.4086*** 0.4385*** 0.3231*** 0.3205*** 0.2980** 0.2473***
(0.081) (0.116) (0.132) (0.083) (0.121) (0.123) (0.140) (0.083)
N 2,028 303 303 720 485 159 159 379
Father Earnings-Son Earnings IGE
Corr 0.2051 0.2759 0.3259 -0.0136 0.0060 0.2038
IGE 0.2139*** 0.3583*** 0.4664*** -0.0159 0.0088 0.2024**
(0.063) (0.080) (0.064) (0.187) (0.234) (0.094)
N 282 282 730 42 42 191
Father Earnings-Daughter Earnings
Corr 0.1385 0.1754 0.1861 0.0615 0.2737 0.0843
IGE 0.1649* 0.2889*** 0.2926*** 0.0484 0.2704** 0.0899
(0.100) (0.111) (0.078) (0.134) (0.102) (0.071)
N 288 288 716 50 50 218










NLSY PSID (#1) PSID (#2) PSID (#3) NLSY PSID (#1) PSID (#2) PSID (#3)
Family Income-Family Income (Not adjusted by family size)
Corr 0.3247 0.2482 0.3524 0.3469 -0.0235 0.1098 0.2469 0.3466
IGE 0.4257*** 0.3773*** 0.6165*** 0.5824*** -0.0289 0.1311 0.3415* 0.4424***
(0.029) (0.078) (0.085) (0.053) (0.091) (0.138) (0.179) (0.111)
N 2,587 445 445 1,181 241 109 109 317
Family Income-Family Income (Family size adjusted by poverty threshold)
Corr 0.2035 0.2832 0.3663 0.3730 0.0922 0.2458 0.3721 0.4425
IGE 0.2244*** 0.3234*** 0.4901*** 0.4959*** 0.1193 0.2365** 0.4378*** 0.4972***
(0.024) (0.057) (0.064) (0.042) (0.096) (0.097) (0.158) (0.099)
N 2,585 445 445 1,181 240 109 109 317
Family Income-Children's Earnings 
Corr 0.1728 0.1843 0.2423 0.2407 -0.0079 0.0923 0.0163 0.0968
IGE 0.4578*** 0.3078*** 0.4746*** 0.4715*** -0.0188 0.1081 0.0230 0.1331
(0.068) (0.092) (0.110) (0.070) (0.182) (0.145) (0.173) (0.110)
N 2,431 403 403 1,056 227 93 93 281
Family Income-Son Earnings 
Corr 0.2479 0.1852 0.3410 0.3501 -0.0404 -0.0606 -0.0277 0.1478
IGE 0.6089*** 0.2657** 0.5564*** 0.6013*** -0.0891 -0.0628 -0.0351 0.1897
(0.078) (0.125) (0.129) (0.092) (0.260) (0.146) (0.228) (0.142)
N 1,316 205 205 563 116 53 53 144
Family Income-Daughter Earnings
Corr 0.0965 0.2054 0.2057 0.2067 0.0204 0.2007 0.1275 0.1415
IGE 0.2645** 0.3291** 0.3976** 0.4053*** 0.0511 0.2283 0.1717 0.1869
(0.115) (0.133) (0.160) (0.100) (0.230) (0.264) (0.291) (0.156)
N 1,115 198 198 493 111 40 40 137
Father Earnings-Son Earnings IGE
Corr 0.1546 0.2385 0.3238 -0.0428 -0.0601 0.1459
IGE 0.1614** 0.3098*** 0.4634*** -0.0491 -0.0871 0.1454
(0.073) (0.109) (0.081) (0.258) (0.284) (0.114)
N 203 203 560 27 27 122
Father Earnings-Daughter Earnings
Corr 0.1410 0.1816 0.2159 -0.2340 0.1628 0.1669
IGE 0.1676 0.2988** 0.3388*** -0.1745 0.1598 0.1798
(0.114) (0.131) (0.087) (0.190) (0.151) (0.124)
N 197 197 492 23 23 114
Never Female Head Ever Female Head













NLSY PSID (#1) PSID (#2) PSID (#3) NLSY PSID (#1) PSID (#2) PSID (#3)
Family Income-Family Income (Not adjusted by family size)
Corr 0.2586 0.0900 0.1095 0.1374 0.2892 0.2404 0.2683 0.3312
IGE 0.3400*** 0.1406 0.1954 0.2346 0.3586*** 0.2845*** 0.3635** 0.4152***
(0.043) (0.262) (0.289) (0.212) (0.053) (0.108) (0.147) (0.095)
N 1,135 221 221 447 592 225 225 468
Family Income-Family Income (Family size adjusted by poverty threshold)
Corr 0.3316 0.0691 0.1277 0.1738 0.3290 0.4367 0.4558 0.4504
IGE 0.3657*** 0.0805 0.1721 0.2306 0.4274*** 0.4144*** 0.5205*** 0.4998***
(0.047) (0.221) (0.217) (0.155) (0.066) (0.105) (0.108) (0.082)
N 1,133 221 221 447 591 225 225 468
Family Income-Children's Earnings 
Corr 0.1834 0.1232 0.1857 0.2666 0.2036 0.1859 0.1960 0.3334
IGE 0.4879*** 0.2036 0.3595* 0.5184*** 0.4855*** 0.2157 0.2704 0.4577***
(0.079) (0.244) (0.184) (0.128) (0.113) (0.131) (0.194) (0.134)
N 1,046 174 174 353 542 185 185 379
Family Income-Son Earnings 
Corr 0.1775 -0.1117 0.0132 0.1059 0.2735 -0.0516 -0.0631 0.1457
IGE 0.4402*** -0.1646 0.0217 0.1796 0.6049*** -0.0519 -0.0772 0.1946
(0.120) (0.189) (0.154) (0.161) (0.160) (0.111) (0.141) (0.237)
N 527 79 79 147 267 70 70 146
Family Income-Daughter Earnings
Corr 0.1934 0.3274 0.2963 0.2925 0.1551 0.4554 0.4579 0.4252
IGE 0.5299*** 0.5387** 0.5938*** 0.5838*** 0.3901** 0.5008*** 0.5877*** 0.5277***
(0.104) (0.212) (0.215) (0.160) (0.157) (0.160) (0.197) (0.125)
N 519 95 95 206 275 115 115 233
Father Earnings-Son Earnings IGE
Corr 0.0488 -0.0442 0.1197 0.2057 0.3632 0.2335
IGE 0.0506 -0.0564 0.1712 0.2444* 0.6315* 0.2079
(0.195) (0.234) (0.132) (0.129) (0.309) (0.200)
N 71 71 146 14 14 66
Father Earnings-Daughter Earnings
Corr 0.0951 0.1887 0.0811 0.3360 0.4561 0.1413
IGE 0.1162 0.3231*** 0.1224 0.2594*** 0.4323*** 0.1336**
(0.119) (0.118) (0.099) (0.059) (0.125) (0.062)
N 81 81 203 24 24 97
Never Female Head Ever Female Head









Appendix Table 3.7: Likelihood of Upward and Downward Mobility by Race for Never-Incarcerated Population, NLSY and PSID
Panel A: Likelihood of upward mobility from bottom quintile
White Black N's White Black N's White Black
Family Income-Family Income
NLSY N w = 416 0.570 0.380 0.190 *** 206 0.621 0.441 0.180 *** 210 0.523 0.339 0.185 ***
N b = 870 (0.027) (0.017) (0.032) 356 (0.038) (0.029) (0.048) 514 (0.038) (0.022) (0.044)
PSID (#3) 192 0.524 0.300 0.224 *** 103 0.541 0.348 0.194 ** 89 0.505 0.270 0.235 *** 
567 (0.041) (0.034) (0.053) 182 (0.055) (0.065) (0.085) 385 (0.060) (0.038) (0.071)
Family Income-Child Earnings
NLSY 397 0.654 0.567 0.087 *** 210 0.741 0.642 0.099 ** 187 0.563 0.511 0.051
804 (0.027) (0.018) (0.032) 351 (0.034) (0.028) (0.044) 453 (0.040) (0.024) (0.047)
PSID (#3) 176 0.558 0.553 0.005 96 0.685 0.704 -0.019 80 0.407 0.458 -0.051
480 (0.042) (0.044) (0.061) 158 (0.055) (0.088) (0.104) 322 (0.061) (0.047) (0.077)
Father Earnings-Child Earnings
PSID (#3) 198 0.614 0.608 0.006 113 0.752 0.788 -0.036 85 0.422 0.477 -0.055
303 (0.038) (0.051) (0.063) 107 (0.046) (0.056) (0.072) 196 (0.059) (0.070) (0.092)
Panel B: Likelihood of downward mobility from top half
White Black N's White Black N's White Black
Family Income-Family Income
NLSY N w = 1471 0.411 0.587 -0.175 *** 746 0.400 0.515 -0.115 ** 725 0.423 0.647 -0.223 ***
N b = 261 (0.013) (0.033) (0.035) 121 (0.018) (0.049) (0.052) 140 (0.019) (0.043) (0.047)
PSID (#3) 772 0.394 0.599 -0.205  * 374 0.364 0.544 -0.180 398 0.423 0.634 -0.211
79 (0.020) (0.104) (0.106) 39 (0.028) (0.153) (0.156) 40 (0.027) (0.136) (0.139)
Family Income-Child Earnings
NLSY 1383 0.454 0.441 0.012 734 0.307 0.363 -0.056 649 0.625 0.509 0.116 **
251 (0.014) (0.034) (0.036) 119 (0.017) (0.047) (0.050) 132 (0.019) (0.047) (0.051)
PSID (#3) 675 0.471 0.230 0.241 *** 328 0.297 0.263 0.034 347 0.635 0.206 0.429 ***
65 (0.021) (0.069) (0.072) 34 (0.028) (0.109) (0.113) 31 (0.028) (0.087) (0.092)
Father Earnings-Child Earnings
PSID (#3) 646 0.456 0.301 0.155 314 0.279 0.168 0.111 332 0.622 0.525 0.097
42 (0.021) (0.108) (0.110) 22 (0.028) (0.090) (0.094) 20 (0.029) (0.207) (0.209)
Both Sons & Daughters Sons Daughters
N: White, 
Black W-B Gap W-B Gap W-B Gap
Both Sons & Daughters Sons Daughters
N: White, 










Appendix Table 3.8: NLSY Family Income-Family Income Mobility Matrices by Race (Sons & Daughters) 
Panel A: Likelihood of Upward Mobility by Race
White Black White Black White Black White Black
1 to 10 N w = 181 0.904 0.802 0.103 ***    0.784 0.562 0.222 ***    0.713 0.393 0.320 ***    0.562 0.272 0.290 ***    
N b = 581 (0.023) (0.017) (0.029) (0.034) (0.022) (0.040) (0.037) (0.022) (0.043) (0.042) (0.020) (0.047)
1 to 20 430 0.826 0.739 0.088 ***    0.696 0.536 0.160 ***    0.566 0.376 0.191 ***    0.439 0.272 0.167 ***    
945 (0.020) (0.015) (0.025) (0.025) (0.017) (0.030) (0.027) (0.017) (0.032) (0.027) (0.015) (0.031)
1 to 30 689 0.799 0.686 0.114 ***    0.679 0.511 0.168 ***    0.546 0.366 0.180 ***    0.440 0.263 0.177 ***    
1194 (0.017) (0.014) (0.022) (0.019) (0.015) (0.025) (0.021) (0.015) (0.025) (0.021) (0.013) (0.025)
1 to 40 982 0.737 0.655 0.082 ***    0.621 0.488 0.133 ***    0.498 0.356 0.142 ***    0.389 0.255 0.135 ***    
1341 (0.015) (0.014) (0.020) (0.017) (0.014) (0.022) (0.017) (0.014) (0.022) (0.017) (0.013) (0.021)
1 to 50 1291 0.694 0.637 0.057 ***    0.578 0.477 0.101 ***    0.458 0.348 0.110 ***    0.351 0.248 0.104 ***    
1432 (0.014) (0.013) (0.019) (0.015) (0.014) (0.020) (0.015) (0.013) (0.020) (0.014) (0.012) (0.019)
Panel B: Likelihood of Downward Mobility by Race
White Black White Black White Black White Black
91 to 100 N w = 306 0.858 0.859 -0.001        0.649 0.640 0.009        0.508 0.477 0.031        0.398 0.431 -0.033        
N b = 38 (0.020) (0.074) (0.077) (0.028) (0.086) (0.091) (0.029) (0.088) (0.093) (0.029) (0.087) (0.091)
81 to 100 614 0.785 0.822 -0.037 0.604 0.671 -0.067 0.465 0.556 -0.091 0.357 0.445 -0.087
87 (0.017) (0.049) (0.052) (0.020) (0.056) (0.059) (0.021) (0.058) (0.061) (0.020) (0.056) (0.060)
71 to 100 927 0.745 0.826 -0.080 ** 0.588 0.732 -0.143 ***    0.453 0.655 -0.202 ***    0.348 0.507 -0.159 ***    
155 (0.015) (0.034) (0.037) (0.016) (0.039) (0.042) (0.017) (0.042) (0.045) (0.016) (0.044) (0.046)
61 to 100 1236 0.709 0.793 -0.084 **    0.560 0.710 -0.150 ***    0.433 0.644 -0.211 ***    0.330 0.511 -0.181 ***    
220 (0.013) (0.030) (0.033) (0.014) (0.033) (0.036) (0.014) (0.035) (0.038) (0.014) (0.037) (0.039)
51 to 100 1537 0.667 0.776 -0.109 ***    0.530 0.706 -0.176 ***    0.410 0.620 -0.210 ***    0.304 0.481 -0.177 ***    
295 (0.012) (0.026) (0.029) (0.013) (0.028) (0.031) (0.013) (0.030) (0.033) (0.012) (0.031) (0.033)
41 to 100 1846 0.628 0.734 -0.106 ***    0.496 0.656 -0.159 ***    0.377 0.560 -0.183 ***    0.272 0.422 -0.150 ***    
386 (0.011) (0.024) (0.027) (0.012) (0.026) (0.028) (0.012) (0.027) (0.029) (0.011) (0.027) (0.029)







Likelihood of falling behind parents 
by at least 1 percentage point
Likelihood of falling behind parents 
by at least 10 percentage points
Likelihood of falling behind parents 
by at least 20 percentage points
Likelihood of falling behind parents 
by at least 30 percentage points






Likelihood of exceeding parents by 
at least 1 percentage point
Likelihood of exceeding parents by 
at least 10 percentage points
Likelihood of exceeding parents by 
at least 20 percentage points
Likelihood of exceeding parents by 
at least 30 percentage points









Appendix Table 3.9: NLSY Family Income-Family Income Mobility Matrices by Race (Sons) 
Panel A: Likelihood of Upward Mobility by Race
White Black White Black White Black White Black
1 to 10 N w = 96 0.952 0.856 0.097 ***    0.829 0.612 0.217 ***    0.748 0.424 0.323 ***    0.539 0.306 0.233 ***    
N b = 254 (0.022) (0.024) (0.032) (0.042) (0.033) (0.054) (0.048) (0.034) (0.059) (0.059) (0.032) (0.067)
1 to 20 228 0.847 0.781 0.066 * 0.720 0.574 0.146 ***    0.595 0.401 0.194 ***    0.421 0.303 0.118 ***    
439 (0.027) (0.021) (0.035) (0.034) (0.026) (0.042) (0.037) (0.025) (0.045) (0.037) (0.024) (0.044)
1 to 30 366 0.805 0.721 0.084 ***    0.700 0.540 0.160 ***    0.561 0.390 0.171 ***    0.428 0.290 0.138 ***    
562 (0.023) (0.020) (0.031) (0.026) (0.023) (0.035) (0.028) (0.022) (0.036) (0.028) (0.021) (0.035)
1 to 40 526 0.752 0.692 0.060 ** 0.650 0.524 0.126 ***    0.521 0.390 0.131 ***    0.392 0.288 0.103 ***    
636 (0.020) (0.020) (0.028) (0.022) (0.021) (0.031) (0.023) (0.021) (0.031) (0.023) (0.019) (0.030)
1 to 50 683 0.700 0.667 0.033 0.592 0.505 0.086 ***    0.472 0.377 0.095 ***    0.349 0.277 0.071 ***    
683 (0.019) (0.020) (0.027) (0.020) (0.021) (0.029) (0.020) (0.020) (0.029) (0.019) (0.019) (0.027)
Panel B: Likelihood of Downward Mobility by Race
White Black White Black White Black White Black
91 to 100 N w = 167 0.840 0.849 -0.009        0.606 0.549 0.057        0.483 0.419 0.063        0.382 0.419 -0.038        
N b = 19 (0.029) (0.084) (0.089) (0.039) (0.124) (0.130) (0.040) (0.126) (0.132) (0.038) (0.126) (0.132)
81 to 100 325 0.764 0.795 -0.031 0.569 0.609 -0.040 0.440 0.513 -0.073 0.338 0.382 -0.044
45 (0.024) (0.068) (0.072) (0.028) (0.079) (0.084) (0.028) (0.081) (0.086) (0.027) (0.078) (0.082)
71 to 100 481 0.747 0.784 -0.038 0.575 0.667 -0.092 0.429 0.611 -0.182 ***    0.324 0.432 -0.108 *
76 (0.020) (0.051) (0.055) (0.023) (0.058) (0.062) (0.023) (0.061) (0.065) (0.022) (0.061) (0.065)
61 to 100 643 0.712 0.765 -0.052 0.550 0.662 -0.112 ** 0.418 0.611 -0.192 ***    0.314 0.452 -0.138 ***    
114 (0.018) (0.043) (0.047) (0.020) (0.047) (0.051) (0.020) (0.049) (0.053) (0.019) (0.050) (0.053)
51 to 100 786 0.674 0.751 -0.077 * 0.522 0.672 -0.149 ***    0.395 0.586 -0.190 ***    0.284 0.445 -0.162 ***    
147 (0.017) (0.038) (0.042) (0.018) (0.041) (0.045) (0.018) (0.043) (0.047) (0.016) (0.044) (0.047)
41 to 100 943 0.638 0.716 -0.079 ** 0.490 0.632 -0.143 ***    0.365 0.549 -0.184 ***    0.257 0.400 -0.143 ***    
194 (0.016) (0.035) (0.039) (0.017) (0.037) (0.041) (0.016) (0.038) (0.042) (0.015) (0.038) (0.040)







Likelihood of falling behind parents 
by at least 1 percentage point
Likelihood of falling behind parents 
by at least 10 percentage points
Likelihood of falling behind parents 
by at least 20 percentage points
Likelihood of falling behind parents 
by at least 30 percentage points






Likelihood of exceeding parents by 
at least 1 percentage point
Likelihood of exceeding parents by 
at least 10 percentage points
Likelihood of exceeding parents by 
at least 20 percentage points
Likelihood of exceeding parents by 
at least 30 percentage points









Appendix Table 3.10: NLSY Family Income-Family Income Mobility Matrices by Race (Daughters) 
Panel A: Likelihood of Upward Mobility by Race
White Black White Black White Black White Black
1 to 10 N w = 85 0.849 0.761 0.088 * 0.732 0.524 0.209 *** 0.672 0.369 0.304 *** 0.589 0.246 0.343 ***
N b = 327 (0.043) (0.025) (0.049) (0.054) (0.029) (0.061) (0.057) (0.028) (0.064) (0.061) (0.025) (0.066)
1 to 20 202 0.805 0.704 0.101 *** 0.671 0.505 0.166 *** 0.536 0.355 0.181 *** 0.458 0.246 0.211 ***
506 (0.030) (0.021) (0.037) (0.036) (0.023) (0.043) (0.039) (0.022) (0.045) (0.039) (0.020) (0.044)
1 to 30 323 0.793 0.655 0.138 *** 0.657 0.486 0.171 *** 0.530 0.345 0.184 *** 0.453 0.240 0.212 ***
632 (0.024) (0.020) (0.031) (0.029) (0.021) (0.035) (0.030) (0.020) (0.036) (0.030) (0.017) (0.035)
1 to 40 456 0.720 0.622 0.098 *** 0.587 0.457 0.131 *** 0.472 0.326 0.146 *** 0.387 0.225 0.162 ***
705 (0.022) (0.019) (0.029) (0.025) (0.019) (0.031) (0.025) (0.018) (0.031) (0.024) (0.016) (0.029)
1 to 50 608 0.687 0.610 0.077 *** 0.563 0.451 0.112 *** 0.443 0.322 0.121 *** 0.354 0.221 0.133 ***
749 (0.020) (0.019) (0.027) (0.021) (0.019) (0.028) (0.021) (0.018) (0.028) (0.020) (0.016) (0.026)
Panel B: Likelihood of Downward Mobility by Race
White Black White Black White Black White Black
91 to 100 N w = 139 0.881 0.868 0.013        0.703 0.719 -0.016        0.539 0.526 0.013        0.418 0.440 -0.022        
N b = 19 (0.028) (0.118) (0.121) (0.040) (0.126) (0.132) (0.043) (0.125) (0.132) (0.043) (0.120) (0.128)
81 to 100 289 0.809 0.849 -0.039        0.646 0.733 -0.087        0.496 0.599 -0.103        0.380 0.507 -0.126
42 (0.024) (0.072) (0.076) (0.029) (0.079) (0.084) (0.030) (0.082) (0.088) (0.029) (0.082) (0.087)
71 to 100 446 0.744 0.863 -0.119 **     0.603 0.790 -0.188 ***    0.480 0.695 -0.215 ***    0.375 0.575 -0.200 ***    
79 (0.021) (0.046) (0.051) (0.024) (0.052) (0.057) (0.024) (0.057) (0.062) (0.023) (0.062) (0.066)
61 to 100 593 0.705 0.822 -0.117 **     0.571 0.760 -0.189 ***    0.449 0.677 -0.229 ***    0.349 0.571 -0.223 ***    
106 (0.019) (0.042) (0.046) (0.021) (0.046) (0.050) (0.021) (0.050) (0.054) (0.020) (0.053) (0.057)
51 to 100 751 0.660 0.800 -0.140 ***    0.539 0.740 -0.200 ***    0.425 0.652 -0.227 ***    0.327 0.516 -0.190 ***    
148 (0.018) (0.036) (0.040) (0.019) (0.039) (0.043) (0.018) (0.042) (0.046) (0.017) (0.045) (0.048)
41 to 100 903 0.618 0.752 -0.134 ***    0.503 0.679 -0.176 ***    0.390 0.570 -0.180 ***    0.288 0.445 -0.157 ***    
192 (0.016) (0.033) (0.037) (0.017) (0.036) (0.040) (0.017) (0.038) (0.042) (0.015) (0.038) (0.041)







Likelihood of falling behind parents 
by at least 1 percentage point
Likelihood of falling behind parents 
by at least 10 percentage points
Likelihood of falling behind parents 
by at least 20 percentage points
Likelihood of falling behind parents 
by at least 30 percentage points






Likelihood of exceeding parents by 
at least 1 percentage point
Likelihood of exceeding parents by 
at least 10 percentage points
Likelihood of exceeding parents by 
at least 20 percentage points
Likelihood of exceeding parents by 
at least 30 percentage points









Appendix Table 3.11: NLSY Family Income-Child Earnings Mobility Matrices by Race (Sons & Daughters) 
Panel A: Likelihood of Upward Mobility by Race
White Black White Black White Black White Black
1 to 10 N w = 167 0.909 0.902 0.007           0.816 0.730 0.086 ** 0.700 0.607 0.094 ** 0.620 0.443 0.178 ***
N b = 547 (0.025) (0.014) (0.029) (0.033) (0.020) (0.039) (0.039) (0.022) (0.045) (0.042) (0.023) (0.048)
1 to 20 409 0.854 0.857 -0.003 0.747 0.690 0.057 * 0.641 0.558 0.083 *** 0.513 0.416 0.097 ***
865 (0.019) (0.013) (0.023) (0.024) (0.017) (0.029) (0.026) (0.018) (0.032) (0.028) (0.018) (0.033)
1 to 30 654 0.821 0.816 0.005 0.699 0.661 0.038 0.592 0.536 0.056 ** 0.468 0.400 0.068 ***
1091 (0.016) (0.013) (0.021) (0.019) (0.015) (0.025) (0.021) (0.016) (0.026) (0.021) (0.016) (0.026)
1 to 40 932 0.761 0.782 -0.022 0.639 0.631 0.008 0.524 0.502 0.022 0.406 0.378 0.029
1225 (0.015) (0.013) (0.020) (0.017) (0.015) (0.022) (0.017) (0.015) (0.023) (0.017) (0.015) (0.023)
1 to 50 1222 0.709 0.768 -0.059 *** 0.592 0.620 -0.028 0.479 0.496 -0.016 0.360 0.367 -0.006
1307 (0.014) (0.013) (0.019) (0.015) (0.014) (0.021) (0.015) (0.015) (0.021) (0.015) (0.014) (0.020)
Panel B: Likelihood of Downward Mobility by Race
White Black White Black White Black White Black
91 to 100 N w = 287 0.840 0.885 -0.044 0.662 0.682 -0.019 0.545 0.516 0.030 0.459 0.391 0.068
N b = 36 (0.022) (0.056) (0.060) (0.029) (0.080) (0.085) (0.030) (0.089) (0.094) (0.030) (0.084) (0.089)
81 to 100 574 0.781 0.773 0.008 0.632 0.594 0.038 0.510 0.480 0.029 0.419 0.388 0.030
86 (0.018) (0.050) (0.053) (0.021) (0.056) (0.060) (0.021) (0.057) (0.061) (0.021) (0.054) (0.058)
71 to 100 865 0.748 0.785 -0.037 0.610 0.630 -0.019 0.486 0.517 -0.031 0.395 0.429 -0.034
146 (0.015) (0.037) (0.040) (0.017) (0.043) (0.046) (0.017) (0.045) (0.048) (0.017) (0.043) (0.047)
61 to 100 1153 0.710 0.766 -0.056 0.590 0.642 -0.052 0.471 0.517 -0.046 0.378 0.422 -0.044
210 (0.014) (0.032) (0.034) (0.015) (0.035) (0.038) (0.015) (0.037) (0.040) (0.015) (0.037) (0.039)
51 to 100 1436 0.685 0.725 -0.040 0.570 0.589 -0.018 0.452 0.467 -0.015 0.359 0.380 -0.021
281 (0.012) (0.029) (0.031) (0.013) (0.031) (0.034) (0.013) (0.032) (0.034) (0.013) (0.031) (0.033)
41 to 100 1726 0.643 0.660 -0.017 0.535 0.530 0.005 0.416 0.410 0.006 0.323 0.324 0.000
363 (0.012) (0.027) (0.029) (0.012) (0.028) (0.031) (0.012) (0.027) (0.030) (0.011) (0.026) (0.028)







Likelihood of falling behind parents 
by at least 1 percentage point
Likelihood of falling behind parents 
by at least 10 percentage points
Likelihood of falling behind parents 
by at least 20 percentage points
Likelihood of falling behind parents 
by at least 30 percentage points






Likelihood of exceeding parents by 
at least 1 percentage point
Likelihood of exceeding parents by 
at least 10 percentage points
Likelihood of exceeding parents by 
at least 20 percentage points
Likelihood of exceeding parents by 
at least 30 percentage points









Appendix Table 3.12: NLSY Family Income-Child Earnings Mobility Matrices by Race (Sons) 
Panel A: Likelihood of Upward Mobility by Race
White Black White Black White Black White Black
1 to 10 N w = 93 0.916 0.920 -0.003           0.850 0.741 0.109 ** 0.733 0.642 0.091           0.664 0.498 0.165 **
N b = 252 (0.031) (0.018) (0.036) (0.040) (0.030) (0.050) (0.051) (0.033) (0.061) (0.055) (0.034) (0.065)
1 to 20 229 0.860 0.868 -0.008 0.781 0.694 0.087 ** 0.701 0.591 0.110 ** 0.580 0.469 0.111 **
417 (0.026) (0.018) (0.031) (0.030) (0.025) (0.039) (0.034) (0.026) (0.043) (0.037) (0.027) (0.045)
1 to 30 361 0.858 0.808 0.050 * 0.763 0.654 0.109 ***    0.693 0.560 0.134 ***    0.581 0.448 0.133 ***    
538 (0.020) (0.019) (0.027) (0.024) (0.022) (0.033) (0.026) (0.023) (0.035) (0.028) (0.023) (0.037)
1 to 40 517 0.814 0.772 0.042 0.717 0.623 0.093 ***    0.624 0.530 0.094 ***    0.508 0.427 0.080 **
607 (0.018) (0.019) (0.026) (0.021) (0.021) (0.030) (0.023) (0.022) (0.032) (0.024) (0.022) (0.032)
1 to 50 666 0.786 0.758 0.028 0.695 0.611 0.084 ***    0.591 0.522 0.069 ** 0.459 0.411 0.048 *
652 (0.017) (0.018) (0.025) (0.019) (0.021) (0.028) (0.020) (0.021) (0.029) (0.021) (0.021) (0.029)
Panel B: Likelihood of Downward Mobility by Race
White Black White Black White Black White Black
91 to 100 N w = 160 0.766 0.848 -0.081        0.537 0.613 -0.076        0.405 0.347 0.058        0.335 0.171 0.165 *
N b = 19 (0.034) (0.085) (0.091) (0.040) (0.120) (0.126) (0.040) (0.121) (0.127) (0.038) (0.077) (0.086)
81 to 100 322 0.684 0.679 0.004 0.512 0.479 0.033 0.366 0.337 0.029 0.285 0.243 0.042
45 (0.026) (0.077) (0.081) (0.028) (0.081) (0.086) (0.027) (0.075) (0.080) (0.026) (0.064) (0.069)
71 to 100 473 0.647 0.705 -0.058 0.479 0.524 -0.046 0.339 0.423 -0.083 0.266 0.351 -0.085
72 (0.022) (0.060) (0.064) (0.023) (0.064) (0.068) (0.022) (0.062) (0.066) (0.021) (0.059) (0.063)
61 to 100 628 0.602 0.676 -0.074 0.455 0.533 -0.078 0.326 0.435 -0.109 ** 0.255 0.347 -0.092 *
110 (0.020) (0.049) (0.053) (0.020) (0.051) (0.055) (0.019) (0.050) (0.054) (0.018) (0.048) (0.051)
51 to 100 766 0.579 0.683 -0.104 ** 0.439 0.529 -0.090 * 0.312 0.430 -0.119 ** 0.243 0.334 -0.090 **
142 (0.018) (0.042) (0.046) (0.018) (0.045) (0.048) (0.017) (0.044) (0.047) (0.016) (0.041) (0.044)
41 to 100 915 0.534 0.614 -0.079 * 0.410 0.486 -0.076 * 0.283 0.396 -0.113 ***    0.217 0.293 -0.076 **
187 (0.017) (0.039) (0.042) (0.017) (0.039) (0.042) (0.015) (0.038) (0.041) (0.014) (0.035) (0.037)







Likelihood of falling behind parents 
by at least 1 percentage point
Likelihood of falling behind parents 
by at least 10 percentage points
Likelihood of falling behind parents 
by at least 20 percentage points
Likelihood of falling behind parents 
by at least 30 percentage points






Likelihood of exceeding parents by 
at least 1 percentage point
Likelihood of exceeding parents by 
at least 10 percentage points
Likelihood of exceeding parents by 
at least 20 percentage points
Likelihood of exceeding parents by 
at least 30 percentage points









Appendix Table 3.13: NLSY Family Income-Child Earnings Mobility Matrices by Race (Daughters) 
Panel A: Likelihood of Upward Mobility by Race
White Black White Black White Black White Black
1 to 10 N w = 74 0.899 0.888 0.011           0.774 0.721 0.053           0.661 0.578 0.083           0.567 0.397 0.170 **     
N b = 295 (0.041) (0.020) (0.045) (0.054) (0.027) (0.060) (0.061) (0.030) (0.068) (0.065) (0.030) (0.071)
1 to 20 180 0.847 0.847 0.000 0.707 0.687 0.020 0.569 0.529 0.041 0.434 0.369 0.065
448 (0.029) (0.018) (0.034) (0.037) (0.023) (0.044) (0.041) (0.024) (0.047) (0.041) (0.024) (0.047)
1 to 30 293 0.779 0.823 -0.044 0.627 0.668 -0.041 0.475 0.514 -0.039 0.339 0.356 -0.016
553 (0.026) (0.017) (0.031) (0.030) (0.021) (0.037) (0.031) (0.022) (0.038) (0.030) (0.021) (0.036)
1 to 40 415 0.697 0.793 -0.096 ***    0.546 0.638 -0.092 ***    0.404 0.475 -0.072 **    0.284 0.330 -0.046
618 (0.024) (0.017) (0.030) (0.026) (0.020) (0.033) (0.025) (0.021) (0.033) (0.023) (0.019) (0.030)
1 to 50 556 0.619 0.778 -0.159 ***    0.471 0.629 -0.158 ***    0.349 0.470 -0.120 ***    0.246 0.324 -0.078 ***    
655 (0.022) (0.017) (0.028) (0.022) (0.020) (0.030) (0.021) (0.020) (0.029) (0.019) (0.019) (0.027)
Panel B: Likelihood of Downward Mobility by Race
White Black White Black White Black White Black
91 to 100 N w = 127 0.936 0.924 0.012 0.825 0.755 0.070        0.726 0.695 0.031        0.620 0.626 -0.006
N b = 17 (0.022) (0.073) (0.076) (0.036) (0.108) (0.114) (0.041) (0.115) (0.122) (0.045) (0.121) (0.129)
81 to 100 252 0.909 0.869 0.040 0.790 0.712 0.078 0.700 0.628 0.072 0.596 0.538 0.058
41 (0.018) (0.060) (0.063) (0.027) (0.076) (0.081) (0.030) (0.079) (0.085) (0.032) (0.081) (0.087)
71 to 100 392 0.873 0.857 0.016 0.774 0.725 0.049 0.667 0.602 0.065 0.555 0.500 0.055
74 (0.017) (0.043) (0.046) (0.022) (0.055) (0.059) (0.024) (0.063) (0.068) (0.026) (0.062) (0.068)
61 to 100 525 0.844 0.861 -0.017 0.756 0.757 -0.001 0.650 0.604 0.046 0.531 0.502 0.029
100 (0.016) (0.036) (0.039) (0.019) (0.045) (0.049) (0.021) (0.054) (0.058) (0.022) (0.054) (0.059)
51 to 100 670 0.810 0.766 0.044 0.724 0.647 0.077  *      0.616 0.503 0.114  **     0.495 0.425 0.070
139 (0.015) (0.038) (0.041) (0.018) (0.043) (0.046) (0.019) (0.046) (0.049) (0.020) (0.045) (0.049)
41 to 100 811 0.770 0.708 0.061 0.681 0.577 0.104  **     0.569 0.425 0.145  ***    0.447 0.356 0.091  **     
176 (0.015) (0.036) (0.039) (0.017) (0.039) (0.043) (0.018) (0.040) (0.044) (0.018) (0.039) (0.043)







Likelihood of falling behind parents 
by at least 1 percentage point
Likelihood of falling behind parents 
by at least 10 percentage points
Likelihood of falling behind parents 
by at least 20 percentage points
Likelihood of falling behind parents 
by at least 30 percentage points






Likelihood of exceeding parents by 
at least 1 percentage point
Likelihood of exceeding parents by 
at least 10 percentage points
Likelihood of exceeding parents by 
at least 20 percentage points
Likelihood of exceeding parents by 
at least 30 percentage points









Appendix Table 3.14: PSID #3 Family Income-Family Income Mobility Matrices by Race (Sons & Daughters) 
Panel A: Likelihood of Upward Mobility by Race
White Black White Black White Black White Black
1 to 10 N w = 77 0.903 0.801 0.102 * 0.727 0.512 0.215 *** 0.550 0.310 0.240 *** 0.384 0.208 0.176 **
N b = 431 (0.047) (0.034) (0.058) (0.061) (0.041) (0.074) (0.063) (0.037) (0.073) (0.059) (0.034) (0.068)
1 to 20 201 0.809 0.707 0.102 ** 0.695 0.476 0.219 *** 0.523 0.321 0.203 *** 0.391 0.219 0.172 ***
619 (0.036) (0.037) (0.051) (0.039) (0.037) (0.054) (0.040) (0.034) (0.052) (0.038) (0.030) (0.048)
1 to 30 344 0.783 0.687 0.096 ** 0.647 0.460 0.187 *** 0.474 0.315 0.159 *** 0.351 0.213 0.138 ***
724 (0.027) (0.035) (0.044) (0.030) (0.035) (0.046) (0.030) (0.032) (0.043) (0.027) (0.028) (0.039)
1 to 40 514 0.767 0.634 0.133 *** 0.635 0.426 0.209 *** 0.471 0.296 0.175 *** 0.338 0.201 0.136 ***
774 (0.022) (0.034) (0.041) (0.024) (0.033) (0.041) (0.024) (0.030) (0.038) (0.022) (0.026) (0.034)
1 to 50 682 0.728 0.622 0.107 *** 0.598 0.410 0.188 *** 0.444 0.286 0.158 *** 0.309 0.195 0.114 ***
827 (0.020) (0.033) (0.039) (0.021) (0.031) (0.038) (0.021) (0.029) (0.035) (0.019) (0.025) (0.031)
Panel B: Likelihood of Downward Mobility by Race
White Black White Black White Black White Black
91 to 100 N w = 165 0.870 1.000 -0.130 *** 0.629 0.316 0.313        0.437 0.316 0.121        0.368 0.316 0.052        
N b = 4 (0.027) 0.000 (0.027) (0.040) (0.266) (0.269) (0.043) (0.266) (0.269) (0.042) (0.266) (0.269)
81 to 100 321 0.783 0.986 -0.203 *** 0.602 0.824 -0.221        0.418 0.797 -0.379 ** 0.326 0.797 -0.470 ***
17 (0.024) (0.016) (0.028) (0.029) (0.148) (0.151) (0.030) (0.156) (0.159) (0.030) (0.156) (0.159)
71 to 100 493 0.745 0.923 -0.178 *** 0.581 0.807 -0.226 * 0.411 0.750 -0.339 *** 0.310 0.722 -0.412 ***
32 (0.020) (0.051) (0.054) (0.024) (0.114) (0.117) (0.024) (0.128) (0.131) (0.024) (0.136) (0.138)
61 to 100 650 0.712 0.886 -0.174 ** 0.557 0.789 -0.232 ** 0.401 0.690 -0.288 *** 0.303 0.623 -0.320 ***
58 (0.018) (0.081) (0.083) (0.021) (0.092) (0.094) (0.021) (0.108) (0.110) (0.021) (0.117) (0.119)
51 to 100 816 0.676 0.819 -0.143 * 0.532 0.734 -0.202 ** 0.391 0.600 -0.209 ** 0.285 0.544 -0.260 **
88 (0.017) (0.076) (0.078) (0.019) (0.083) (0.085) (0.019) (0.099) (0.101) (0.018) (0.103) (0.105)
41 to 100 984 0.625 0.748 -0.122        0.495 0.682 -0.187 ** 0.359 0.555 -0.196 ** 0.255 0.483 -0.228 **
141 (0.016) (0.077) (0.079) (0.017) (0.079) (0.081) (0.017) (0.085) (0.087) (0.016) (0.088) (0.089)







Likelihood of falling behind parents 
by at least 1 percentage point
Likelihood of falling behind parents 
by at least 10 percentage points
Likelihood of falling behind parents 
by at least 20 percentage points
Likelihood of falling behind parents 
by at least 30 percentage points






Likelihood of exceeding parents by 
at least 1 percentage point
Likelihood of exceeding parents by 
at least 10 percentage points
Likelihood of exceeding parents by 
at least 20 percentage points
Likelihood of exceeding parents by 
at least 30 percentage points









Appendix Table 3.15: PSID #3 Family Income-Family Income Mobility Matrices by Race (Sons) 
Panel A: Likelihood of Upward Mobility by Race
White Black White Black White Black White Black
1 to 10 N w = 44 0.921 0.838 0.082           0.763 0.561 0.202 * 0.591 0.377 0.214 ** 0.468 0.279 0.189 *
N b = 149 (0.055) (0.056) (0.078) (0.079) (0.072) (0.107) (0.084) (0.069) (0.108) (0.082) (0.067) (0.106)
1 to 20 116 0.806 0.720 0.086 0.689 0.503 0.187 ** 0.530 0.362 0.168 ** 0.386 0.242 0.144 ** 
223 (0.046) (0.067) (0.081) (0.051) (0.064) (0.082) (0.052) (0.060) (0.080) (0.049) (0.051) (0.071)
1 to 30 191 0.782 0.676 0.106 0.644 0.444 0.200 *** 0.481 0.335 0.146 ** 0.362 0.212 0.150 ***
279 (0.036) (0.060) (0.070) (0.040) (0.057) (0.069) (0.040) (0.052) (0.066) (0.037) (0.042) (0.056)
1 to 40 289 0.774 0.623 0.151 ** 0.630 0.417 0.213 *** 0.490 0.320 0.170 *** 0.356 0.206 0.150 ***
299 (0.029) (0.056) (0.063) (0.033) (0.052) (0.062) (0.033) (0.049) (0.059) (0.030) (0.040) (0.050)
1 to 50 381 0.713 0.616 0.096 0.578 0.415 0.163 *** 0.441 0.319 0.122 ** 0.305 0.210 0.095 ** 
324 (0.027) (0.054) (0.060) (0.029) (0.050) (0.058) (0.028) (0.047) (0.055) (0.025) (0.039) (0.046)
Panel B: Likelihood of Downward Mobility by Race
White Black White Black White Black White Black
91 to 100 N w = 77 0.862 1.000 -0.138 *** 0.628 0.881 -0.253 * 0.418 0.881 -0.463 *** 0.350 0.881 -0.531 ***
N b = 3 (0.042) 0.000 (0.042) (0.059) (0.135) (0.147) (0.062) (0.135) (0.148) (0.062) (0.135) (0.148)
81 to 100 158 0.776 0.922 -0.146 * 0.624 0.773 -0.149 0.421 0.737 -0.316 ** 0.320 0.737 -0.417 ***
11 (0.035) (0.078) (0.086) (0.041) (0.132) (0.138) (0.043) (0.139) (0.145) (0.042) (0.139) (0.145)
71 to 100 255 0.726 0.773 -0.048 0.580 0.719 -0.140 0.389 0.605 -0.216 * 0.306 0.585 -0.279 ** 
21 (0.029) (0.111) (0.115) (0.033) (0.115) (0.119) (0.034) (0.126) (0.131) (0.033) (0.127) (0.131)
61 to 100 334 0.699 0.751 -0.052 0.557 0.632 -0.075 0.380 0.563 -0.183 0.304 0.441 -0.137
32 (0.026) (0.162) (0.164) (0.029) (0.163) (0.165) (0.030) (0.164) (0.167) (0.029) (0.167) (0.170)
51 to 100 407 0.667 0.773 -0.106 0.532 0.668 -0.136 0.371 0.583 -0.212 0.295 0.478 -0.183
44 (0.025) (0.138) (0.140) (0.027) (0.139) (0.141) (0.027) (0.140) (0.143) (0.026) (0.144) (0.146)
41 to 100 499 0.631 0.706 -0.075 0.506 0.617 -0.111 0.353 0.523 -0.169 0.268 0.428 -0.160
69 (0.023) (0.113) (0.115) (0.024) (0.114) (0.116) (0.024) (0.115) (0.118) (0.023) (0.116) (0.118)







Likelihood of falling behind parents 
by at least 1 percentage point
Likelihood of falling behind parents 
by at least 10 percentage points
Likelihood of falling behind parents 
by at least 20 percentage points
Likelihood of falling behind parents 
by at least 30 percentage points






Likelihood of exceeding parents by 
at least 1 percentage point
Likelihood of exceeding parents by 
at least 10 percentage points
Likelihood of exceeding parents by 
at least 20 percentage points
Likelihood of exceeding parents by 
at least 30 percentage points









Appendix Table 3.16: PSID #3 Family Income-Family Income Mobility Matrices by Race (Daughters) 
Panel A: Likelihood of Upward Mobility by Race
White Black White Black White Black White Black
1 to 10 N w = 33 0.881 0.775 0.106           0.682 0.478 0.204 * 0.498 0.263 0.235 ** 0.278 0.159 0.119           
N b = 282 (0.080) (0.043) (0.091) (0.096) (0.049) (0.108) (0.096) (0.039) (0.104) (0.084) (0.031) (0.090)
1 to 20 85 0.813 0.697 0.116 0.703 0.456 0.247 *** 0.514 0.289 0.224 *** 0.398 0.202 0.196 ***
396 (0.057) (0.042) (0.070) (0.061) (0.043) (0.074) (0.062) (0.038) (0.072) (0.059) (0.035) (0.068)
1 to 30 153 0.785 0.696 0.089 0.650 0.473 0.177 *** 0.466 0.298 0.167 *** 0.336 0.213 0.123 ** 
445 (0.040) (0.039) (0.056) (0.044) (0.042) (0.061) (0.044) (0.039) (0.059) (0.040) (0.037) (0.055)
1 to 40 225 0.757 0.644 0.114 ** 0.642 0.434 0.208 *** 0.446 0.275 0.171 *** 0.314 0.198 0.117 ** 
475 (0.033) (0.040) (0.052) (0.036) (0.040) (0.054) (0.036) (0.036) (0.051) (0.032) (0.035) (0.048)
1 to 50 301 0.749 0.626 0.123 ** 0.623 0.405 0.217 *** 0.447 0.257 0.190 *** 0.315 0.183 0.132 ***
503 (0.029) (0.040) (0.049) (0.031) (0.039) (0.050) (0.031) (0.035) (0.046) (0.028) (0.033) (0.043)
Panel B: Likelihood of Downward Mobility by Race
White Black White Black White Black White Black
91 to 100 N w = 88 0.876 1.000 -0.124 *** 0.631 0.000 0.631 *** 0.454 0.000 0.454 *** 0.384 0.000 0.384 ***
N b = 1 (0.036) 0.000 (0.036) (0.054) 0.000 (0.054) (0.059) 0.000 (0.059) (0.058) 0.000 (0.058)
81 to 100 163 0.790 1.000 -0.210 *** 0.581 0.835 -0.254        0.415 0.809 -0.394 ** 0.332 0.809 -0.477 **
6 (0.033) 0.000 (0.033) (0.041) (0.175) (0.180) (0.043) (0.184) (0.188) (0.042) (0.184) (0.188)
71 to 100 238 0.767 1.000 -0.233 *** 0.583 0.853 -0.269 * 0.435 0.825 -0.390 ** 0.315 0.793 -0.478 ***
11 (0.028) 0.000 (0.028) (0.034) (0.152) (0.156) (0.035) (0.159) (0.163) (0.034) (0.170) (0.173)
61 to 100 316 0.727 0.992 -0.265 *** 0.556 0.911 -0.355 *** 0.425 0.788 -0.362 *** 0.302 0.764 -0.463 ***
26 (0.026) (0.006) (0.026) (0.030) (0.063) (0.070) (0.031) (0.124) (0.128) (0.030) (0.128) (0.132)
51 to 100 409 0.686 0.850 -0.165 * 0.532 0.778 -0.246 ** 0.411 0.611 -0.200 0.274 0.588 -0.314 **
44 (0.024) (0.083) (0.086) (0.026) (0.096) (0.100) (0.027) (0.134) (0.137) (0.026) (0.137) (0.139)
41 to 100 485 0.619 0.775 -0.155 0.483 0.723 -0.240 ** 0.366 0.576 -0.210 * 0.241 0.518 -0.276 **
72 (0.023) (0.102) (0.105) (0.025) (0.105) (0.108) (0.025) (0.118) (0.121) (0.023) (0.121) (0.123)







Likelihood of falling behind parents 
by at least 1 percentage point
Likelihood of falling behind parents 
by at least 10 percentage points
Likelihood of falling behind parents 
by at least 20 percentage points
Likelihood of falling behind parents 
by at least 30 percentage points






Likelihood of exceeding parents by 
at least 1 percentage point
Likelihood of exceeding parents by 
at least 10 percentage points
Likelihood of exceeding parents by 
at least 20 percentage points
Likelihood of exceeding parents by 
at least 30 percentage points









Appendix Table 3.17: PSID #3 Family Income-Child Earnings Mobility Matrices by Race (Sons & Daughters) 
Panel A: Likelihood of Upward Mobility by Race
White Black White Black White Black White Black
1 to 10 N w = 80 0.916 0.926 -0.010           0.754 0.740 0.014 0.561 0.568 -0.006 0.477 0.400 0.077
N b = 377 (0.038) (0.025) (0.045) (0.053) (0.040) (0.067) (0.062) (0.043) (0.076) (0.062) (0.043) (0.076)
1 to 20 184 0.902 0.868 0.033 0.761 0.696 0.065 0.561 0.541 0.020 0.426 0.392 0.034
512 (0.025) (0.027) (0.037) (0.035) (0.042) (0.055) (0.041) (0.042) (0.059) (0.041) (0.042) (0.058)
1 to 30 325 0.801 0.859 -0.058 * 0.694 0.692 0.002 0.523 0.526 -0.003 0.402 0.381 0.021
585 (0.025) (0.024) (0.035) (0.028) (0.038) (0.047) (0.031) (0.040) (0.050) (0.030) (0.040) (0.050)
1 to 40 471 0.772 0.813 -0.041 0.666 0.659 0.008 0.511 0.503 0.008 0.391 0.370 0.021
627 (0.021) (0.028) (0.035) (0.024) (0.037) (0.044) (0.025) (0.038) (0.046) (0.025) (0.038) (0.045)
1 to 50 622 0.703 0.804 -0.101 *** 0.614 0.650 -0.036 0.465 0.499 -0.034 0.348 0.351 -0.003
663 (0.020) (0.027) (0.034) (0.021) (0.036) (0.042) (0.022) (0.038) (0.043) (0.021) (0.037) (0.042)
Panel B: Likelihood of Downward Mobility by Race
White Black White Black White Black White Black
91 to 100 N w = 143 0.870 1.000 -0.130 *** 0.658 0.894 -0.236 * 0.608 0.838 -0.231        0.494 0.838 -0.345 * 
N b = 3 (0.029) 0.000 (0.029) (0.043) (0.130) (0.137) (0.044) (0.169) (0.175) (0.045) (0.169) (0.175)
81 to 100 280 0.789 0.914 -0.125        0.618 0.850 -0.232 * 0.540 0.816 -0.276 ** 0.453 0.816 -0.363 ***
9 (0.025) (0.077) (0.081) (0.031) (0.114) (0.118) (0.032) (0.129) (0.133) (0.032) (0.129) (0.133)
71 to 100 432 0.745 0.901 -0.155 ** 0.597 0.764 -0.167 0.499 0.737 -0.237 ** 0.406 0.638 -0.232 * 
23 (0.022) (0.056) (0.060) (0.025) (0.102) (0.105) (0.026) (0.106) (0.110) (0.026) (0.128) (0.130)
61 to 100 574 0.715 0.586 0.129        0.583 0.292 0.291 ** 0.491 0.286 0.205 * 0.391 0.212 0.179 * 
43 (0.020) (0.174) (0.175) (0.022) (0.110) (0.113) (0.023) (0.109) (0.111) (0.022) (0.089) (0.092)
51 to 100 715 0.691 0.494 0.197        0.558 0.260 0.297 *** 0.471 0.242 0.229 *** 0.375 0.160 0.215 ***
69 (0.018) (0.120) (0.121) (0.020) (0.074) (0.076) (0.020) (0.071) (0.074) (0.020) (0.053) (0.056)
41 to 100 866 0.658 0.462 0.195 * 0.527 0.247 0.280 *** 0.434 0.229 0.204 *** 0.333 0.147 0.186 ***
105 (0.017) (0.100) (0.101) (0.018) (0.061) (0.064) (0.018) (0.058) (0.061) (0.018) (0.043) (0.047)







Likelihood of falling behind parents 
by at least 1 percentage point
Likelihood of falling behind parents 
by at least 10 percentage points
Likelihood of falling behind parents 
by at least 20 percentage points
Likelihood of falling behind parents 
by at least 30 percentage points






Likelihood of exceeding parents by 
at least 1 percentage point
Likelihood of exceeding parents by 
at least 10 percentage points
Likelihood of exceeding parents by 
at least 20 percentage points
Likelihood of exceeding parents by 
at least 30 percentage points









Appendix Table 3.18: PSID #3 Family Income-Child Earnings Mobility Matrices by Race (Sons) 
Panel A: Likelihood of Upward Mobility by Race
White Black White Black White Black White Black
1 to 10 N w = 46 0.890 0.988 -0.098 0.852 0.815 0.038 0.755 0.694 0.061 0.645 0.561 0.084
N b = 136 (0.061) (0.007) (0.061) (0.066) (0.063) (0.091) (0.074) (0.070) (0.102) (0.080) (0.073) (0.109)
1 to 20 109 0.945 0.948 -0.003 0.852 0.758 0.094 0.683 0.665 0.018 0.528 0.551 -0.023
187 (0.025) (0.021) (0.033) (0.041) (0.076) (0.087) (0.052) (0.075) (0.092) (0.054) (0.075) (0.092)
1 to 30 185 0.900 0.928 -0.028 0.824 0.739 0.085 0.669 0.615 0.054 0.526 0.500 0.026
224 (0.025) (0.021) (0.033) (0.033) (0.066) (0.074) (0.040) (0.067) (0.078) (0.041) (0.068) (0.079)
1 to 40 272 0.888 0.904 -0.016 0.806 0.726 0.080 0.660 0.606 0.053 0.519 0.497 0.022
239 (0.021) (0.024) (0.032) (0.028) (0.062) (0.068) (0.033) (0.063) (0.071) (0.034) (0.064) (0.072)
1 to 50 353 0.810 0.895 -0.085 ** 0.739 0.718 0.021 0.597 0.597 0.000 0.464 0.484 -0.020
257 (0.024) (0.024) (0.034) (0.027) (0.060) (0.066) (0.029) (0.061) (0.068) (0.029) (0.062) (0.069)
Panel B: Likelihood of Downward Mobility by Race
White Black White Black White Black White Black
91 to 100 N w = 67 0.809 1.000 -0.191 *** 0.525 0.346 0.178 0.465 0.000 0.465 *** 0.376 0.000 0.376 ***
N b = 2 (0.049) 0.000 (0.049) (0.066) (0.323) (0.329) (0.067) 0.000 (0.067) (0.067) 0.000 (0.067)
81 to 100 140 0.677 0.667 0.010 0.458 0.419 0.040 0.396 0.287 0.109 0.325 0.287 0.038
6 (0.041) (0.216) (0.220) (0.045) (0.229) (0.233) (0.045) (0.219) (0.223) (0.045) (0.219) (0.223)
71 to 100 225 0.637 0.812 -0.174 * 0.444 0.622 -0.178 0.334 0.569 -0.236 0.264 0.382 -0.117
16 (0.033) (0.098) (0.103) (0.036) (0.143) (0.148) (0.035) (0.146) (0.150) (0.033) (0.151) (0.154)
61 to 100 294 0.594 0.506 0.088 0.430 0.321 0.109 0.328 0.305 0.022 0.252 0.184 0.069
24 (0.030) (0.200) (0.202) (0.032) (0.143) (0.147) (0.031) (0.139) (0.142) (0.029) (0.096) (0.100)
51 to 100 354 0.566 0.417 0.149 0.406 0.299 0.107 0.316 0.284 0.033 0.230 0.133 0.097
36 (0.028) (0.146) (0.149) (0.029) (0.116) (0.120) (0.028) (0.113) (0.116) (0.026) (0.062) (0.067)
41 to 100 435 0.541 0.412 0.129 0.380 0.279 0.101 0.288 0.261 0.028 0.205 0.111 0.094 * 
54 (0.026) (0.123) (0.126) (0.026) (0.095) (0.099) (0.025) (0.092) (0.095) (0.023) (0.049) (0.054)







Likelihood of falling behind parents 
by at least 1 percentage point
Likelihood of falling behind parents 
by at least 10 percentage points
Likelihood of falling behind parents 
by at least 20 percentage points
Likelihood of falling behind parents 
by at least 30 percentage points






Likelihood of exceeding parents by 
at least 1 percentage point
Likelihood of exceeding parents by 
at least 10 percentage points
Likelihood of exceeding parents by 
at least 20 percentage points
Likelihood of exceeding parents by 
at least 30 percentage points









Appendix Table 3.19: PSID #3 Family Income-Child Earnings Mobility Matrices by Race (Daughters) 
Panel A: Likelihood of Upward Mobility by Race
White Black White Black White Black White Black
1 to 10 N w = 34 0.948 0.881 0.067           0.636 0.685 -0.049           0.328 0.475 -0.148           0.275 0.283 -0.008
N b = 241 (0.036) (0.041) (0.055) (0.089) (0.051) (0.102) (0.093) (0.053) (0.107) (0.092) (0.045) (0.102)
1 to 20 75 0.840 0.806 0.033 0.630 0.647 -0.017 0.384 0.444 -0.060 0.280 0.269 0.010
325 (0.049) (0.042) (0.064) (0.061) (0.046) (0.077) (0.063) (0.047) (0.079) (0.060) (0.038) (0.071)
1 to 30 140 0.673 0.801 -0.128 ** 0.525 0.653 -0.128 ** 0.334 0.451 -0.117 * 0.240 0.281 -0.040
361 (0.044) (0.038) (0.058) (0.046) (0.044) (0.063) (0.044) (0.046) (0.064) (0.041) (0.042) (0.059)
1 to 40 199 0.618 0.738 -0.120 ** 0.479 0.603 -0.124 ** 0.313 0.418 -0.105 * 0.219 0.264 -0.045
388 (0.037) (0.043) (0.057) (0.039) (0.045) (0.059) (0.036) (0.045) (0.058) (0.034) (0.039) (0.052)
1 to 50 269 0.565 0.732 -0.167 *** 0.453 0.597 -0.144 ** 0.294 0.421 -0.127 ** 0.200 0.246 -0.047
406 (0.033) (0.042) (0.053) (0.033) (0.045) (0.056) (0.031) (0.046) (0.055) (0.028) (0.038) (0.047)
Panel B: Likelihood of Downward Mobility by Race
White Black White Black White Black White Black
91 to 100 N w = 76 0.923 1.000 -0.077 ** 0.774 1.000 -0.226 *** 0.732 1.000 -0.268 *** 0.596 1.000 -0.404 ***
N b = 1 (0.034) 0.000 (0.034) (0.055) 0.000 (0.055) (0.057) 0.000 (0.057) (0.063) 0.000 (0.063)
81 to 100 140 0.902 1.000 -0.098 *** 0.779 1.000 -0.221 *** 0.685 1.000 -0.315 *** 0.582 1.000 -0.418 ***
3 (0.027) 0.000 (0.027) (0.038) 0.000 (0.038) (0.043) 0.000 (0.043) (0.046) 0.000 (0.046)
71 to 100 207 0.864 1.000 -0.136 *** 0.766 0.924 -0.158 * 0.682 0.924 -0.242 *** 0.562 0.924 -0.362 ***
7 (0.027) 0.000 (0.027) (0.032) (0.082) (0.088) (0.035) (0.082) (0.089) (0.038) (0.082) (0.090)
61 to 100 280 0.844 0.641 0.203        0.746 0.272 0.474 *** 0.665 0.272 0.393 ** 0.539 0.231 0.308 **
19 (0.024) (0.256) (0.257) (0.028) (0.154) (0.157) (0.031) (0.154) (0.157) (0.033) (0.138) (0.142)
51 to 100 361 0.815 0.548 0.267        0.707 0.233 0.474 *** 0.624 0.213 0.411 *** 0.518 0.178 0.340 ***
33 (0.022) (0.170) (0.172) (0.026) (0.093) (0.097) (0.027) (0.088) (0.092) (0.029) (0.079) (0.084)
41 to 100 431 0.776 0.493 0.283 ** 0.677 0.228 0.449 *** 0.581 0.210 0.371 *** 0.462 0.169 0.294 ***
51 (0.022) (0.141) (0.142) (0.025) (0.077) (0.081) (0.026) (0.073) (0.078) (0.026) (0.065) (0.070)







Likelihood of falling behind parents 
by at least 1 percentage point
Likelihood of falling behind parents 
by at least 10 percentage points
Likelihood of falling behind parents 
by at least 20 percentage points
Likelihood of falling behind parents 
by at least 30 percentage points






Likelihood of exceeding parents by 
at least 1 percentage point
Likelihood of exceeding parents by 
at least 10 percentage points
Likelihood of exceeding parents by 
at least 20 percentage points
Likelihood of exceeding parents by 
at least 30 percentage points









Appendix Table 3.20: PSID #3 Father Earnings-Child Earnings Mobility Matrices by Race (Sons & Daughters) 
Panel A: Likelihood of Upward Mobility by Race
White Black White Black White Black White Black
1 to 10 N w = 94 0.898 0.946 -0.049 0.803 0.720 0.083 0.683 0.602 0.082 0.497 0.445 0.052
N b = 237 (0.035) (0.018) (0.040) (0.044) (0.047) (0.065) (0.054) (0.054) (0.076) (0.058) (0.064) (0.086)
1 to 20 214 0.866 0.876 -0.010 0.735 0.696 0.038 0.618 0.577 0.041 0.461 0.423 0.039
327 (0.026) (0.034) (0.043) (0.034) (0.045) (0.056) (0.037) (0.051) (0.063) (0.038) (0.058) (0.069)
1 to 30 329 0.785 0.850 -0.064 0.670 0.676 -0.006 0.555 0.545 0.010 0.443 0.393 0.049
402 (0.025) (0.044) (0.051) (0.029) (0.047) (0.055) (0.030) (0.050) (0.058) (0.030) (0.052) (0.060)
1 to 40 478 0.757 0.827 -0.070 0.641 0.658 -0.017 0.518 0.532 -0.014 0.407 0.391 0.016
451 (0.022) (0.041) (0.046) (0.024) (0.044) (0.051) (0.025) (0.047) (0.053) (0.025) (0.049) (0.055)
1 to 50 613 0.700 0.827 -0.127 *** 0.592 0.669 -0.077 0.472 0.524 -0.052 0.364 0.357 0.006
470 (0.020) (0.038) (0.043) (0.022) (0.043) (0.048) (0.022) (0.047) (0.052) (0.021) (0.048) (0.053)
Panel B: Likelihood of Downward Mobility by Race
White Black White Black White Black White Black
91 to 100 N w = 130 0.852 0.897 -0.045        0.660 0.897 -0.237 * 0.532 0.897 -0.365 *** 0.419 0.897 -0.478 ***
N b = 3 (0.033) (0.128) (0.132) (0.044) (0.128) (0.135) (0.047) (0.128) (0.136) (0.046) (0.128) (0.136)
81 to 100 267 0.790 0.877 -0.087 0.634 0.828 -0.195 0.527 0.828 -0.301 * 0.430 0.777 -0.347 *
6 (0.026) (0.123) (0.126) (0.031) (0.154) (0.157) (0.033) (0.154) (0.158) (0.033) (0.188) (0.191)
71 to 100 396 0.750 0.927 -0.177 *** 0.611 0.898 -0.287 *** 0.488 0.898 -0.410 *** 0.396 0.868 -0.472 ***
12 (0.023) (0.063) (0.067) (0.026) (0.075) (0.079) (0.027) (0.075) (0.080) (0.027) (0.088) (0.092)
61 to 100 526 0.735 0.372 0.363 ** 0.602 0.366 0.236        0.484 0.349 0.135 0.384 0.269 0.115
24 (0.020) (0.167) (0.169) (0.023) (0.165) (0.167) (0.024) (0.160) (0.162) (0.023) (0.136) (0.138)
51 to 100 675 0.696 0.347 0.349 *** 0.570 0.343 0.227 * 0.457 0.301 0.156 0.358 0.217 0.141
42 (0.019) (0.119) (0.120) (0.020) (0.118) (0.120) (0.021) (0.108) (0.110) (0.020) (0.089) (0.092)
41 to 100 810 0.664 0.272 0.392 *** 0.543 0.267 0.276 *** 0.426 0.210 0.217 *** 0.322 0.154 0.168 ***
61 (0.018) (0.083) (0.085) (0.019) (0.082) (0.084) (0.019) (0.069) (0.071) (0.018) (0.058) (0.061)







Likelihood of falling behind parents 
by at least 1 percentage point
Likelihood of falling behind parents 
by at least 10 percentage points
Likelihood of falling behind parents 
by at least 20 percentage points
Likelihood of falling behind parents 
by at least 30 percentage points






Likelihood of exceeding parents by 
at least 1 percentage point
Likelihood of exceeding parents by 
at least 10 percentage points
Likelihood of exceeding parents by 
at least 20 percentage points
Likelihood of exceeding parents by 
at least 30 percentage points









Appendix Table 3.21: PSID #3 Father Earnings-Child Earnings Mobility Matrices by Race (Sons) 
Panel A: Likelihood of Upward Mobility by Race
White Black White Black White Black White Black
1 to 10 N w = 57 0.901 0.981 -0.080 0.891 0.821 0.070 0.805 0.742 0.063 0.597 0.566 0.031
N b = 87 (0.048) (0.010) (0.049) (0.049) (0.064) (0.081) (0.063) (0.072) (0.096) (0.074) (0.094) (0.120)
1 to 20 128 0.939 0.961 -0.021 0.846 0.821 0.025 0.741 0.736 0.006 0.571 0.531 0.040
127 (0.024) (0.020) (0.031) (0.037) (0.053) (0.064) (0.044) (0.061) (0.076) (0.049) (0.085) (0.098)
1 to 30 198 0.878 0.873 0.005 0.790 0.749 0.042 0.681 0.643 0.038 0.551 0.433 0.118
153 (0.027) (0.085) (0.089) (0.033) (0.085) (0.091) (0.038) (0.085) (0.093) (0.039) (0.086) (0.095)
1 to 40 274 0.874 0.831 0.043 0.782 0.710 0.072 0.658 0.607 0.051 0.529 0.417 0.112
181 (0.023) (0.076) (0.079) (0.028) (0.076) (0.081) (0.032) (0.077) (0.083) (0.033) (0.079) (0.085)
1 to 50 342 0.822 0.830 -0.008 0.729 0.711 0.018 0.608 0.604 0.004 0.473 0.397 0.075
190 (0.024) (0.072) (0.076) (0.028) (0.073) (0.078) (0.030) (0.074) (0.080) (0.030) (0.076) (0.081)
Panel B: Likelihood of Downward Mobility by Race
White Black White Black White Black White Black
91 to 100 N w = 63 0.796 0.000 0.796 *** 0.513 0.000 0.513 *** 0.390 0.000 0.390 *** 0.327 0.000 0.327 *** 
N b = 1 (0.053) 0.000 (0.053) (0.067) 0.000 (0.067) (0.067) 0.000 (0.067) (0.065) 0.000 (0.065)
81 to 100 140 0.669 0.450 0.219 0.474 0.232 0.243 0.394 0.232 0.162 0.309 0.000 0.309 *** 
4 (0.042) (0.261) (0.264) (0.046) (0.211) (0.216) (0.045) (0.211) (0.216) (0.044) 0.000 (0.044)
71 to 100 208 0.623 0.757 -0.133 0.443 0.660 -0.217 0.329 0.660 -0.331 * 0.261 0.558 -0.297        
7 (0.036) (0.169) (0.173) (0.038) (0.186) (0.189) (0.036) (0.186) (0.189) (0.035) (0.201) (0.204)
61 to 100 266 0.608 0.197 0.411 *** 0.438 0.188 0.250 ** 0.326 0.164 0.162 0.246 0.095 0.151 *
13 (0.032) (0.125) (0.129) (0.033) (0.120) (0.125) (0.032) (0.109) (0.113) (0.030) (0.072) (0.078)
51 to 100 340 0.563 0.220 0.344 *** 0.395 0.213 0.182 0.299 0.168 0.131 0.213 0.079 0.134 **
22 (0.029) (0.110) (0.114) (0.029) (0.108) (0.111) (0.028) (0.090) (0.094) (0.025) (0.051) (0.057)
41 to 100 408 0.533 0.212 0.321 *** 0.378 0.207 0.171 * 0.268 0.159 0.109 0.190 0.083 0.107 **
31 (0.027) (0.088) (0.092) (0.027) (0.086) (0.090) (0.025) (0.072) (0.076) (0.023) (0.046) (0.051)







Likelihood of falling behind parents 
by at least 1 percentage point
Likelihood of falling behind parents 
by at least 10 percentage points
Likelihood of falling behind parents 
by at least 20 percentage points
Likelihood of falling behind parents 
by at least 30 percentage points






Likelihood of exceeding parents by 
at least 1 percentage point
Likelihood of exceeding parents by 
at least 10 percentage points
Likelihood of exceeding parents by 
at least 20 percentage points
Likelihood of exceeding parents by 
at least 30 percentage points








Appendix Table 3.22: PSID #3 Father Earnings-Child Earnings Mobility Matrices by Race (Daughters) 
Panel A: Likelihood of Upward Mobility by Race
White Black White Black White Black White Black
1 to 10 N w = 37 0.893 0.913 -0.021           0.669 0.624 0.045           0.497 0.468 0.029           0.343 0.330 0.013           
N b = 150 (0.051) (0.033) (0.060) (0.083) (0.062) (0.104) (0.093) (0.070) (0.117) (0.094) (0.076) (0.121)
1 to 20 86 0.753 0.805 -0.052 0.563 0.591 -0.028 0.427 0.442 -0.016 0.291 0.331 -0.040
200 (0.052) (0.057) (0.077) (0.059) (0.064) (0.088) (0.059) (0.070) (0.092) (0.056) (0.074) (0.093)
1 to 30 131 0.650 0.831 -0.181 *** 0.495 0.620 -0.124 * 0.372 0.469 -0.097 0.285 0.362 -0.078
249 (0.046) (0.043) (0.063) (0.048) (0.055) (0.073) (0.048) (0.062) (0.078) (0.047) (0.066) (0.080)
1 to 40 204 0.598 0.824 -0.226 *** 0.449 0.615 -0.166 ** 0.327 0.469 -0.142 ** 0.241 0.369 -0.128 *
270 (0.037) (0.041) (0.055) (0.038) (0.053) (0.066) (0.037) (0.060) (0.070) (0.035) (0.063) (0.072)
1 to 50 271 0.544 0.824 -0.280 *** 0.418 0.637 -0.219 *** 0.299 0.462 -0.163 ** 0.225 0.326 -0.101
280 (0.033) (0.039) (0.051) (0.033) (0.053) (0.062) (0.031) (0.063) (0.070) (0.030) (0.062) (0.068)
Panel B: Likelihood of Downward Mobility by Race
White Black White Black White Black White Black
91 to 100 N w = 67 0.903 1.000 -0.097 ** 0.797 1.000 -0.203 *** 0.664 1.000 -0.336 *** 0.505 1.000 -0.495 ***
N b = 2 (0.039) 0.000 (0.039) (0.053) 0.000 (0.053) (0.064) 0.000 (0.064) (0.066) 0.000 (0.066)
81 to 100 127 0.922 1.000 -0.078 *** 0.808 1.000 -0.192 *** 0.673 1.000 -0.327 *** 0.562 1.000 -0.438 ***
2 (0.026) 0.000 (0.026) (0.039) 0.000 (0.039) (0.046) 0.000 (0.046) (0.048) 0.000 (0.048)
71 to 100 188 0.893 1.000 -0.107 *** 0.801 1.000 -0.199 *** 0.667 1.000 -0.333 *** 0.548 1.000 -0.452 ***
5 (0.023) 0.000 (0.023) (0.032) 0.000 (0.032) (0.037) 0.000 (0.037) (0.039) 0.000 (0.039)
61 to 100 260 0.864 0.811 0.053        0.769 0.811 -0.042        0.645 0.811 -0.166 0.524 0.705 -0.181
11 (0.022) (0.160) (0.161) (0.028) (0.160) (0.162) (0.032) (0.160) (0.163) (0.033) (0.181) (0.185)
51 to 100 335 0.830 0.562 0.269        0.746 0.562 0.184        0.616 0.525 0.091 0.504 0.449 0.055
20 (0.021) (0.215) (0.216) (0.026) (0.215) (0.217) (0.029) (0.207) (0.209) (0.029) (0.192) (0.195)
41 to 100 402 0.796 0.323 0.473 *** 0.710 0.319 0.391 *** 0.586 0.253 0.333 *** 0.457 0.216 0.241 **
30 (0.021) (0.139) (0.140) (0.024) (0.138) (0.140) (0.027) (0.116) (0.119) (0.027) (0.106) (0.109)
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Wealth is a crucial component of a family’s economic well-being. In times of economic 
distress, wealth can be dipped into for consumption smoothing, or it can be borrowed against as a 
source of credit. Having several months of savings can mean the difference between losing one’s 
home or not during a period of unemployment or unexpected medical expenditures. Wealth can 
also be used to invest in education and human capital for future generations as well as to start 
one’s own business. Furthermore, a large portion of wealth is passed down from one generation 
to the next, compounding (dis)advantage across generations. 
In the United States, wealth disparities between black and white families are extreme and 
notwithstanding reduction in other forms of inequality and discrimination, the black-white 
wealth gap is at its greatest level in over 25 years. Despite the importance wealth plays in the 
economic lives of families, it has largely been ignored by the intergenerational income mobility 
literature as a potential factor in explaining the black-white mobility gap. This chapter fills this 
omission and examines the role of parental wealth in assisting in upward mobility from low-
income backgrounds and preventing downward mobility from families from the top half of the 
income distribution by race. 
BACKGROUND 
Historic Trends 
Analysis of cross-sectional wealth data suggests that black-white wealth inequality 
reached its 25-year peak in 2009 with the median white family holding 22 times more wealth 








(see Figure 4.1), the median black family net worth declined by over 50 percent (from $10,345 to 
$4,500) during the recent recession while the median white net worth declined 20 percent 
($124,138 to $98,200). Black families have experienced declining median net worth since 2001, 
suggesting that they never fully recovered from the previous recession. White families, on the 
other hand, have experienced continuous upward growth in net worth from 1984 (the first year of 
available data) to 2007. Following the last recession, white wealth did not decline, but remained 
flat from 2001 to 2003 and increased by 2005 before declining between 2007-2009.  
A slightly different picture emerges excluding the dramatic increases and subsequent 
decline in home equity values (see Figure 4.2). For the median white family, non-housing wealth 
has been declining since 1999. Exclusive of home equity, median white wealth peaked in 1999 at 
$42,481 and black wealth peaked in 2003 at $3,505. In other words, non-housing wealth had 
been in a pattern of decline long before the current recession. Furthermore, the non-housing 
wealth disparities between blacks and whites in 2009 were similar to the wealth ratios in 1984-
1994. 
Distribution of Wealth  
For both groups the current share without positive net worth is at an all-time high (see 
Figures 4.3 & 4.4). Since 2007, the share of black families with negative or zero net worth 
increased from 29 to 36 percent and the share of white families increased from 13 to 15 percent. 
Black families are also much more likely to have very low net worth and unlikely to have high 
net worth. More than half (57%) of black families had less than $10,000 in net worth in 2009, 
compared with a quarter (26 %) of white families. In contrast, only 14% of black families own 
over $100,000 in total wealth, compared with 50% of white families. Trends in net worth at 









One of the largest historical predictors of wealth inequality has been the combination of 
race and education. As shown in Figure 4.5, dramatic differences exist in wealth by race and 
educational attainment. While median wealth holdings for most other race/education 
combinations have remained relatively flat from 1984-2007, followed by large declines from 
2007-2009, the wealth holdings of white families with at least a bachelor’s degree have 
skyrocketed, increasing nearly 50% in the past 25 years. Much of the black-white wealth gap 
appears to be stemming from the considerable growth in wealth holdings of highly-educated 
white families relative to everyone else.  The wealth gap between high and low-educated 
families likely reflects similar trends in hourly wages for these groups (Mishel, Bernstein and 
Shierholz 2009). College-educated blacks have lower net worth than white families with less 
than a high school degree, even controlling for age, marital status and income. In 2007 these 
groups were roughly equal, but by 2009 college-educated blacks fared much worse than whites 
with less than a high school education.  
Causes of Wealth Gap 
Previous research has found that the black-white wealth gap is due to both historical and 
contemporaneous wealth policies, including policies that have impaired the ability of many black 
Americans to accumulate wealth (including barriers to certain occupations, welfare policies that 
discouraged wealth accumulation and historical exclusion of blacks from governmental wealth-
creation policies) as well as through the cumulative effects of intergenerational transmission of 
wealth (Oliver & Shapiro, 2006; Conley, 1999). Oliver and Shapiro find that asset poverty (and 
wealth) is passed between generations, regardless of occupational and educational mobility. 








and intergenerational transfers between black and white families, rather than to differences in 
rates of savings or returns on assets (Gittleman & Wolff 2000). This finding was reinforced by 
John Karl Scholz and David Levine (2004) who found that wealth differences across race are 
large and cannot be accounted for by age or educational attainment.  
Theoretical Framework 
It is important to note that wealth, in itself, does not necessarily cause income persistence 
or mobility. Wealthier people could have different attitudes towards risk or time discounting and 
pass those attitudes on to their children. Theory suggests several possible causal connections 
between wealth and parent-child association in income via education, occupation and 
neighborhood choices (Grawe 2008). This goal of this analysis is not to specify the mechanisms 
through which wealth impacts economic mobility, but rather it is to examine the potential total 
relationship between parental wealth and rates of upward and downward mobility.  
The primary way in which researchers hypothesize that wealth will affect children’s 
economic outcomes is through restricting access to education. The Becker and Tomes’ (1979) 
theoretical human capital model states that parents will maximize a Cobb-Douglas utility 
function spanning several generations which allocates their lifetime earnings between their own 
consumption and investment in their children. This utility function then influences their 
children’s future lifetime earnings. Expansions by Becker and Tomes (1986) and Mulligan 
(1997) have extended the human capital model to include the notion of credit constraints and 
found that parents with low earnings are most likely to lack access to credit markets and as a 
result would be unable to optimally borrow against their lifetime earnings to invest in their 








While the assumption of binding credit constraints has shown difficult to prove,
17
 other 
researchers have used some measure of actual wealth as a proxy for credit constraints, but have 
found conflicting results. Mulligan (1997) finds no difference in the elasticities of a split sample 
based on anticipation of inheritance receipt. He concludes that borrowing constraints are not a 
significant determinant of mobility. Mazumder (2005) finds that the intergenerational earnings 
elasticity for families with above-median net worth is about 33 percent lower than for families 
with below-median net worth, meaning that high-wealth families have more mobility than low-
wealth families.  
However, both of these studies examine overall intergenerational elasticity conditional on 
a dichotomous wealth value, which provides limited interpretation and cannot differentiate 
between the direction of mobility (upward or downward), only that there is less of a relationship 
between parent and child earnings in high wealth families. While a small literature exists looking 
at the probability of upward mobility from a given point in the income distribution, such as the 
2009 Pew report by Cramer, O’Brien, Cooper and Luengo-Prado, which finds that greater 
parental savings (although still conditional on a dichotomous wealth value) increase the 
likelihood of upward intergenerational mobility, this research does not disentangle race from the 
analysis 
Wealth has largely not been examined as a mechanism in intergenerational mobility due 
to the way previous studies have examined intergenerational mobility. By focusing on 
intergenerational earnings (or income) elasticity and controlling for parental wealth, researchers 
are only able to compare rates of intergenerational volatility between two (or possibly more) 
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 In 2004, Grawe wrote an article in the Journal of Human Resources beseeching researchers to stop using 
nonlinearities in intergenerational elasticities as evidence of binding credit constraints. Grawe argues that for 









wealth groups, which does not provide much information. Quantile regression would allow for 
comparisons of elasticities at different points in the income distribution, but not for different 
wealth levels at different points in the income distribution and quantile regression also fails to 
provide the direction of mobility. As a result of these limitations, I utilize a new conceptual 
framework for examining directional mobility which can be extended to be conditional on a 
continuous variable such as wealth. 
DATA 
This analysis utilizes the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), which is a 
longitudinal survey that follows individuals and their offspring from 1968 to present. The survey 
has been conducted annually from 1968-1997 and biannually between 1997 and 2009. The PSID 
has the advantage of following a nationally representative sample over time, while also having 
information about the income and wealth of two subsequent generations.
18
 The PSID includes 
rich data on labor earnings, family income, hours worked, employment status and family 
relationships and is one of the most widely used datasets for studying intergenerational income 
and earnings elasticities in the United States. Using this data it is also possible to link wealth data 
from the following years: 1984, 1989, 1994, 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005, 2007, and 2009. The 
frequent collection of wealth data in recent years allows researchers to track changes in wealth 
holdings both longitudinally and cross-sectionally for the current generation of PSID members.  
Terms 
Wealth is primarily defined as total net worth (total assets minus total liabilities/debts). 
Net worth is broken into the following four categories: financial assets, tangible assets, home 
equity and uncollateralized debt. 
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 However, while the PSID is nationally representative, it was not initially designed to be a wealth survey and 









Financial assets are defined as the sum of assets from checking/savings accounts 
(including money market funds, certificates of deposit, government savings bonds, or 
treasury bills and IRA's
19
), stocks/mutual funds or investment trusts, and any other 
savings or assets (such as bonds, rights in a trust or estate, cash value in a life insurance 
policy, or a valuable collection for investment purposes).  
Tangible assets are defined as the sum of assets from vehicles (including motor homes, 
trailers, and boats), equity in farm/business ownership, and real estate other than main 
home.  
Home equity is primary home equity—home value net of mortgage debt (could be 
negative value).  
Uncollaterialized debt (elsewhere simply referred to as ―debt‖) includes all other debt—
such as credit card debt, student loans, medical or legal bills, personal loans, or loans 
from relatives, etc). This does not include mortgage on main home or farm/business debt 
(which is already factored into net equity values above). 
Race: The race measure is based on the head of the household’s reported race and 
Hispanic ethnicity in 1985 (and, if missing, in subsequent years up to 2009). This 
analysis only provides information on White, non-Hispanic and Black, non-Hispanic 
families. To simplify, the terms ―black‖ and ―white‖ are used throughout this chapter, 
although they always refer to non-Hispanic individuals.  
Income: Income is defined as the sum of total family income for all family unit members 
in the previous year. Family income includes labor income from wages and salaries, 
                                                          
19








bonuses, overtime, tips, commissions and other job-related income, as well as transfers 
and social security income. Income can be zero or positive.   
METHODS 
This analysis utilizes the complete PSID to examine the relationship between parental 
wealth and intergenerational income mobility. To be included in the sample, children must be 
present (and between age 5-21) in parent’s household for at least three years when parents report 
income and wealth data between 1984 and 1989 (the first available years the wealth supplement 
is collected), and children must report at least three years of income from 1997-2009 when they 
are either the head or spouse of their own family. In each generation, income for every available 
year is first adjusted to 2009 dollars, logged, averaged and then age-adjusted.
20
 Wealth is 
transformed using the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation, which essentially creates a logged 
transformation for a distribution which includes negative and zero values.
21
 For the parent 
generation, income is collected from 1984-1989 for each year the child is living at home and age 
5-21. For the child generation, income is collected from 1997-2009 for each year the child is 
head of household or spouse. Income is only collected in years when the head of household is 
below age 65. To be included in the sample, individuals had to report at least three years of 
income in each generation. The average number of years of income data for the parent generation 
is 5.4 years and 5.9 years for the child generation. The total sample size is 1,777, with 1,172 
white families and 605 black families (see Table 4.1). The distribution of each generation can be 
seen in Figures 4.6 and 4.7, with black families disproportionately represented in lower income 
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 Age-adjustment is done by to account for life-cycle variation in earnings. Following previous research, (Bratberg 
et al 2007)  I first subtract the mean value of log earnings in each generation from each observation to suppress the 
constant term and then regress log earnings on age and age-squared. The residuals from these equations are then 
grouped into percentiles to estimate percentile rankings in each generation. 
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 The inverse hyperbolic sine transformation is defined as:        √    , which is approximately equal to 
log(2)+log(w), or roughly log(w), and therefore can be interpreted as a standard logarithmic variable, except that it 








rankings in the parent’s generation. As a result of these restrictions, the parent cohort was born 
between 1920-1954 and the child cohort was born between 1963-1979. 
 Using new methodology developed by Bhattacharya and Mazumder (2010) to calculate 
rates of upward and downward intergenerational income mobility by race, I estimate directional 
rank probabilities conditional on parental wealth while the child was living at home age 5-21. 
Measuring parental wealth and income at this age provides the best model for an estimation of 
the effect of capital constraints on intergenerational income mobility. This estimate gives the 
likelihood of a child exceeding (or falling below) their parent’s place in the income distribution 
by a certain number of percentile points, conditional on their parents beginning at or below a 
given percentile (i.e. given that a child grew up in the bottom quintile of the income distribution, 
there is a 20 percent probability of that child moving at least 30 percentage points above their 
parent’s income). Borrowing notation directly from Mazumder (2011),22 this estimating equation 
is: 
                      |           (2) 
 
where URM stands for upward rank mobility, s is a given percentile in the income distribution 
and   is the amount that children’s income percentile (  ) exceeds their parent’s income 
percentile (  ). When   =0, this equation estimates the likelihood that a child’s income rank 
exceeds their parents’. The downward rank mobility (DRM) equation is a slight modification:  
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 See Bhattacharya and Mazumder (2010) for methodology derivation. As opposed to estimating the 
intergenerational income elasticity for the two racial groups separately (which would provide rates of regression to 
the mean within each group),  this analysis follows Bhattacharya and Mazumder (2010) to calculate rates of upward 
and downward intergenerational mobility by race. Usage of these transition probabilities overcomes the sensitivity 
of transition matrices to choice of cut-points (i.e. whether to use quartiles or quintiles) and instead allows the 








Both the upward and downward rank measures can be estimated to examine rank 
conditional on parental wealth in 1984-1989 (        ) to examine the role that wealth plays as a 
mechanism in explaining the black-white mobility gap: 
    
          ̂                        |                                        (4) 
 
 
These measures are calculated separately for black and white families and used to 
estimate the black-white mobility gap at varying points in the wealth distribution. I also examine 
Model 4 conditional on values and presence of the four main subcategories of wealth (financial 
assets, tangible assets, home equity and debt) to see whether ownership of certain types of assets 
or value of given asset has a significant relationship with the likelihood of upward or downward 
mobility. Finally, in addition to estimating upward and downward rank mobility based on probit 
models as shown in Model 4, kernel regression models are also used to examine the non-
parametric nature of the relationship between wealth and mobility.  
Previous literature has been mixed in whether (Hertz 2005) or not (Bhattacharya and 
Mazumder 2010) family income should be adjusted for family size and composition prior to 
measuring intergenerational mobility. The main results presented use unadjusted income. 
However, I also test the sensitivity of all results by adjusting family income by family size and 
composition in three different ways.  Results of these sensitivity analyses are presented in 
appendix tables but discussed in the text as relevant. 
The first method uses the OECD equivalence scale as follows: 
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The third method: 
                  
             




To examine the potential relationship of wealth with intergenerational mobility, I 
examined a sample of individuals who were children age 5-21 and living at home when their 
parent’s wealth holdings were surveyed in 1984 and 1989 and looked at their intergenerational 
income mobility conditional on their parent’s wealth when these individuals reached adulthood.  
Wealth was allowed to have both a parametric and nonparametric effect on income mobility, 
meaning that a $1,000 increase in wealth from $0 to $1,000 could have a greater (or smaller) 




Nearly two-thirds (62.1%) of white children who grew up in the bottom 20th percentile 
of the income distribution are estimated to exceed their parent’s position by at least 20 
percentage points, compared with 42.4% of similarly situated black children. The difference in 
these two estimates (62.1-42.4=19.7) is called the black-white mobility gap. Table 4.3A shows 
the upward mobility gap at the full range of thresholds and cutpoints. While the rates of upward 
mobility differ based on choice of these measures, the magnitude of the black-white gap remains 
relatively constant across model choice.  
                                                          
23 For both upward and downward mobility, I examined the unconditional model, a probit model and a lowess 
nonparametric regression model. Lpoly models were examined as well since they allow for weighted kernel 








Controlling for parental wealth, the analysis finds that higher wealth is associated with an 
increased likelihood of upward mobility for white families, but not black families (see Figure 
4.8). As a result, the black-white mobility gap actually increases as wealth increases (see Figure 
4.9). At low levels of wealth, the likelihood of upward mobility for both black and white children 
is essentially the same.
24
  
Low-income white families are helped by ownership and value of most any type of 
wealth: total net worth, total net worth excluding home equity, financial assets, tangible assets, 
and debt and the greater the level of each of those types of asset (or debt), the greater the 
likelihood of upward mobility (see Tables 4.4A and 4.5). The only asset that does not have a 
statistically significant positive relationship with upward mobility was home equity, which has a 
positive but insignificant association. 
In contrast, low-income black families do not experience a monotonically increasing 
likelihood of upward mobility with increases in total net worth (see Tables 4.4A and 4.5). As a 
result, I cannot conclusively state that higher levels of wealth increase the probability of upward 
mobility for black families. Children from low-income black families with positive or non-zero 
net worth are no more likely to have upward mobility than similar children with negative net 
worth.
25
 The only asset type that has a positive (and significant) relationship with black upward 
mobility is financial assets (savings, stocks and other assets). Approximately forty percent of 
low-income black families own a financial asset compared with three-fourths of low-income 
white families (see Table 4.1). Ownership of a financial asset alone does not predict upward 
mobility, but rather the likelihood of upward mobility increases as the value of financial assets 
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 There is not a statistically significant difference in predicted likelihood of upward mobility for families in the 
bottom quintile with $0 or less in total net worth by race, but comparison based on a very small sample of families. 
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 While it appears that children from negative net worth families are more likely to have upward mobility, this 








increase. Furthermore, owning a home is negatively associated with black children’s likelihood 
of upward mobility in the next generation. The value of home equity is also negatively related to 
upward mobility but this finding is not robust across alternate model specifications. All other 
findings are robust when family size adjustments are made to income, except the relationship 
between home equity and upward mobility for low-income black families, which is consistently 
negative, but not consistently statistically significant. Low-income black children who grow up 
in a home owned by their parents have a 30.6% chance of upward mobility, compared with a 
47.8% likelihood of upward mobility if their parents do not own a home. The black-white 
upward mobility gap is almost completely eliminated (2.3 percentage point gap, p>.1) among 
families that do not own. Conversely, the black-white mobility gap is largest among low-income 
home owners (38.0 percentage point gap, p<0.01). 
Downward Mobility 
In an analogous model, white children who grew up in the top half of the income 
distribution are estimated to have a 34.5% chance of falling below their parent’s rank by at least 
20 percentage points, compared with black children who have a 45.2% likelihood of downward 
mobility. The difference in these two estimates (34.5-45.2= -10.7) is the downward mobility gap, 
indicating that black children are more likely to experience downward mobility than white 
children. However, this gap is not statistically significant, likely due to the small sample of black 
families in the top half of the income distribution. The full matrix of results is shown in Table 
4.3B. Family size adjustments reduce the magnitude of both the upward and downward mobility 
gap (see Appendix Tables 4.1-4.3). 
I find no conclusive evidence that parental wealth has a protective association with the 








probit and lowess models do not predict any differences in mobility probabilities across the 
wealth distribution. In regards to the mobility gap, both models find the gap to be constant (and 
statistically insignificant) across levels of wealth.
26
  
Furthermore, no sub-category of wealth (either ownership or value) has a significant 
association with the likelihood of downward mobility for white families (see Tables 4.4B and 
4.5). However, both debt and home equity levels have protective associations for black families, 
but ownership of these assets is only very weakly associated with a decrease in likelihood of 
downward mobility. 
Additional Analyses 
Exploration of the Relationship between Home Ownership and Black Upward Mobility 
 There are several possible explanations that might explain the counter-intuitive finding 
that home ownership is negatively associated with the likelihood of upward mobility for low-
income black families: differential housing stability, mortgage quality, income volatility and 
home value appreciation between low-income blacks and whites. In exploring these, I found that 
low-income black homeowners were just as likely to own a home in subsequent waves of the 
PSID as low-income white homeowners. While information regarding mortgage interest rates or 
the distinction between variable and fixed rate mortgages is not available in the 1984 and 1989 
wealth supplements, I was able to look at several other indicators of mortgage ―quality‖ (ratio of 
annual mortgage payments to family income, the ratio of remaining mortgage principle to family 
income, the share of families with a second mortgage and the average number of years remaining 
on mortgage) and found that low-income black families appeared to have similar (or slightly 
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 It is more likely that we would see a relationship between wealth and downward mobility if we restricted our 
analysis to the top 20
th
 percentile versus the top half of the parental income distribution, but the sample of black 
families gets very small at the top of the distribution, so I follow previous research and only examine downward 








better) outcomes on all measures. Low-income black families had slightly fewer remaining years 
on their mortgages. I also examined whether there was more income volatility among low-
income black families than low-income white families between 1984-1989 using year-to-year arc 
percentage changes and found no differences.  
The one exception is future home equity values. Comparing home equity values from 
1984-2009 for low-income homeowners in 1984, I find that home equity values increased much 
more dramatically for low-income white families than for low-income black families (see Table 
4.6). The bottom 25% of black families experienced a real decline in home equity over the 
period, while the upper percentiles experience modest real growth of slightly more than 1% per 
year (all values in 2009$). In comparison, white home equity increased at much more rapid pace, 
with the median family experiencing a doubling of home equity from 1984 to 2009. 
Decomposing the Relationship between Wealth and Upward Mobility 
I next examine the extent to which differences in upward mobility by race are due to 
differences in total net worth versus differential returns to wealth by race. I use a Blinder-Oaxaca 
decomposition to explore this relationship: 
         ̂         ̂                    (5) 
 
where D is the difference in the likelihood of upward mobility for whites versus blacks. Using a 
three-fold decomposition to divide this difference into endowments (wealth levels), coefficients 
(returns to wealth) and an interaction between the two, I get the following identifying equation 
(drawn from Jones and Kelley 1984; Oaxaca and Ransom 1999):  
               
          
                       









which uses black wealth levels and returns to predict white upward mobility. This decomposition 
is also conducted in the reverse way by switching notation above to predict black mobility.  
As shown in Table 4.7, the results of this exercise show that despite enormous wealth 
disparities between black and white families in the United States, most of the difference in 
mobility is due to differential returns to wealth as opposed to differences in wealth. Using white 
wealth levels and returns to predict black upward mobility, 67% of the mobility gap is explained 
by differential returns to wealth, while -13% is due to differential wealth levels. In the reverse 
decomposition, using black wealth to explain white upward mobility, returns to black wealth 
explain over 100% of the mobility gap. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter attempts to better explain the black-white mobility gap by taking into 
account parental wealth above and beyond the impact of parental income. By looking at total net 
worth as well as the individual components comprising a family’s wealth portfolio, this analysis 
allows an investigation not only into the total relationship between wealth and mobility, but the 
associations with specific asset types. I find that the black-white upward mobility gap grows with 
parental wealth and that returns to wealth (and returns to home ownership in particular) are the 
largest explanatory factor of the gap.  
Although wealth in nearly any form aids the upward mobility prospects of low-income 
white families, wealth has little positive effect on black families and housing wealth is actually 
associated with negative outcomes for low-income black families. Conversely, parental wealth 
for families from the top half of the income distribution has little protective effect against 
downward mobility in subsequent generations, with the exception of housing wealth for black 








While these findings are compelling, additional research needs to be undertaken to fully 
understand potential policy implications. With dramatic disparities in parental wealth by race, 
largely driven by differential rates of inheritance, policy has the potential to intervene in asset 
creation and prioritization of asset ownership. However, this analysis raises some important 
concerns about the potential hazards of home ownership among low-income black families. The 
fact that home ownership also does not help low-income white families (although it does not 
harm them either) suggests that perhaps asset creation programs targeted at low-income families 
should focus on assets other than home ownership, such as financial assets which were found to 
be associated with both black and white upward mobility. 
Finally, this analysis finds that it is not only in the current economic crisis that 
homeownership has been problematic for low-income families. This analysis shows that 
homeownership in the mid-late 1980s was also associated with negative outcomes for low-
income families, especially black families. While sub-prime mortgages and predatory lending 
practices can be to blame for some of the housing failures in recent years, historical differences 
are much less about blacks receiving bad mortgages or having more volatile home ownership or 
income but is more about the returns to this investment. This is consistent with research by 
Oliver and Shapiro (2006) who found that low-income blacks had skewed access to mortgage 
and housing markets which lead to differential rates of housing appreciation. They also found 
that homes in black neighborhoods appreciate much more slowly than homes in predominantly 
white neighborhoods.  Alternatively it is possible that low-income black families were 
disproportionately denied credit to buy a new home or improve their existing one which is why 
we see heterogeneous returns to home ownership. Future research should explore which is the 








among low-income families. Until then, reframing the American Dream to focus less on home 
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kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 6.0515


















kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 6.1851



















Table 4.1: Demographic Characteristics of Sample by Race and Parental Ranking
White Black White Black White Black
Parent Characteristics
Median Family Income $65,238 $29,426 $14,538 $17,538 $106,888 $92,920
Self-Employed (%) 29% 7% 43% 9% 28% 5%
Family Structure Single Parent (%) 13% 54% 39% 75% 5% 4%
Average Parent Age 42.1 39.7 41.9 39.1 42.2 41.5
Parent Education Less than high school 15% 26% 39% 33% 8% 7%
High School 32% 50% 31% 52% 26% 42%
Some College 24% 18% 18% 11% 25% 35%
Bachelors + 30% 6% 12% 4% 41% 15%
Parent Wealth Ownership Rates Own Home 86% 48% 63% 32% 95% 78%
Own Financial Assets (Savings, Stocks, Other Assets) 95% 63% 74% 42% 99% 100%
Own Tangible Assets (Vehicles, Farm, Other Real Estate) 98% 76% 92% 62% 99% 100%
Have Debt 74% 62% 63% 53% 77% 87%
Parent Wealth Values Median Net Worth $344,785 $37,138 $134,162 $9,728 $499,331 $108,137
Median Net Worth Excluding Home Equity $275,338 $16,413 $89,054 $2,698 $413,715 $59,838
Median Financial Assets $92,255 $20,510 $38,563 $7,185 $127,573 $48,824
Median Tangible Assets $79,584 $10,424 $21,917 $1,316 $107,080 $41,365
Median Home Equity $200,800 $8,831 $71,745 $3,503 $312,598 $24,366
Median Debt $5,047 $2,841 $4,608 $2,121 $5,963 $5,892
Child Characteristics
Median Family Income $55,511 $30,745 $37,506 $25,425 $67,224 $50,206
Self-Employed (%) 30% 16% 29% 17% 30% 13%
Family Structure Married with Children (%) 52% 23% 41% 19% 53% 37%
Married without Children (%) 13% 6% 13% 3% 15% 12%
Single Parent (%) 8% 29% 17% 29% 6% 25%
Single, no Children (%) 27% 42% 29% 48% 26% 27%
Average Child Age (when income measured) 31.4 32.2 31.3 32.2 31.6 31.8
Child Education Less than high school 7% 13% 19% 17% 2% 6%
High School 30% 41% 38% 44% 25% 24%
Some College 29% 32% 25% 28% 29% 45%
Bachelors + 34% 14% 17% 12% 43% 26%
N 1,172      605         148         325         654         115         













































Total Net Worth 344,785 120,682 37,138 11,014
Net Worth Excluding Home Equity 275,338 43,321 16,413 4,008
Main Home 86.3% 92,255 60,932 107,170 75,425 47.8% 20,510 0 39,135 25,053
Financial Assets 94.6% 79,584 14,230 84,817 16,702 62.5% 10,424 418 19,097 3,933
    Savings 93.8% 28,316 6,977 30,698 8,941 56.1% 3,458 123 6,556 1,503
    Stocks 44.4% 20,259 0 50,199 13,362 11.2% 1,470 0 19,733 13,764
   Other Assets 52.8% 31,010 590 68,260 10,370 34.3% 5,495 0 23,864 3,933
Tangible Assets 98.2% 200,800 20,836 204,881 21,724 76.3% 8,831 4,176 13,136 7,865
    Vehicles 97.9% 17,967 13,293 18,630 13,859 76.2% 6,506 2,948 9,636 6,977
    Farm 30.5% 94,214 0 328,958 68,820 3.1% 961 0 55,702 58,989
   Other Real Estate 37.5% 88,619 0 268,381 50,106 9.6% 1,363 0 23,632 19,663
Debt 73.7% 5,047 1,941 9,123 4,620 62.5% 2,841 590 5,602 3,386
Source: Author's calculations using PSID data. N=1,777




















Table 4.3a: Likelihood of Upward Mobility by Race
White Black White Black White Black White Black
1 to 10 N w =72 0.884 0.734 0.150 ** 0.770 0.508 0.262 *** 0.644 0.347 0.298 *** 0.455 0.250 0.206 **
N b =188 (0.038) (0.051) (0.064) (0.051) (0.065) (0.083) (0.059) (0.060) (0.084) (0.064) (0.056) (0.085)
1 to 20 148 0.857 0.730 0.128 ** 0.714 0.553 0.161 ** 0.621 0.424 0.197 *** 0.431 0.306 0.125 *
325 (0.030) (0.044) (0.053) (0.039) (0.051) (0.064) (0.042) (0.051) (0.066) (0.044) (0.048) (0.065)
1 to 30 251 0.806 0.687 0.119 ** 0.681 0.528 0.152 *** 0.579 0.394 0.185 *** 0.434 0.298 0.136 **
407 (0.026) (0.041) (0.048) (0.031) (0.045) (0.055) (0.033) (0.045) (0.056) (0.034) (0.043) (0.054)
1 to 40 381 0.749 0.670 0.079 * 0.639 0.518 0.120 ** 0.545 0.385 0.160 *** 0.416 0.292 0.124 **
455 (0.023) (0.039) (0.046) (0.026) (0.043) (0.050) (0.027) (0.043) (0.051) (0.027) (0.041) (0.049)
1 to 50 518 0.704 0.658 0.046 0.597 0.504 0.093 * 0.505 0.376 0.129 *** 0.372 0.281 0.091 **








Likelihood of exceeding parents 
by at least 1 percentage point
Likelihood of exceeding parents 
by at least 10 percentage points
Likelihood of exceeding parents 
by at least 20 percentage points
Likelihood of exceeding parents 
by at least 30 percentage points
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Table 4.3b: Likelihood of Downward Mobility by Race
White Black White Black White Black White Black
91 to 100 N w =125 0.768 0.672 0.096 0.566 0.535 0.031 0.414 0.535 -0.121 0.280 0.535 -0.255
N b =3 (0.042) (0.287) (0.290) (0.048) (0.314) (0.318) (0.046) (0.314) (0.318) (0.041) (0.314) (0.317)
81 to 100 245 0.731 0.817 -0.085 0.565 0.675 -0.110 0.434 0.604 -0.171 0.306 0.483 -0.177
23 (0.031) (0.113) (0.117) (0.034) (0.151) (0.155) (0.033) (0.165) (0.168) (0.031) (0.187) (0.189)
71 to 100 378 0.668 0.782 -0.114 0.531 0.647 -0.116 0.412 0.558 -0.146 0.303 0.479 -0.176 *
68 (0.026) (0.079) (0.083) (0.027) (0.094) (0.098) (0.027) (0.097) (0.101) (0.025) (0.099) (0.102)
61 to 100 517 0.610 0.725 -0.115 0.488 0.605 -0.117 0.372 0.519 -0.147 0.279 0.443 -0.164 *
86 (0.023) (0.081) (0.084) (0.023) (0.089) (0.092) (0.023) (0.090) (0.092) (0.021) (0.090) (0.093)
51 to 100 654 0.576 0.697 -0.121 0.457 0.579 -0.122 0.345 0.452 -0.107 0.252 0.386 -0.134 *
115 (0.021) (0.083) (0.085) (0.021) (0.084) (0.086) (0.020) (0.080) (0.083) (0.018) (0.078) (0.080)
41 to 100 791 0.550 0.684 -0.134 * 0.436 0.583 -0.147 * 0.320 0.433 -0.113 0.226 0.359 -0.133 *





Likelihood of falling behind 
parents by at least 1 percentage 
point
Likelihood of falling behind 
parents by at least 10 percentage 
points
Likelihood of falling behind 
parents by at least 20 percentage 
points
Likelihood of falling behind 
parents by at least 30 percentage 
points
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Note: Showing Inference Area (~$18,000 to $300,000)
N=769
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Table 4.4a: Likelihood of Upward Mobility from Bottom 20%, Conditional on Parental Wealth Attributes
White Black
Overall 62.1% 42.4% 19.7% ***
Negative Wealth 44.5% 52.1% -7.7%
Zero Wealth -- 35.6% --
Positive Wealth 64.0% 41.0% 23.0% ***
Positive, but less than Median Wealth 57.3% 40.8% 16.6% *
Positive, and greater than Median Wealth 72.8% 44.9% 27.9% *
Own Home 68.6%** 30.6%** 38.0% ***
   Don't Own Home 50.1% 47.8% 2.3%
Own Financial Assets 65.3% 48.0% 17.3% *
    Don't Own Financial Assets 51.6% 38.0% 13.6%
Own Tangible Assets 63.2% 43.9% 19.3% **
   Don't Own Tangible Assets -- 39.9% --
Have Debt 67.4% 44.1% 23.3% ***
   Don't Have Debt 53.7% 40.2% 13.5%
Table 4.4b: Likelihood of Downward Mobility from Top 50%, Conditional on Parental Wealth Attributes
White Black
Overall 34.5% 45.2% -10.7%
Negative Wealth -- -- --
Zero Wealth -- -- --
Positive Wealth 34.5% 43.6% -9.1%
Positive, but less than Median Wealth 36.4% 47.6% -11.2%
Positive, and greater than Median Wealth 34.1% 40.1% -6.0%
Own Home 34.0% 39.2% -5.2%
   Don't Own Home 43.1% 67.1% -24.0%
Own Financial Assets 34.5% 45.0% -10.4%
    Don't Own Financial Assets -- -- --
Own Tangible Assets 34.6% 45.0% -10.4%
   Don't Own Tangible Assets -- -- --
Have Debt 34.3% 42.2% -7.9%
   Don't Have Debt 35.0% 64.1% -29.1% **
Source: Analysis of PSID data













Table 4.5: Likelihood of Mobility by Asset Values and Race
White Black White Black White Black White Black
Total Net Worth 0.0318* -0.0128 -0.0064 -0.1282 0.0318* -0.0128 -0.0064 -0.1282
(0.017) (0.014) (0.034) (0.121) (0.017) (0.014) (0.034) (0.121)
Net Worth Excluding Home Equity 0.0353** -0.0078 0.0064 0.0823 0.0353** -0.0078 0.0064 0.0823
(0.017) (0.015) (0.015) (0.099) (0.017) (0.015) (0.015) (0.099)
Financial Assets (Savings, stocks & other assets) 0.0690** 0.0427** 0.0226 0.0104 0.1734*** 0.0912 0.0246 0.0908
(0.027) (0.020) (0.028) (0.098) (0.063) (0.068) (0.039) (0.125)
Tangibile Assets (Vehicles, Farm and other real estate) 0.0921** 0.0108 0.0265 -0.2473 0.1375** 0.0129 0.0122 -0.0342
(0.036) (0.023) (0.034) (0.227) (0.064) (0.090) (0.037) (0.210)
Home Equity 0.0284 -0.0391** -0.0319 -0.0795** 0.0289 -0.0199 -0.1207*** -0.1477
(0.020) (0.017) (0.021) (0.037) (0.035) (0.029) (0.042) (0.092)
Debt 0.0536* 0.0161 -0.0000 -0.0863* 0.2128** 0.0651 0.0026 -0.2391
(0.027) (0.021) (0.015) (0.052) (0.089) (0.106) (0.052) (0.162)
Net Financial Assets (Fin Assets-Debt) 0.0074 0.0149 0.0026 0.0404 0.0062 0.0153 0.0026 0.0418
(0.014) (0.016) (0.008) (0.028) (0.014) (0.015) (0.008) (0.028)
Net Tangible Assets (Tangible Assets + Home Equity) 0.0788** -0.0035 -0.0293 -0.3318 0.1262** -0.1124* -0.0333 -0.2848
(0.035) (0.020) (0.052) (0.206) (0.061) (0.067) (0.052) (0.216)
Observations 148 325 654 115 94-148 117-325 509-654 90-115
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Including 0's Conditional on Ownership










Table 4.6: Real Home Equity  (low-income home owners in 1984)
1984 1989 1994 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009
Change 
84-09
White 25th ptile 19,663 16,702 12,881 16,702 24,231 29,156 43,948 49,655 28,000 42%
Mean 63,893 64,389 52,879 64,389 78,493 87,527 117,439 156,895 105,296 65%
Median 41,860 48,436 51,164 48,436 63,000 59,478 87,897 103,474 89,000 113%
75th ptile 84,944 100,212 78,714 100,212 96,923 116,624 153,819 206,897 160,000 88%
Black 25th ptile 7,865 8,351 7,156 8,351 9,692 5,831 10,987 12,414 4,000 -49%
Mean 31,381 33,599 38,400 33,599 38,718 36,314 51,217 44,778 44,578 42%
Median 31,461 20,042 26,477 20,042 26,654 30,322 40,927 35,690 42,000 34%










Table 4.7: Decomposition of the Effects of Wealth on White-Black Upward Mobility Gap 
 
Total Net Worth 
White Predicted Upward Mobility 0.621*** 
 
(0.04) 
Black Predicted Upward Mobility 0.424*** 
 
(0.04) 




Using White Wealth to Explain 
Black Mobility 
 









% of W-B 
Mobility Gap 
Explained 








































Appendix Table 4.1a: Likelihood of Upward Mobility by Race--Adjusted by Family Size
White Black White Black White Black White Black
1 to 10 65 0.870 0.721 0.149 ** 0.745 0.512 0.233 *** 0.550 0.295 0.255 *** 0.498 0.212 0.286 ***
207
1 to 20 158 0.744 0.666 0.078 0.584 0.471 0.113 * 0.409 0.304 0.105 0.330 0.231 0.099
347
1 to 30 271 0.726 0.676 0.050 0.568 0.473 0.095 * 0.429 0.322 0.107 * 0.317 0.233 0.084
411
1 to 40 393 0.697 0.652 0.045 0.551 0.456 0.095 * 0.426 0.291 0.135 *** 0.326 0.208 0.117 **
462
1 to 50 535 0.649 0.632 0.017 0.511 0.449 0.062 0.393 0.292 0.101 ** 0.284 0.210 0.073 *
505
Appendix Table 4.1b: Likelihood of Downward Mobility by Race
White Black White Black White Black White Black
91 to 100 123 0.851 1.000 -0.149 *** 0.672 0.798 -0.127 0.553 0.500 0.053 0.441 0.500 -0.059
10
81 to 100 249 0.764 0.956 -0.193 *** 0.607 0.865 -0.258 *** 0.507 0.435 0.072 0.395 0.356 0.039
20
71 to 100 378 0.721 0.632 0.089 0.580 0.539 0.041 0.468 0.349 0.120 0.351 0.220 0.131
43
61 to 100 510 0.657 0.658 0.000 0.527 0.548 -0.020 0.418 0.365 0.054 0.308 0.227 0.081
67
51 to 100 637 0.622 0.692 -0.070 0.503 0.558 -0.056 0.389 0.349 0.041 0.282 0.238 0.044
100
41 to 100 779 0.598 0.674 -0.076 0.482 0.523 -0.041 0.368 0.342 0.025 0.256 0.243 0.013
143





Likelihood of falling 
behind parents by at 
least 1 percentage point
Likelihood of falling 
behind parents by at 
least 10 percentage 
points
Likelihood of falling 
behind parents by at 
least 20 percentage 
points
Likelihood of falling 
behind parents by at 
least 30 percentage 
points






Likelihood of exceeding 
parents by at least 1 
percentage point
Likelihood of 
exceeding parents by 
at least 10 percentage 
points
Likelihood of 
exceeding parents by 
at least 20 percentage 
points
Likelihood of 
exceeding parents by 
at least 30 percentage 
points










Appendix Table 4.2a: Likelihood of Upward Mobility by Race--Adjusted by Family Size
White Black White Black White Black White Black
1 to 10 66 0.833 0.751 0.083 0.716 0.513 0.203 ** 0.506 0.379 0.127 0.457 0.270 0.187 *
203
1 to 20 153 0.775 0.657 0.118 ** 0.632 0.482 0.150 ** 0.452 0.338 0.113 * 0.340 0.261 0.079
349
1 to 30 262 0.731 0.654 0.078 0.592 0.490 0.103 * 0.452 0.357 0.095 * 0.348 0.256 0.092 *
408
1 to 40 387 0.706 0.636 0.069 0.572 0.475 0.097 * 0.437 0.341 0.096 * 0.330 0.239 0.091 *
456
1 to 50 528 0.667 0.615 0.052 0.538 0.457 0.081 * 0.419 0.330 0.089 * 0.307 0.228 0.080 *
500
Appendix Table 4.2b: Likelihood of Downward Mobility by Race
White Black White Black White Black White Black
91 to 100 124 0.834 1.000 -0.166 *** 0.655 0.581 0.075 0.535 0.255 0.280 * 0.377 0.255 0.122
7
81 to 100 244 0.765 0.958 -0.193 *** 0.604 0.870 -0.266 *** 0.491 0.792 -0.301 ** 0.350 0.370 -0.019
21
71 to 100 383 0.701 0.670 0.031 0.555 0.602 -0.047 0.433 0.454 -0.021 0.311 0.249 0.062
50
61 to 100 513 0.633 0.651 -0.018 0.506 0.575 -0.069 0.389 0.413 -0.024 0.266 0.187 0.079
72
51 to 100 644 0.604 0.709 -0.104 0.491 0.644 -0.153 * 0.366 0.462 -0.097 0.254 0.261 -0.007
105






Likelihood of falling 
behind parents by at 
least 1 percentage point
Likelihood of falling 
behind parents by at 
least 10 percentage 
points
Likelihood of falling 
behind parents by at 
least 20 percentage 
points
Likelihood of falling 
behind parents by at 
least 30 percentage 
points






Likelihood of exceeding 
parents by at least 1 
percentage point
Likelihood of 
exceeding parents by 
at least 10 percentage 
points
Likelihood of 
exceeding parents by 
at least 20 percentage 
points
Likelihood of 
exceeding parents by 
at least 30 percentage 
points










Appendix Table 4.3a: Likelihood of Upward Mobility by Race--Adjusted by Family Size
White Black White Black White Black White Black
1 to 10 65 0.870 0.723 0.147 ** 0.718 0.519 0.198 ** 0.525 0.292 0.233 ** 0.483 0.215 0.269 ***
210
1 to 20 158 0.752 0.667 0.085 0.600 0.475 0.125 * 0.402 0.295 0.106 * 0.322 0.235 0.087
350
1 to 30 272 0.732 0.679 0.053 0.585 0.497 0.088 0.426 0.299 0.127 ** 0.300 0.241 0.058
416
1 to 40 391 0.702 0.662 0.040 0.558 0.480 0.078 0.425 0.289 0.136 *** 0.313 0.218 0.095 **
467
1 to 50 528 0.665 0.626 0.039 0.528 0.459 0.069 0.398 0.283 0.115 ** 0.280 0.216 0.064
513
Appendix Table 4.3b: Likelihood of Downward Mobility by Race
White Black White Black White Black White Black
91 to 100 123 0.846 1.000 -0.154 *** 0.649 0.787 -0.137 0.541 0.472 0.070 0.482 0.472 0.010
9
81 to 100 250 0.768 0.956 -0.188 *** 0.598 0.864 -0.266 *** 0.492 0.429 0.063 0.408 0.349 0.059
19
71 to 100 378 0.723 0.632 0.090 0.571 0.548 0.024 0.450 0.350 0.099 0.345 0.214 0.131
42
61 to 100 514 0.660 0.623 0.038 0.521 0.515 0.006 0.409 0.325 0.084 0.306 0.171 0.135 **
64
51 to 100 644 0.635 0.633 0.002 0.497 0.539 -0.042 0.378 0.363 0.014 0.281 0.236 0.045
92
41 to 100 781 0.606 0.634 -0.028 0.478 0.513 -0.035 0.355 0.336 0.019 0.260 0.218 0.042
138




Likelihood of falling 
behind parents by at 
least 1 percentage point
Likelihood of falling 
behind parents by at 
least 10 percentage 
points
Likelihood of falling 
behind parents by at 
least 20 percentage 
points
Likelihood of falling 
behind parents by at 
least 30 percentage 
points







Likelihood of exceeding 
parents by at least 1 
percentage point
Likelihood of 
exceeding parents by 
at least 10 percentage 
points
Likelihood of 
exceeding parents by 
at least 20 percentage 
points
Likelihood of 
exceeding parents by 
at least 30 percentage 
points










Appendix Table 4.4: Decomposition of Wealth on Upward Mobility
White Predicted Upward Mobility
Black Predicted Upward Mobility
W-B Mobility Gap
Explained
% of W-B Mobility 
Gap Explained
% of W-B Mobility 
Gap Explained
% of W-B Mobility 
Gap Explained
% of W-B Mobility 
Gap Explained
Due to disparities in wealth levels -0.026 -13.2% 0.065* 33.0% 0.016 15.1% 0.070** 66.0%
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Due to differential returns to wealth 0.132* 67.0% 0.223*** 113.2% 0.036 34.0% 0.090 84.9%
(0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.09)
Due to interaction 0.091* 46.2% -0.091* -46.2% 0.054 50.9% -0.054 -50.9%
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
White Predicted Upward Mobility
Black Predicted Upward Mobility
W-B Mobility Gap
Explained
% of W-B Mobility 
Gap Explained
% of W-B Mobility 
Gap Explained
% of W-B Mobility 
Gap Explained
% of W-B Mobility 
Gap Explained
Due to disparities in wealth levels 0.005 2.5% 0.139** 70.6% 0.028 26.4% 0.211*** 199.1%
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07)
Due to differential returns to wealth 0.057 28.9% 0.192*** 97.5% -0.105 -99.1% 0.078 73.6%
(0.08) (0.06) (0.08) (0.09)
Due to interaction 0.135* 68.5% -0.135* -68.5% 0.183** 172.6% -0.183** -172.6%




Using White Wealth to Explain Black 
Mobility
Using Black Wealth to Explain White 
Mobility
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
Fundamentally, an investigation into intergenerational mobility is an examination of 
equality of opportunity in a society. An accurate measure of intergenerational mobility is 
essential for policymakers concerned with redistribution and inequality. A major tension in the 
current intergenerational mobility literature is the tradeoff between a larger, more representative 
sample and avoiding potentially confounding issues such as selection bias, family structure and 
incarceration. Narrow definitions of families will reduce the potential confounding issues, but 
reduce representativeness of the sample and also reduce statistical power for making inferences. 
When dealing with intergenerational mobility, previous studies have often very narrowly defined 
their samples to only examine intact, two-parent families and restricted earnings measurement to 
years of full-time employment. While these decisions may not cause bias for overall estimates of 
mobility or white-only estimates, they have serious implications for estimating intergenerational 
economic persistence for black families, primarily as they are restricting the estimation of ―black 
mobility‖ to only examine a sub-population of black families—those in two-parent households, 
those with employed fathers, and those who are employed full-time as adults. Conceptually, the 
most appropriate measure of intergenerational mobility or persistence is the comparison of 
parental family income to child family income, as it is less likely to be biased by selection into 
employment and restricted to particular family structures. 
This dissertation has explored various forms of bias and error that researchers may 
encounter when estimating intergenerational mobility by race. Specific attention has been paid to 
forms of bias that primarily affect estimations of intergenerational mobility for black families 









gaps (Chapters 2-3). Beyond methodological concerns this dissertation has provided new 
evidence on the heterogeneous role of wealth in influencing mobility by race (Chapter 4).  
In Chapter 2, I used the PSID to examine the impact of restricting earnings information to 
years when individuals are employed full-time. This restriction is typically made to reduce the 
transitory error in intergenerational analyses, under the assumption that most men work full-time 
throughout their prime-age years and therefore any earnings observed in a year when this 
individual did not work full-time are censored and therefore bias the estimation of permanent 
earnings. I found that this assumption of exogenous selection into full-time employment 
significantly biases the intergenerational elasticity estimates for blacks, although it does not have 
a large impact on estimates for whites. As a consequence, this assumption will result in selection 
bias, which will understate the magnitude of the black-white mobility gap. I found that two 
methods substantially mitigate this selection bias: having a long panel, or imputing data in a 
short panel. 
In Chapter 3, I expanded the analysis from Chapter 2 to incorporate the more inclusive 
economic outcome of family income (instead of father-son earnings) and examine the sensitivity 
of these results to the exclusion of incarcerated and female-headed households. I used both the 
PSID and NLSY to compare estimates of mobility using three methodologies: elasticities, 
correlations and directional rank mobility matrices. While I found that relying on different 
datasets or measures of economic resources will lead to different conclusions about the relative 
magnitudes of black versus white elasticities and correlations, using directional mobility matrices 
consistently revealed a sizable mobility gap between black and white families, with low-income 
black families disproportionately trapped at the bottom of the income (or earnings) distribution. 









than similar white children. I found the family income analyses to be most consistent across 
dataset and sample construction and estimated the upward mobility gap as between 19.0 and 22.4 
percentage points and the downward gap between -17.5 and -20.5. 
In Chapter 4, I examined the role of parental wealth as an explanatory factor in the black-
white mobility gap utilizing the PSID. I found that total parental wealth promotes upward 
mobility for low-income white families, but does not protect against downward mobility for 
white families from the top half of the income distribution. Conversely, I find that total parental 
wealth does not assist low-income black families while home ownership may have negative 
associations with the likelihood of upward mobility for these families. However, for black 
families from the top half of the income distribution home equity is protective against downward 
mobility suggesting a heterogeneous relationship between home ownership and mobility among 
black families. In a decomposition analysis, I found that most of the black-white upward 
mobility gap was attributable to differential returns to wealth as opposed to differences in wealth 
levels between the two groups. 
Chapter 4 has direct implications for policymakers and social work practitioners. While 
home ownership may provide a path out of poverty for low-income white families, it may 
actually have negative consequences for black families due to low home value appreciation rates. 
Promoting home ownership over other asset accumulation, such as through the Assets for 
Independence program, could result in a promulgation of inequality across generations. As a 
result, social work practitioners may want to reconsider asset-accumulation efforts focused 
primarily on home ownership and instead explore promotion of other assets such as savings or 
stocks, which are more consistently beneficial to low-income families. Of course, additional 









research should also explore the reasons underlying the differential rates of return to 
homeownership by race and explore potential policy remedies. 
While caution should be given to point estimate comparisons of results across chapters as 
the parent and child cohorts differ, the comparably-estimated relationships were fairly similar 
across chapters. Parental income was measured in 1968-82 in Chapter 2, 1979-81 in Chapter 3 
and 1984-89 in Chapter 4, while child income was measured in 1997-2009 in each chapter. 
While black-white wage disparities have changed considerably from the mid-1960s to present 
day (Couch and Daly 2002), comparisons of median family income show very little change in 
relative positions, with median black family income only increasing from 59% to 62% of median 
white family income between 1967-2007 (Mishel, Bernstein and Shierholz 2009). This 
dissertation provides preliminary suggestive evidence that the nature of intergenerational 
relationships has also not changed dramatically, even across differing parental cohorts. Future 
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